The Lincoln Plawg - the blog with footnotes

Politics and law from a British perspective (hence Politics LAW BloG): ''People who like this sort of thing...'' as the Great Man said

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Monday, March 31, 2003
 

Meanwhile in Turkey...


You turn your back for five minutes and - find the Turks have stepped back from the brink.

When we left the story last Wednesday (March 26), it was with Richard Boucher and his free will gift of $1bn for the Turks.

By a spooky coincidence, on that self-same Wednesday, it seems, friend of the blog Gen Hilmi Ozkok, made a statement pledging
to coordinate with the United States before sending troops into northern Iraq and [saying] there would be no deployment unless a refugee crisis erupted or Turkey's security was threatened.

Why this dramatic change in Turkish government policy should be made by the head of the military rather than - to pick a name at random - Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, added to the 'mystery' of the timing of the statement, inspire less than total confidence in the present government - or system of government [1].

Ozkok showed a decent bad grace about the US strongarm stuff:
I find it hard to understand that those beyond the oceans, who say they are threatened, do not believe Turkey when it says it faces the same threat from right across its border.

Bearing in mind the translation loss, that is a pretty damned fine zinger from a brass hat.

Oktay Eksi, a columnist from Hurriyet had a piece on March 27 abridged into English thus:
We agreed with Ozkok's observations and evaluations to a great extent but his words sometimes contained certain political opinions, a habit which soldiers should generally steer clear of.

I'm rather afraid that Mr Eksi's comments may have been noted for future, post-coup reference!

A scan of the Google News results on the (highly searchable) Ozkok shows (apart from the deluge of duplicate agency pieces) not much editorial from the senior rags in the US or UK. Nothing in the Post, that I could see (the NY Times search engine is down - but the rag doesn't appear in the Google listing that I could see).

Not that I'm looking for an excuse for not having picked up Ozkok's volte-face sooner; it just makes one wonder whether
  • the anglophone news agenda is warped; or

  • there's less to the statement than meets the eye.

Much as I'm loathe to infer sophisticated thinking from the actions of our media, I wonder whether the second possibility isn't right; whether this isn't rather more truce than capitulation on the Turkish side.

Even (no, particularly) a stand-by military dictator needs legitimacy for his actions. Ozkok has seen what trouble the US have made for themselves by their bone-headed diplomacy and bully-boy tactics in failing to get the vital fig-leaf of a second UN resolution. (I suspect he views Blair's position - the sanctimonious sidekick with the chalk-line already drawn around him - with particular relish.)

He needs a pretext to invade - and who more likely to give him one than the Kurds? Who, more likely than not, will be fighting each other within a few months of celebrating victory over Saddam. And (a little insurance here) for Turcoman, read Sudetendeutsche [2].

Besides, Ozkok needs to manage USG - Turkey's position in NATO tends to buttress the military's standing in Turkish politics; and playing Mutt to Erdogan's Jeff [3] has a piquancy that, one suspects, a man of his evident sense of humour would relish.

And, when it comes to the coup, it's essential that it's the AKP who come off as the bad guys, screwing up the economy and relations with the US and whatever, and the military are seen as stepping in more in sorrow than in anger. A little bending to the wind right now costs Ozkok little, and shows the military as the reasonable party on the Turkish side.

That's the theory, at least...

From the civilian side of the government, there's a long, jumbled and dreadfully translated [4] piece on an interview Erdogan gave on March 28. If I understand it right, he's saying that the $1bn in aid has been in the air since the March 1 rejection of the US deployment authorisation resolution.

And more generally on Iraq, he's supposed to have said the
Presidency, General Staff and the government were carrying on studies to put forth a single and coordinated view.

Shouldn't they have done those studies before Ozkok made his big speech?

  1. It also followed the establishment of the Military Coordination and Liaison Command in Northern Iraq - the WaPo piece datelined March 25.

  2. In the very narrow sense of their being a handily placed ethnic group whose woes (actual or fictitious) stand ready to provide a pretext for military action.

  3. Or is the other way round?

  4. Don't they have access to English mother-tongue speakers to at least polish the work? The iron rule of translation is: except in emergencies, use a mother-tongue speaker of the target language.


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Could UK forces breach land mines treaty by working with US colleagues?


Not an original point, but one I was reminded of by a radio discussion on the Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation (as the joke used to go) earlier today.

The UK has signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel land mines, the US has done neither.

What, therefore, of the situation of UK forces operating with their US brothers-in-arms?

Now, so far as I can see, there's a currently an effective system of military Jim Crow in operation, the British taking the low road to Basra, whilst Uncle Sam's boys head north. On the other hand, the war's less than two weeks' old - who knows what military exigencies will force a commingling of nationalities?

The Ottawa text is (as treaties go) fairly clear: Article 1(1) says that
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:

a) To use anti-personnel mines;

b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.


Most of the rest of the treaty deals with destruction of existing stocks and administrative and procedural matters.

The activists speaking on the radio seemed quite convinced that joint operations could be - I give in - a minefield for UK forces. I'm not so sure.

I reckon that, in order for the UK to contravene the Treaty, its forces need to do something more than merely use an existing US minefield laid by US personnel off their own bat. Even a UK commander in such a joint op inviting his US opposite number to consider the use of landmines might not constitute a breach.

Now, if I were a UK commander, operating with US forces or on my own, I reckon I'd be more than happy if a US unit happened along and laid a minefield just in the right place to protect my boys. And, if things get really rough, one foresees that the landmine, rather jesuitically singled-out for opprobrium by Saint Tony and his chums, may well become a popular item of 'trade' between US and UK forces.

But - well, mark the Convention down as a stick with which to beat the aforementioned Crusader if and when the facts allow.


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Iraqi oil bonanza? I'm having trouble with the numbers


Just how great a deal is available in the short term?

Some ballpark numbers (just to get orders of magnitude - these obviously aren't exact production figures or spot prices!): world consumption is something a bit under 80 million barrels per day. Taking 80mbpd, at $30/barrel, that's a gross revenue of $2.4bn/day or nearly $900bn/year.

Iraq in the year or two before the war started was producing roughly 2.5mbpd (at $30pb, a gross revenue of a bit under $30bn/year).

My first problem with the numbers: this CFR study (PDF) says (p28) that if
no facilities were damaged, Iraq's total oil revenues would still only likely average around $10 billion to $12 billion annually.
I can't get anywhere near that number using the basic information of 2.5mbpd production and a $30pb price.

The report suggests (p25) that
Iraq's current sustainable oil production capacity is no higher than 2.6 to 2.8 million bpd and could slip further if hostilities result in a sudden or prolonged cessation of oil production....it will take Iraq between eighteen months and three years to return to its pre-1990 production level of 3.5 million bpd. It will cost an estimated $5 billion to repair and restore previously used facilities, in addition to an estimated $3 billion in annual operating expenses.

Just pause there: let's use my basis of estimating gross revenues; and let's assume that this is right that the production cost of Iraqi crude is about $2pb; currently, assuming production at the middle of the CFR range (2.7mbpd), that gives a net production revenue of $27.6bn/year [1]; an investment of $5bn to bring production up to 3.5mbpd would yield an increase in net production revenue (on the same basis ) of $5.8bn [2].

Now, even taking account of the suggested delays before the oil (and cash) starts flowing, that doesn't seem too bad a deal on the face of it. But I'd like to see a lot more analysis of the numbers than my back-on-the-envelope sums before starting to decide quite what the short-term prospects for Iraqi oil are. (Not to mention a final tally of war damage.) And I'm somewhat concerned that my numbers for current revenue (based on the simple sum of production multiplied by market price) seem to differ from the CFR estimates by a factor of 3!

In longer term, of course, things should be rosy - Iraq has oil (p25) and gas (p32) reserves out the wazoo. But the number of risk factors (including, of course, USG's GWACS plans for a Middle East of US economic satrapies) would seem to make the day when those assets can be realised in significant quantity an even more far-off prospect than the oil industry generally offers!

Of course, at the level of the individual with sticky fingers, a cash flow of even $10bn a year leaves ample scope for substantial rake-offs. But at the level of either investor companies, or of the US protectorate we assume will be responsible for post-war Iraqi affairs, or the Iraqi people themselves, I'd need some persuading that an oil bonanza is on the horizon [3].

This New Republic piece from January 9 2003 (which draws - in an unhelpfully confused fashion! - on the CFR study) suggests that hiking Iraqi oil production is a USG ploy to cripple OPEC and destabilise the Middle East in general, and the hated Saudis in particular.

If true, what I've seen does not suggest that the equipment will accommodate their wish anytime soon; not within Rummy's planning horizon, at least.

  1. (30-2) x 2.7m x 365.

  2. (30 x (3.5m-2.7m) x 365) - 3bn - if the suggested $3bn annual expenses number does not include the $2pb production cost I've factored in, that reduces the increase in net revenue from $5.8bn to $5.2bn - still not a bad return, though.

  3. Of course, oil companies may be happy to invest in Iraq without immediate hope of great returns just to get their foot in the door for a chance at a slice of those reserves in 10, 20 or 30 years time. But that's not the same deal as a short-term slash-and-burn operation to extract cash now.
UPDATE
Further details on the pre-war Iraqi industry, reserves, investors, and the like in this RIIA paper (PDF) from December 2002.


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Sunday, March 30, 2003
 

Some thoughts on US strategy: (2) Civilian casualties


Relative to the amount of ordnance that's been flying about, the level of civilian casualties seems to date to be pretty low [1].

But the new strategy, according to this WaPo piece from today, may involve taking more risks.

A retired colonel is quoted as saying that
No country and no military force in recorded history has ever attempted to simultaneously fight and win a war, preserve the resources and infrastructure of the country, reduce noncombatant deaths to the absolute minimum within their capability and conduct a major humanitarian effort

During his March 28 press conference, Rumsfeld said
We do not need to kill thousands of innocent Iraqis to remove Saddam Hussein from power. At least that's our belief.
A study of Rummy's tone of voice and body language would clearly be essential to interpreting this!

The Post says that
Other officials in Washington were discussing reinterpreting the rules of engagement to place less emphasis on minimizing civilian casualties and more on destroying the enemy, even if Iraqi tanks and other heavy weapons are interspersed with civilians.

And, when it comes to a siege, they're clearly not ruling much out:
"We're not going to catapult diseased cattle into the city or anything like that," said one planner. "But there's a question of what you can do and what you should do."
The But there speaks volumes - I suspect the guy had a Rummy smile on his lips when he mentioned the cattle. If it ever came to poisoning the plebs, they'd be a whole lot subtler about it!

The same is quoted as citing
...the example of knocking out electrical power, which the military can do. But, he added, "Do you want to see pictures on CNN of the baby who died because power to the incubator was cut off?"

You get the feeling that the guy was looking right into the hack's eyes, making him a one-man focus group for the latest idea they were kicking around in the office! I mean to say, one baby [2]... Incubators are particularly sensitive, of course, after the Hill & Knowlton scam from 1990/1 involving the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador!

Of course, one shouldn't rule out the possibility that the slow progress in winning the war (contrasted with the speed of covering the ground) has been a deliberate ploy on the part of (some sections of) the US military: to demonstrate that the omelette can't be made without breaking a few eggs. To rachet down the expectations of some in USG of a quick, easy, politically pain-free war. They're saying, We tried it the Errol Flynn way - and Olivia de Havilland's still in Nottingham Castle. Now we do it the Army way.

This piece from the San Jose Mercury of March 27 on the subject mentions a piece (PDF) by Michael O'Hanlon from last year suggesting (p10) that a full-scale fight with the RG and SRG might yield 10,000 military and 10,000 civilian deaths [3]. They're suspiciously round numbers - and no workings shown; and he says they're
not predictions but a sober reminders of what can happen.

But, clearly, civilian deaths of anything like this level would imply a vastly difficult exercise for USG in managing upwards casualty expectations all round the world which USG have deliberately tried to keep at rock-bottom as it struggles with the problem of the dubious legitimacy of the war as a whole.

No doubt the WaPo piece is part of that management exercise.

[There's a quote in the piece that deserves noting for future reference:
One Army general in Iraq drew an analogy to the Union's initial "on to Richmond" strategy in the Civil War, which evolved into a strategy of "kill the enemy army first." The Civil War lasted four years -- during which President Abraham Lincoln searched among his commanders for one who would take the fight to the enemy.

The unnamed general was either politically naive to a degree or deliberately putting a spoke in the politico-military wheel: I'm no Civil War buff. But I've watched the Ken Burns series a few times on tape, and I'm pretty damned sure that one fundamental matter arising was the utter incompetence of virtually every general put in charge of the Union's key fighting force, viz, the Army of the Potomac.

Perhaps he thought Bush would be flattered by the comparison with Lincoln. Less flattering (both to Bush and the men concerned) is the implication that Bush is trying to win a difficult war with senior officers comparable to the deadbeats and no-hopers that Lincoln struggled for long and bloody years to inculcate with the need which even a country lawyer could appreciate - to destroy Lee's army wherever it might be.

On the other hand, Lt Gen William S Wallace wasn't exactly being politic with his crack about
The enemy we're fighting against is different from the one we'd wargamed against.

Surely, there's not a pattern emerging here?]

  1. This site is apparently keeping count.

  2. It's the sort of reverse of the scene in The Third Man - probably the greatest movie ever on America's view of itself (and others' views of America), vitriolically anti-American (and anti-Everyone Else!) (and one of the laugh-out-loud funniest pics you'll ever see) - where Trevor Howard takes Joseph Cotten round the hospital ward full of kids afflicted with the sequelae of Harry Lime's duff penicillin (sez Howard). That scene combined with the Prater Wheel scene with Orson Welles:
    If I offered you 20,000 pounds for every dot that stopped moving, would you really, old man, tell me to keep my money?...Free of income tax, old man.

  3. Again, the possibility of guerilla warfare is not contemplated.


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Some thoughts on the change in US strategy: (1) Decapitation


The idea of me commenting on strategy in the way a teacher grades an assignment is so laughable I'll assume no one even gives a thought to the possibility that that's what's going on.

As ever, it's just kibbitzing, pulling on what look like loose threads to see if anything interesting comes out.

This WaPo piece on the strategy from March 21 you wouldn't exactly call gung-ho. It recalls failures (ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II was an attempt I'd never heard of!) as well as successes (eg Noriega); it has ex CIA head James Woolsey- the guy responsible for the hunt for Aidid in Somalia - being circumlocutorily downbeat about the possibilities of a successful assassination attempt on Saddam.

However, what the article does seem to assume is that killing Saddam would bring the regime, and opposition to a US-imposed settlement of the Iraq question, to a grinding halt. That all that is holding back the (to date mythical) rebellion in Basra from rising to the level of reality is fear of retribution on orders issuing from the top. That the command structure of the military - in particular the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard is built with Saddam as a keystone - knock that away, and the entire edifice crumbles.

The more I read (which, to date, is nowhere near enough to form a conclusion), the less sure I am of that assumption. Two key factors in the mix are motivation and organisation.

As to motivation, hatred of Saddam (which I'm prepared, for the sake of argument, to grant is widespread to almost universal) does not equate to love of Uncle Sam. That old nationalist impulse that the US failed to see as the driving force behind Ho Chi Minh [1] is likely to be as strong in the ordinary Iraqi. Going back no further than World War 1, there was the revolt in 1920 against the British mandate (under the League of Nations) [2]. It's unlikely that rule by the Great Satan would be more warmly welcomed.

As to organisation, I've mentioned before the tribes of Iraq. Not only do these apparently have large forces - whose number and fighting quality is open to doubt - but they are, according to their own statements, actively contemplating an autonomous role in the conflict. In fact, one wonders whether some tribes - estranged from positions of influence under Saddam - might not actually welcome his elimination as a chance to take up the fight against the Infidel, and win themselves legitimacy for having so done.

To date, we've seen highlighted the role of irregulars in harassing the notorious long US supply-line from the Baghdad region down to the Kuwaiti border; and the use of suicide bombers, of course. But it seems to me that the key role for the tribes may be that of denying the US a chance to declare victory; beyond the cost in the losses of men and matériel that a guerilla campaign might cause, it's the potential political cost to Bush of not being able to draw a line under the conflict, of the Vietnam spectre haunting his campaign [3]. And don't forget what the Iran hostages did for poor old Jimmy Carter - with the day-counter over the shoulder of every news anchor in the country!

The old Mao Tse Tung crack about the guerillas being the fish swimming in the sea of the peasantry seems, on the face of it, pretty apt for Iraq; and - unlike in Afghanistan (or South Vietnam) - there's no force of local guys on our side who can take the brunt, do the rough stuff, take the pressure off the US+ men. The Iraqis that Uncle Sam are associated with are mostly worse than Ngo Dinh Diem [4] - they're a bunch of Emperor Bao Dais! They have zero legitimacy, political or military - except for the Kurds and the Iranian-backed Shi'ites in SCIRI [5]! (With friends like those...)

When it comes to decapitation, one could do worse than think Hydra...

  1. That doesn't mean he wasn't a convinced Communist - the alternative Vietnamese fallacy. So far as I can see, his desire was sole control of Vietnam; Communism was the only remaining political system to offer that chance; so he embraced Communism. It was a means to an end, but he was in no way shamming. (That's my hypothesis, at any rate.)

  2. Costly though it was to the British, it only succeeded in getting a quasi-puppet king, Faisal, placed in nominal charge. But the nationalist expression was genuine enough. (The piece linked throws doubt on the supposed secular decline of the tribes' power up till Saddam's time:
    As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monarchy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British cultivated the tribal shaykhs, whose power had been waning since the end of the nineteenth century.)
  3. It's 43 weeks to the New Hampshire Primary on January 27 2004!

  4. Sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem in Homer Bigart's line - the only son-of-a-bitch we got according to Lyndon Johnson, returning from his visit to SVN in 1961.

  5. Whose Badr forces Rumsfeld warned off in his press conference on March 28 - of which more later.


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The racial element in underestimating the enemy - the Japanese example


Further enlightenment from the book by John Dower I mentioned in my piece yesterday .

Having read the first 150 pages or so, it's a book I can thoroughly recommend: in particular for evidencing the fact that the War in the Pacific was essentially a race war, fought (generally) with no quarter given on either side, and marked reluctance to take prisoners, and a vigorous use of derogatory imagery in both the US and Japan. Talk of the Good War and the Best Generation should be taken, evidently, with more than a pinch of salt [1].

The point, for my purposes, is that it highlights the direly smug and complacent attitudes of the British military tasked with defending Singapore.

Not an area I've ever looked at in any detail; but the Cliff Notes version goes something like this: once upon a time, when Queen Victoria became Empress of India (1877), there were no external threats to the eastern portion of the British Empire. Then, Japan rose as a maritime power, defeating first China (1894-5) and then Russia (1904-5), essentially in sea battles. This was a clear threat to the Empire; but was dealt with by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (treaties of 1902 and 1905).

Following World War 1, a resurgent US wished to gain security in its back yard - and the 1922 Washington Conference established a regime of naval limitations to contain Japanese naval strength and a Nine Power Treaty designed to regulate the affairs of Uncle Sam's Darling, China [2].

In that system, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had no place; and the US prevailed on the British to ditch it [3].

The Washington naval regime proved to be a crock; in the absence of its UK alliance [4], the military rose to power in Japan, and everyone on both sides must have known that the Empire east of Calcutta was effectively at the mercy of the Japanese. In the sense that it was always like the US-Canadian border: effectively undefended and undefendable.

Britain had nearly two decades to prepare to kiss its eastern empire goodbye: against a background of economic depression and reluctance to rearm, it only completed works to fortify Singapore in 1938 [5].

Yet, it seems, its mental preparation of its commanders was even more behindhand. Starting on p99 of the Dower are some pretty cringemaking quotes: as from Gen Sir Robert Brooke-Popham (CiC Far East), who apparently observed Jap troops in China from across the border in Hong Kong:
If these represent the average of the Japanese army...I cannot believe they would form an intelligent fighting force.

At the same time, he received a message from the British Chiefs of Staff saying that the Japanese
should not be over-estimated.

There's plenty more in the same vein.

Why this impression should have survived the evidence of nearly five decades of Japanese military activity (on and off) is indeed a puzzle.

It can't be based on any simple notion that the Asiatic soldier was militarily ineffective, given the regular use made of Indian troops, not only on the Subcontinent but (in World War 1) in the war against the Ottoman Turks and on the Western Front. Indeed, the recruiting of sepoys was limited to certain populations - the so called martial races (Sikhs, Gurkhas and so on) - within the Subcontinent, identified as having particular characteristics of temperament which suited them to soldiering.

In fact, the suggestion is that the Japanese had been rated as being the opposite of a martial race, on psycho-sociological grounds. The book quotes an American, Fletcher Pratt (!) from 1939, giving four theories why the Japanese made bad pilots (p102): defects of the inner ear, Bushido teaching that life is worthless, they work only in teams, and they got fewer mechanical toys to play with as kids!

The book goes on to look at how Western popular theories on the Japanese evolved during the course of the war - the oscillations between the Jap soldier as subhuman and superhuman. The one thing that actual evidence of his fighting abilities failed to provide was anything like a fact-based appreciation of those abilities. The more evidence that came in, the wilder the fantasies became.

More to come on this, I suspect.

  1. This review (picked more or less randomly) of Saving Private Ryan hits at the false sentimentality which gets into some modern portrayals of WW2.

  2. Got from this, apparently interesting, listing.

  3. What looks like an interesting piece on the matter from a Japanese perspective here.

  4. Beware post hoc, propter hoc here, of course.

  5. The indispensable guide to British perceptions of their pre-war strategic situation is Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom by members of the RIIA (the senior UK foreign affairs think-tank) and published in March 1939. As an aficionado of the secondhand bookshop, I'd rate the book as very rare. One to pick up whatever the condition.

    It's an extraordinarily hard read - but it has not only some good facts, but also (impossible to reproduce now) the perspective of pre-war untainted by hindsight. (The Singapore reference is on p213.)



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Saturday, March 29, 2003
 

Olive-branch offered in that other war of Uncle Sam's


A certain sector of warbloggerdom will be appalled - that sector for which only Randy Newman has a sufficiently radical foreign policy [1] - but Madison, WI, has offered an olive branch [2] to the cheese-eating surrender monkeys (aka weasels).

Now, I'm struggling to find any historical perspective here: Wisconsin was insurgent and Progressive (under the LaFollette family), but isolationist on account of the German element [3] (went to Dewey in 1944); but I'm not clear how far Madison was then (or is now) representative of the state as a whole in its political beliefs. In any case, I doubt that foreign policy towards France in particular (as contrasted with the European opposition as a whole to Nazi Germany - what there was of it) ever had any resonance in the state's politics.

I'm sure all that's ancient history by now. In fact, I wonder if you could even find a genuine German county in the state, after so much opportunity for population movement and inter-ethnic marriages.

In the absence (I'm supposing) of sharply defined ethnic divides, does Wisconsin give good politics these days? After a run of five decades and more of political stardom, perhaps its citizens are happy with anonymity in its leading pols these days. Feingold and Kohl, the rest of the Congressional delegation - Jim Doyle? Of these, only Feingold even gets as far as ringing a bell. (Perhaps getting in the pork while drawing minimum attention to oneself is what a state should look for in a pol...)

  1. It's willing to suspend the Boom goes London part so long as Saint Tony keeps writing Bush those blank cheques on the Blair Bank of Credibility (what price an It's A Wonderful Life rerun there? And, Tony, do us all a favour and jump!)

  2. Olive leaf (Gen 8:11), actually. I'm only saying...

  3. And the Irish element? As represented from 1947 by Sen Joseph McCarthy, of course.


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US assumptions about Iraqi fighting strengths - a racial element?


This is very much in the realm of the hypothetical - but, I think, worth a little attempt at exploration.

One big difference between the US and UK (from, let's say, 1789) was their experience in dealing with non-European enemies.

Whilst in some parts of the Empire (Australia, for instance) resistance to British territorial advances proved on the whole pretty feeble, in many areas the natives gave nothing away. The illusion that men of duskier hue were inferior as fighters to the British Tommy was never one seriously entertained by those directly concerned. Disasters such as the First Afghan War (1839-42) and the Siege of Khartoum (1884) in which General Gordon famously perished were ever-present reminders, even at the height of imperial power, that the native was not to be underestimated [1].

Whereas, pretty much, the first solid military resistance faced by US forces from the less than lily-white was in World War 2. A war which, in the Pacific (quite unlike that waged in Europe), was an out-and-out race war on both sides. Ever since (and perhaps before) Chinese coolies were brought in to work on the Central Pacific Railroad, the Yellow Peril had been a more or less virulent companion in the West of the US to what passed for race relations down South. And Pearl Harbor didn't exactly help [2]. The internments, the propaganda posters - the clear message from USG to its people was these apes were at least a genus apart from Uncle Sam's boys.

And then there was Korea - where the performance of the gooks was variable; and Vietnam (where the gooks on the other side seemed, perhaps, rather better fighters on the average that ours). But, all the while, the innate inferiority of the little brown brother seems to have been more or less accepted subconsciously. And, in the 1991 war, the Iraqis didn't exactly break the mould.

All of this is pretty sketchy - most hypotheses are, I fear. But there at least seems to be a case worth proper investigation that the US is not culturally attuned to accepting evidence that non-white forces have either the technical capability or strength of will to resist US forces.

What might the elements be? Unalloyed feelings of white superiority may have something to do with it. More, perhaps, the idea of an American race superior to its decadent and decrepit European forefathers which I discussed (in the context of Frog-bashing) on January 29. Also, perhaps, an unwillingness to engage intellectually with the non-white world.

By contrast, in the century or so following the initial irruption of the British onto the Indian scene (via Robert Clive), a great deal of effort was put by European scholars into researching the language, literature and history of the Subcontinent. Intermarriage was not uncommon. Racial feeling was nowhere near as virulent as contemporary caste feeling amongst Hindus; or, one suspects, between Hindu and Moslem (at particular times and places, at least). What killed it? The arrival in strength of European women!

Whereas the Know Nothing clowning of the US in and around Indo-China in the immediate post-war era - the activities of Archimedes Patti, General Chennault giving Ho Chi Minh a signed portrait - almost seemed to invite the attention of the fickle finger of fate. And would have got it in 1954 had it not been for Anthony Eden removing Eisenhower's tackle from the Dien Bien Phu blender just before Giap switched it on.

The complication of colour on the US side can't be ignored. The unwillingness to recruit Negro troops for combat duties in the Union armies seems to us mighty strange. Stroking the border states was initially politic, no doubt; and, rightly, Lincoln went deep into the conflict (going the extra thousand miles) before finally giving up hope of some kind of settlement with the Confederacy - and use of Negro troops in the Union army would not exactly have helped negotiations along!

But part of the reason, I suspect [3], was the fear that they would not fight as well as their white comrades-in-arms [4], and would let them down when push came to shove.

Following the great reconciliation of 1877, there was no longer any call to ruffle Southern sensibilities on the Negro question - the more so since a disproportionate number of army facilities seem to have been located in Jim Crow territory. And, despite Truman's big civil rights push in Executive Order 9981 (1948) to desegregate the US armed forces - actually, it looks to me like pie-in-the-sky plus a committee - they were still, it appears, not even completely desegregated by the end of the Korean War in 1953!

Given the extraordinary way current US political life fetishises race - as in the system of affirmative action shortly to come under the scrutiny of SCOTUS in the University of Michigan cases (Grutter and Gratz - this blog passim) - it seems bizarre that attitudes of racial superiority should still infect US military thinking. The more so given the fact that the US military - so far as I'm aware - is itself disproportionately composed these days of the less than lily-white.

But that's what I'm hypothesising. The entire US military may recently have been under the command of a man with brown skin (who's now doing such a great job on the diplomatic front. Not); but, beneath several yards thickness of equal-opportunity boilerplate, its attitudes, I'm positing, continue to reek of magnolia.

  1. The defeat at Isandhlwana in 1879 by the Zulus (barely redeemed by the successful Alamo of Rorke's Drift) was followed, in a curiously multiracial one-two, by a hideous campaign in the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-81.

  2. I've a book, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War by John Dower (1986), which deals with the issue. (One of the many I've skimmed without reading - but it looks promising.)

  3. This is a site which looks interesting on the employment of Negro troops by Union and Confederacy.

  4. Mentioned here.


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Iraq: US takes care of business - as it were....


The business of America is business - as one great Republican once said; and, before any key military objectives have been achieved (so far as this, most unmilitary, mind can see) the contracts have started to be let.

Now, bearing in mind that 10% of bugger-all is not exactly worth wetting one's pants for, the action to date has, so far as I can tell, been symbolic. Stevedoring Services of America (a name so Man from UNCLE-phoney that it might actually be genuine) has been granted a contract to run Umm Qasr port.

Several points arise. First, the area was liberated by UK forces; the contract was let by USAID - under what authority? What agreement has HMG made with USG covering commercial operations in its area of control? Surely - and here I fear the answer is yes - it hasn't just opened its legs, lain back and - well, thought of England?

Second, the choice of SSA is rather like getting Bull Connor to organise policing for the Million Man March; company policy, it seems, would be to have them by the balls and not give a flying one about their hearts and minds. As, for instance, in Chittagong Harbour.

Third, the UK was rather keen on the management of Umm Qasr being given back to the Iraqis - since this seems to be the only area of Iraq comprehensively under US+ control, and given Blair's sensitivities about being seen to be the Angel of Peace, and not another Robert Clive (as if!). Bush doesn't care - whether it's screwing British companies or screwing with Blair's relations with the hand of history, he's not interested. He has the measure of Blair: hessian. (The doormat fabric, rather than the military sort, of course....)

On the one hand, I want to know, who are SSA? What contributions have they made (in the myriad of different ways available) to further the interests (direct and indirect) of the Republican Party in general, and George W Bush in particular?

On the other hand, I say - what's the point? How much rake-off for George and boys from a contract with a gross value of less than $5m?

The point, I think, is to establish a pattern of conduct. SSA's expression of gratitude (whatever form that takes) may only be a few grand. For all I know, SSA may even be taking the Umm Qasr deal as a loss-leader, as an actual contribution in itself to grub itself some USG work back in the US. (We need, in trying to attack USG machinations, to be as flexible in our thinking as they seem not to be when it comes to military matters.)

The USAID program (I can't find it on their site) apparently mentions a figure of around $1bn for the reconstruction of Iraq. More scope for rake-offs - but scarcely Eldorado.

Of course, to ensure maximum rake-off potential, only US firms are invited to tender. Which makes Tony Blair come off all kinds of sucker. But then, from the UNSC farce, I think we all knew George (or one of his brighter boys) saw Blair coming a mile off. Good to see Phineas T Barnum still the touchstone of America.

The real bunce will come with oil. Oil is fungible, the costs of production (unlike poor old SSA, with those ghastly natives to manage!) will, I suspect, be minimal, and Iraq has got the world's second largest reserves. Come to Poppa! And, when it comes to oil, the rake-off playbook is, I'm sure, a well-thumbed tome on George's bookshelf.

And what with Brown and Root (Lyndon Johnson's great backer) getting stuck into Iraq - it's quite like old Texan times (alarming news, though, for Cheney's Halliburton, B&R's owners - according to Reuters they're out of the running for a big chunk of Iraq reconstruction money. How did that happen? Is it a case of reculer, pour mieux sauter? Or, in this case, forgoing a good contract to set up the PR climate for receiving a better one?)

Obviously, much more on this to come.


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Friday, March 28, 2003
 

Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt: a Ripley's connection


As loyal readers will be aware, I have a certain yen for the more obscure detail of American political history. And, whilst my associated war blog is temporarily off the air, thoughts naturally turn to frivolous political coincidence.

The connection I have in mind? Both Wilson and FDR, as insurgents, thwarted the ambitions of a machine politician for a seat in the US Senate (in the years shortly before the 17th Amendment came into force).

In Wilson's case, it was ex-Senator James Smith Jr [1]; Smith, boss (in a way I'm not clear about) of New Jersey under a grave misapprehension as to Wilson's regularity, got him the Democratic candidacy for 1910 race for Governor - and then had to listen to Wilson's acceptance speech which soon disabused him of the candidate's true inclinations.

Apparently, Wilson had only agreed to let his name go forward on the strength of a pledge from Smith that he would not run that year for US Senator. No doubt feeling he had been duped, and that bad faith on Wilson's part dissolved any obligations he might have had, Smith decided to stand against the nonentity the Convention had nominated.

In that great year of insurgency, Wilson mounted his high horse, and denounced Smith's welshing. When the (Dem-controlled) legislature voted on the Senate seat, Smith was defeated [2].

Wilson went on to higher things, while Smith - who never again got to run for the US Senate [3], continued as boss of New Jersey. This piece provides a (tenuous) link between the Smith era and that of Frank Hague [4]; the man who ran the state in between was apparently James R Nugent [5] of Essex County. (Hague had already made his mark in politics during Wilson's second term in the White House.)

FDR's target was William F Sheehan ('Blue-Eyed Billy' Sheehan to his friends), who was Tammany's choice; FDR had also been elected (to the New York Senate for his home 26th District) in 1910, and the election for US Senator was early on the agenda of the new legislature [6]. Squire Roosevelt got stuck in and Sheehan lost out; the bad news was that the guy who won was no lesser Tammany stalwart than James Aloysius O'Gorman [6]. FDR got the politics bug, was eventually persuaded of the necessity for regularity to stay in the biz, and the rest is history. (O'Gorman lasted a single term in the Senate - and was defeated by a Republican, to boot!)

My information on both cases comes initially from books in the Teach Yourself History series, published in the couple of decades after the end of World War 2 by English Universities Press. The idea (which still seems an excellent one to me) is to take a historical figure, and explain his era through his biography [7]. The Wilson I rate higher than the Roosevelt - mainly as it strikes me as rather better written. But some others I remember as pretty good - the volume on Georges Clemenceau opens up 60 odd years of pretty racy French history (I'm thinking of the politics there, of course...) Whether they travelled across the pond, I doubt. But well worth looking out for in secondhand bookshops.

  1. Congressional and Political Graveyard bios.

  2. There seems nothing much online about this: snippets in longer pieces like this.

  3. Bosses tended not to hold high office, is my impression. Sen David Walsh of Massachusetts is an exception, I believe.

  4. Of I Am the Law fame.

  5. No record in the Graveyard of his holding office.

  6. Sharing that middle name, of course, with Anthony Aloysius St John Hancock (qv).

  7. Woodrow Wilson and American Liberalism by EM Hugh-Jones (p105ff) and Roosevelt and Modern America by John A Woods (p 15ff).


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Existential threat and legal latitude - the nuclear case


In my piece from March 22 on NSA Rice's notions of US strategy, I mentioned her critical claim in the article I commented on that
...after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security....

These words were not, I believe, selected at random: they were intended to support a claim that US action should be free of shackles otherwise imposed by international law.

An illustration of the importance of the concept is given in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case [1].

The question asked of the ICJ was
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?

Having gone through a number of potential stymies for the use of such weapons, the final question (discussion starts at para 74) was whether humanitarian law - the Geneva Conventions and similar rules - made their use unlawful in all circumstances.

The opinion identifies (para 78) two cardinal principles in these texts: States
must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets;
and must not
cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.

The Court concludes (para 86) that these rules apply to nuclear weapons.

But on the question posed by the UNGA, it follows Mr Dooley's expression of Theodore Roosevelt's views on Trusts [2]. It states (not, one feels without a degree of sympathy) the views of states wanting a No answer to the question that (para 92)
In the event of their use, nuclear weapons would in all circumstances be unable to draw any distinction between the civilian population and combatants, or between civilian objects and military objectives, and their effects, largely uncontrollable, could not be restricted, either in time or in space, to lawful military targets.

And the court's sympathies also come out in the truly regretful expression of no can do here (para 95):
In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.

The reason (para 96 - emphasis mine)?
the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.

And the nail in the coffin (para 97 - ditto):
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.

This is, I believe, what is known in the trade as a non liquet. Or, in the London argot, delivered with palms upwards and head cocked quizzically, Search me, guv.

(Not, I suspect, a stunt that SCOTUS or the House of Lords would pull (or they'd be a lot subtler about it!). But, then, they don't have even-numbered panels with (as on this issue) the chairman having a casting vote, either.)

The critical thing was that, however clearly the texts of the humanitarian law treaties might be, the ICJ could not bring itself to say that a nation which was suffering (in Condi's phrase) an existential threat should be deprived of any means at its disposal, however inhumane, to deter the threat or defeat it if put into effect.

All other uses of nuclear weapons are clearly illegal (from the ICJ judgement) - the wrappings can only be taken off its nukes by a country whose survival is at stake.

We have there, it seems to me, the start of a sort of safe haven rule: not that all uses of nuclear weapons within the safe haven would be legal - but that all uses outside would be illegal. And if the safe haven works for nuclear, who knows what else it might work for?

The Bush crew would clearly like to find out. Just in case the Wyatt Earp approach to international law (as in his March 6 press conference
when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission)
doesn't work out.

  1. The opinion requested by the UN General Assembly. A request from the WHO covering similar territory was ruled inadmissible by the ICJ.

  2. Briefly
    'Th' thrusts,' says he to himsilf, ' are heejous monsthers built up be th' inlightened intherprise iv th' men that have done so much to advance pro-gress in our beloved counthry,' he says. 'On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other hand not so fast.'


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Blair sleaze plumbs new depths


For Blair, as for any totalitarian, his ends are so transcendently clear, clean and good as to justify any means necessary to their fulfillment.

Yesterday, at his joint press conference with Bush, knowing this appearance would secure the largest worldwide audience of any since the start of the war, he said
Day by day, we have seen the reality of Saddam's regime -- his thugs prepared to kill their own people; the parading of prisoners of war; and now, the release of those pictures of executed British soldiers. If anyone needed any further evidence of the depravity of Saddam's regime, this atrocity provides it. It is yet one more flagrant breach of all the proper conventions of war. More than that, to the families of the soldiers involved, it is an act of cruelty beyond comprehension. Indeed, it is beyond the comprehension of anyone with an ounce of humanity in their souls.


On behalf of the British government, I would like to offer my condolences particularly to the family and the friends of those two brave young men who died in the service of their country, and to the ordinary Iraqi people, to whom we are determined to bring a better future.



I've only seen a brief clip on TV - but, in what I saw, sanctimony oozed from every word like the liquor from a dung pile.

And the truth? Blair has, it seems, been doing what he does best - or, at least, most frequently: lying. Because the families of the men, Sapper Luke Allsopp and Staff Sergeant Simon Cullingworth, who Blair says were executed, were told by the Army that they died in an ambush of the Land Rover they were travelling in. Allsop's sister said
The Colonel from his barracks came around to our house to tell us he was not executed. Luke's Land Rover was ambushed and he died instantly. The Colonel told us he was doing what he could to set the record straight.

The cynic in me tries to come up with some reason why the families would be lying. And fails miserably.

Having made such an allegation, the least one would expect would be for Blair's gofers to back it up. But his Official Spokesman is quoted (March 28 untimed) that
there was no "absolute evidence" that two British soldiers who were killed after being separated from their unit in southern Iraq were executed.

Very unusual. When a true story is circulating against the government, the usual response to the hacks from Tony's toadies is a non-denial denial. Such expressions as Bollocks! delivered in suitably dismissive tones serve as a reply.

In comparison, the no absolute evidence reply is as good as a confession.

How hard, one wonders, did Blair try to verify the story, before he spoke to the world? How hard did he push the MoD to say that the soldiers had been executed, and thus give him cover for his claim? What communications were there between the levels of command in the Gulf and the MoD in London.

My feeling is that this another Tonkin Gulf Incident, only worse: in the sense that Lyndon Johnson only had a few hours to decide the second incident had occurred (and not to look very hard to check); whereas, it seems, the soldiers in question were killed on Sunday [1].

Is there any long-term mileage in the story, in the sense of helping to get rid of Blair? Not on its own, I think. But, clearly, he now thinks he can walk on water. Our mission, should we choose to accept it, is to find a way of getting him to try.

  1. I can't find online confirmation of the first time that Al Jazeera broadcast their pictures - surely, though, the Army had identified them and the way they died well before the first broadcast. We need a timeline here. This from Reuters (March 28 0826 EST) merely talks about
    earlier this week.


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Thursday, March 27, 2003
 

Has this got old?


My war stuff, that is. Because, having gone with the general spike in traffic for anything war-related as the shooting started, my numbers have just completely collapsed. About which I do not complain: the customer is king.

But here's the thing - the one group of customers whose traffic I have no idea about are those who take the RSS feed. I'm told that there is no counter that can count the number of times that feed is used. And these, almost by definition, are my regular customers. The kind, in any ordinary business, one would be most keen to pay attention to.

I may have a thousand taking the RSS every day; it may be zero.

But, for the countable rest, as I say, the numbers are 90% off in the space of 24 hours.

And, as it would be with any regular business, that's the sort of stat that gets my attention! I'd love to know why. I've concentrated on the war because there's been stuff I've been interested in writing; and, frankly it's been hunting where the ducks are. Perhaps they flew off when my attention was engaged elsewhere.

Is this whinging? I prefer to think of it as market research....


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What legal regime for post-Saddam Iraq?


No doubt the esteemed US Defense Secretary would say Legal, shmlegal: we're in charge; they obey or they get it. And perhaps that's how it'll be. If USG has a good, quick war - and it's still far from too late for that - they can politically get away with depositing the entire system of international legal regulation of war and peace into the dumpster, and make their own rules for the future governance of those parts of the world they might happen to covet from time to time.

But I'm all about looking on the bright side, as loyal readers will know. Not. In any case, it bugs the hell out of the completist in me not to know the laws that Bush is ignoring. So...

To take it from the top, before the first incursion of US+ forces, the law in force throughout the territory of Iraq was that of the state of Iraq. (In theory; Saddam's writ didn't run in Kurdistan, thanks to the northern NFZ; the fact that (apparently) it did/does in the southern NFZ is presumably testament to the extent of the pasting he gave the Shi'ites who rebelled in 1991.)

Since the arrival of US+ forces, they have passed through a lot of territory (eg, on the way to Baghdad); and some territory (quite how much, I'm not clear) they will have been occupied (Umm Kasr, for instance). Occupied in the sense that Iraqi forces have been driven out of the area, and the forces which drove them out are responsible for its administration.

Under what law is that territory held? There are, of course, the provisions of the Geneva Convention, Geneva IV, on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. But, so far as I can see, this operates merely as a regime of control (like the US Constitution controls what laws can be passed or government actions taken). It's not a substitute for a whole legal system.

Think of the ordinary incidence of government on everyday life. Criminal law, say - will the regular Iraqi courts continue operation? And what law will they enforce? As to taxation, this says there isn't any to speak of. But it wouldn't be unreasonable, as the economy gets going again (in particular, as the oil starts flowing more freely) that taxes should be raised to cover the cost of services (such as education and health) which will continue under the occupation regime.

The last occupation I can think of of any size involving Western troops is that of Kosovo; there UNSCR 1244 provided that there should be an international security presence and an international civil presence - the latter tasked (OP11) with specified tasks. So far as I can see, it does not establish in the ICP any legislative power, or indicate any regime the ICP might apply apart from the law in Kosovo as it existed prior to occupation.

That presumably meant that the laws of Yugoslavia and of Serbia (of which Kosovo was previously a part) still applied. Except, perhaps, for a dispensing power [1] exercised by the ICP in aid of fulfilling its specified tasks.

What about earlier occupations? The AMGOTs that ran Belgium and the Netherlands after World War 2, for instance. Can I find the documents establishing these fine institutions? Can I buggery! Presumably there is a US/UK/USSR agreement somewhere covering it, but it's nowhere to be found online [2].

My feeling is that these matters, if they've been considered at all, have been consigned definitively to the backburner. (The question of who should govern being of all-consuming interest.) There is, of course, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance within the DOD (the Office for some reason does not seem to have its own page on the DOD site or elsewhere). Under Secretary Douglas Feith (speaking on February 11), said of the ORHA
we describe it as an "expeditionary" office.
He went on to say that it was
charged with establishing links with the United Nations specialized agencies and with non-governmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq.

The UN, one suspects, has subsequently been scratched from the invitation list.

For the moment
The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field.

So it'll be martial law that'll be imposed?

All this is, of course, confused by the role of the infamous Iraqi opposition. This piece from yesterday has the DOD
planning to give a major role in a future Iraqi government to controversial exile opposition figure Ahmed Chalabi and members of his Iraqi National Congress.

The piece says that this
has sparked a new round of bitter feuding within the U.S. government over the shape of any post-Saddam authority in Baghdad

Déjà vu all over again. Also in the mix is
retired Iraqi Gen. Nizar al Khazraji, believed to be the highest ranking military figure to defect under Saddam....[The General] who had been charged in Denmark with war crimes relating to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in the 1980s, disappeared last week
and, according to USG sources, was working with US forces in the Gulf.

Glad to see all that pussyfooting about the USG agencies working with doubtful types has gone by the board...

Meanwhile the International Crisis Group has issued a report (PDF 1MB) standing Canute-like [3] against the waves of USG anti-UNism (rather like poor old Tony at Camp David right now).

The question remains: if, once the glorious victory has reached throughout Iraq, a guy is caught stealing from a shop in Baghdad, by whom will he be arrested? Under what law will he be charged? In what tribunal will he be tried? The genius of the English common law (to which the US is some kind of heir) is the heavy bias of inductive reasoning - we use the concrete case to test the validity of the legal principle. And, so far, I can't see that any proposed scheme of administration for post-Saddam Iraq has been thought through enough to survive a test like that.

  1. Something like that exercised by Charles I of England.

  2. This on medical conditions during WW2 touches on AMGOTs - it seems that they were organised from within the armed forces commands (rather than at the Three Power level). But it's all pretty sketchy and unreliable, I'd say.

  3. Yeah, I know Canute was making a point...

UPDATE (March 27 1640 GMT)
The Open Sesame in this neck of the international legal woods is apparently belligerent occupation. The main provisions are in the Annex (the Hague Regulations) to the 1907 Hague Convention known as Hague IV (in Articles 42-56); in Articles 47-78 of Geneva IV (as supplemented by Protocol 1).

One also has the USA's Law of Land Warfare - the Contents page and Chapter on Occupations seem now only to be available cached. (This is the 1976 replacement of the 1940 version I mentioned yesterday. Whether the 1976 version has in turn been replaced is something I'm not clear on.)

Once I've digested that lot, hopefully I shall be able to make more sense of the post-Saddam problem.


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Wednesday, March 26, 2003
 

War humour corner


Nothing the least amusing about events in the Gulf; but a little light relief may be welcome.

This Powerpoint version of the Gettysburg Address has been knocking around for some time, I suspect - but is still good value.

And this piece in which Donald Rumsfeld is surprisingly frank on sexual matters also struck me as amusing.


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Iraqi tribesman: Unlawful combatant or Geneva Convention POW?


A correspondent raised this issue with me a couple of days ago; and the piece yesterday on Iraqi tribes stirred the subconscious to thought. (This is pretty much all hypothesis. But one has to start somewhere.)

The suggestion is that the tribes have organised large numbers (perhaps not as large as claimed, though) of armed men (presumably just small arms, but even so); are led in such a way as to be capable of operation without direction from Baghdad; and would be able to mount guerilla operations against the US+ forces both before and after the assumed victory over Saddam.

If some of these men were captured during such operations by men of a USA unit, what, I wonder, would be their status
  1. under the Geneva Conventions and international law generally; and

  2. under US military law?

From an initial scan of the Conventions [1], the provisions dealing with guerillas and other non-conventional fighters are in Article 43-47 of Protocol 1. The upshot seems to be irregular forces (something like Tito's Partisans in World War 2, I'm reckoning) get treated, if caught, as POWs under Geneva III (Art 44 - combatants is the term used) [2]; and even a member of a rabble or DIY guerilla unit, who does not fall into the Art 44 definition of combatant, is (by Art 45) to be presumed to qualify as a POW until his status is
determined by a competent tribunal..

I suspect some tribal fighters would, and some would not, fall within the definition of combatant, depending on the particular circumstances of each case.

Approaching the matter from the perspective of US law, one starts with the 1942 case of Ex parte Quirin - where SCOTUS decided that had a bunch of hapless German would-be saboteurs had no reason to complain of being tried by a military tribunal.

The gang were tried for offences against Arts 81 and 82 of the Articles of War (a document whose legal status I'm unclear [3]). The Articles gave jurisdiction to the tribunal, and I'm not, from a first read (in a while), quite clear on what precise grounds they were expecting habeas to issue. But the court does make the notorious distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants (at p31); traces the source in General Order 100 April 24 1863 to the 1940 Rules of Law Warfare [4]; and mentions that
definition of lawful belligerents by Paragraph 9 is that adopted by Article 1, Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, to which the United States was a signatory and which was ratified by the Senate in 1909. 36 Stat. 2279, 2295.

A translation of the 1907 Convention is here. The definition of lawful belligerents has been carried forward into Art 4 of Geneva III.

So, there, it seems, is the (missing?) link between the universes of US and of international law.

But, which law will apply to the hypothetical Iraqi tribesmen? Presumably, their treatment by US forces will be subject to US military law - whatever that is (eg, is there any longer a Rules of Land Warfare?). But also, obviously, subject to international law (including the Geneva Conventions).

In due course, an AMGOT is to be set up; presumably, its status derives from international law, rather than US law. But how? Is there an interregnum or hiatus between systems of law over a given part of Iraq, depending on whether that part is under full US+ control at the time? What about areas controlled by UK forces? Are those areas subject to UK military law?

Where conflicts arises between international and domestic law (and how might that happen?), what body would settle the matter?

I'm pretty much totally in the dark about this stuff, as you will gather. All the easier to make an impression with the slightest amount of daylight. In theory...

  1. Geneva III and Protocol 1 are the relevant ones, I think.

  2. Art 44(3) says that combatants are obliged to wearing distinguishing emblems during battle. Art 44(4) says that, if caught while not so doing, he forfeits POW status - but is still entitled to be treated as if he were a POW! However, it leaves open the possibility of trying him for his actions.

  3. Quirin places the Articles at 10 USC 1471-1593 - they're not there any longer!

  4. How this was coordinated with the Articles of War is on the list of things to look at.


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Turkey: Bush's $1bn handout explained....


Well, just a little.

The new information I have is really limited to Richard Boucher's State Department of yesterday which is now up.

He confirms that the aid (called ESF money in the briefing) is subject to continuing compliance with economic reform requirements (as those of the IMF). But is not tied to any deal on Turkish deployments into Northern Iraq.

One question on which I'm still hazy (personal ignorance playing a large part!) is the question of leveraging the aid into loans. In my piece last night I queried how this should work for a sovereign borrower.

Apparently, from cursory searching, I find the concept of collateral is certainly a part of the sovereign lending business[1]. But that seems to be a case where dollar assets or streams of export receipts are pledged to the lenders, who pony up a percentage by way of loan (like a standard house loan). The loan is smaller than the value of the asset pledged.

Whereas here, USG is saying that pledging $1bn in cash to a lender will get a loan eight times as much as the value of the asset pledged!

Getting Turkish economic stats is like drawing teeth. This summary of 2002 stats shows, as far as balance of payments is concerned, a trade deficit [2] of $8bn, offset by tourism income and remittances. Not a complete disaster, to my untutored eye.

But the USG scheme is based on lending not based on the strength of the Turkish economy (whatever that is) - but simply on the collateral of the $1bn. And not seeing how its done bugs the hell out of me!

However... Boucher's view is this
...the general rule of thumb is that you can do eight to 10 billion in loans for a billion dollars with friends........if -- yeah, actually, the estimate here is -- the legislative language that we have provided would authorize up to $8.5 billion in loan guarantees through this fund.

He reveals that he's not sure whether USG informed Turkey of its impending good fortune in advance of the announcement - clearly, the kid-glove diplomacy continues, as discussed yesterday.

And he's similarly unbothered on Congressional approval:
QUESTION: And have you also told them that, of the problems that you anticipate facing up on the Hill because of their reluctance to participate fully?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure that they as well as we do understand the needs of Congress to understand the needs of Turkey and we will help them in that regard.

QUESTION: Well, I guess what I'm getting at is, have you warned the Turks that they shouldn't expect to get all of this money, that it is in fact a request and it's not -

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, we're all quite clear on what this is. This is a request for money from the Congress and we will work, all of us, to support the President's request. We think it's been carefully studied, that it's necessary and I'm sure we'll all go up to the Hill to try to support the President on this one.

QUESTION: That means when you go up to the Hill, you are going to be definitely asking them, the lawmakers, to give Turkey this --

MR. BOUCHER: We're going to ask them to fund the President's supplemental funding request, yes.


The Turks could truly sing loud What a friend we have in Boucher - I can see the elastic on that billion from 3.000 miles away.

Clearly, the hour of the Armenian Caucus has come - Boucher seemed practically to give them a gold-edged invitation to kick the Turk's billion into the Potomac.

  1. The online material I've found so far is technical and specific - nothing useful for reference, merely the odd suggestion.

  2. On what in the UK (when the number mattered) was called visible trade.


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Tuesday, March 25, 2003
 

Turkey: war funding request includes $1bn consolation prize


The Armenian caucus won't like this!

Last word was that the aid package on offer as quid pro quo for US ground deployments had been snatched back, never to reappear. US policy was all about Plan B.

And Congress, with the House in the role of Little Sir Echo, had already stricken a Turkish aid provision from HR 1047, so as to facilitate Powell's negotiations on the deployment agreement. Supposedly.

Now, we find the President's additional funding request for the war includes $1bn by way of cash grant to the Turks, according to this AP piece reporting Richard Boucher. The accompanying USG document is at pains, this Reuters piece says, to quantify the amount of loan that this cash could generate as
not to exceed $8.5bn
- exactly how the Turks are supposed to leverage the loan (a sovereign lender is not like an ordinary Joe, providing collateral to a bank), why this rather specific amount (which smacks of spurious accuracy), and why the loan isn't to exceed $8.5bn even if the Turks could screw a better deal - all that, I'd like more particulars on.

No doubt, the hacks are working on it as I type. More tomorrow.


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The very unlinked web


Another topic I might well have majored on absent the war - this short burst triggered by looking at the Frist story.

I find my cheese grated yet again by news sources online failing to link to the subjects of their stories, despite the pages being available at the time. (In this case, the Senate roll call votes.) Since the journo obviously has to get the vote details up to do the story, why not include a link in his piece?

In fact, though AP sometimes supplies links to sources at the bottom on the page, other sources almost uniformly don't. The most you get is a random selection of vaguely relevant links to the home pages of organisations having something to do with the topic of the piece.

But a link to the government report, or press briefing transcript, or court opinion that the article is actually discussing? No chance!. Apparently, there's some sort of unwritten rule that the online stuff of newspapers should be as un-interactive as the dead-tree equivalent....


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What's up with Senator Doctor Frist?


Not a rhetorical question!

I've only been keeping a good deal less than half an eye on Trent Lott's successor, thanks to the war. But it seems to me that the record isn't good.

Not only do have we the continuing filibuster lite [1] on Miguel Estrada; but now the astonishing turnaround on the Budget cuts. Astonishing to my untutored eye, at least: no fewer than 14 senators who supported the Administration on rejecting a reduction in the Bush tax cuts on March 21 supported a reduction today [2]!

Now, I recall that the voting last week of some senators (Chafee for instance) was deemed eccentric (also here). But to lose 14 in less than a week strikes me as a tad above careless.

No doubt I'll wise up eventually...

  1. No time to research this yet - but, isn't this like being slightly pregnant? I've skimmed Rule 22 and can't see how this filibuster with toilet breaks works. Why would anyone have wanted to make it easier to have a filibuster, surely the Senate's badge of shame through the decades?)

  2. Roll Call Votes 76 and 93, for those wishing to do the analysis.


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Turkish troops in Northern Iraq - didn't they settle that already?


No apologies for returning to one of the most difficult problems for USG. And, no, they didn't.

The latest from the wires (not that I do breaking news...) seems to be more denials from the Turks that the troops are over the border; and more reassurance on their being limited to a narrow strip along the border; and assigned to humanitarian duties only.

This AP piece (March 25 1046 EST) has an interview with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, saying that
Turkey was looking to create a 12-mile zone on the border.
and that Turkish troops
will only move if a crisis develops.

Zalmay Khalilzad was in Ankara talking to the Turkish government today on the deployments. His words of diplomatic wisdom:
These are difficult and complicated issues.
The talks seem to have gone nowhere.

Meanwhile, UPI has a piece (March 25 1155 EST) out of EU HQ in Brussels on Turkish deployments, saying that the Turks had told European Commission President Romano Prodi
Whatever the size or nature of their possible military presence on the Iraq side of the border, they are only for humanitarian purposes to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe..

In Ankara they're talking 12 miles, in Brussels, it's Whatever the size or nature! And there are the other stated aims of the deployments: stymieing possible Kurdish UDI and protecting the Turcomans. For which the 12 mile zone is as much use as a ham sandwich at a barmitzvah. A point underlined by the last par of the AP piece, which sticks out like a sore thumb:
In addition to a flow of refugees, Turkey also fears that the fall of Saddam Hussein could lead to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. That could boost the aspirations of Turkey's Kurdish rebels, who fought a 15-year war for autonomy in southeastern Turkey.

Meanwhile RFE are reporting (March 25 untimed) that, yesterday, friend of the blog
General Hilmi Ozkok, the Turkish Army's chief of staff, began a two-day inspection tour of units garrisoned in the country's southeast.
Not a social call, one surmises.

The piece also mentions that the Turkish deployment motion approved by the Parliament on March 20
said, in part, that it was necessary for Ankara to send troops into the region in order to stem a potentially massive inflow of Kurdish refugees and any fallout from Iraq's disintegration during or after the U.S.-led conflict.

(Again, the second of the purposes incompatible with a mere buffer-zone.)

And that both Powell and Blair have been sounding off against the deployments.

In yesterday's State Department briefing, Richard Boucher was pressed on the issue.

In particular, he says that NATO chief Lord Robertson
had received from Mr. Gul assurances to NATO that the media reports have been incorrect and that no forces have entered Iraq.
The next question is
You have assurances they haven't actually entered Iraq, but do you yet have an assurance that they will not enter Iraq?

But, in the circumstances, I would be curious whether Gul was implying that the Turkish troops had no need to enter, since they were already there! (And had moved - according to this VOA report (March 21 2328 EST) - as late as last Friday.)

Boucher also mentions a point - that I confess I missed in my March 23 piece - from Erdogan's WaPo interview, where he says USG approved a Turkish deployment plan during the abortive discussions on overflight rights. Why Erdogan should have thought so, he leaves in the air. It puzzles me a bit.

He sums up USG's position on the deployments thus:
First of all, the Turkish Government itself is saying Turkish forces have not entered into Northern Iraq. No Turkish incursion. They have said that. They have told NATO that. That is what we understand.

Second of all, we have talked -- the Turks are quite clear on our view that no uncoordinated military action should occur by any party in Northern Iraq.

Third of all, we are in discussions with them to try to make sure that -- excuse me -- to try to make sure that the situation in Northern Iraq is handled in such a way that the need doesn't arise for Turkish forces to be there for either in a coordinated or an uncoordinated fashion, so that under any conditions they wouldn't feel the need to go there.


And, when it was put to him that
the U.S. can't prevent Turkey from coming in
he replied
That is what I would call a hypothetical or theoretical question at this point....I don't think the kind of situation you are forecasting is arising, certainly not at this point.

It was indeed a rather silly question.

Conclusions? The Turkish-US deadlock sounds genuine enough; I can't imagine that there haven't at all times been substantial numbers of Turkish forces inside Northern Iraq (though many fewer that the 30,000 mentioned in my piece of March 23); the buffer-zone notion is so unsuited to Turkish aims as to imply a lack of good faith in proposing it.

One day, all will be clear. In this millennium would be nice, though....


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Where's the killer image?


One thing's that's puzzling me: with a vast array of artistic types of all nations ranged squarely against - some of whom were at the Oscars, of course - why has no one managed to produce the image to nail the war?

Of course, there have been passionate written pieces, speeches, rallies - but the iconic image skewering this for a war of aggression I find lacking.

Now, I'm sure an icon shouldn't be important - we're pretty well all literate, and sane (most of us!); surely the most effective way to sway opinion should be the sustained application of reason?

But no. Icons matter. The famous LBJ campaign ad with the mushroom cloud and the little girl with the flower - that's what we want. Photojournalism might help (though the embeds are no doubt self-censoring what the military are not): an iconic photo may come along - but it took seven years from the decision to go all out in Vietnam until the napalmed body of Kim Phuc hit the TV screens.

I have difficulty drawing convincing stick-men, so I'm not exactly the guy to advise on detail. But the evidence - from World War 2, say, of the iconography built up around Winston Churchill (cigar, bulldog, siren-suit, bowler-hat) - seems to be that, in some inexplicable (to me) way, it works. It establishes a mindset (of resistance or opposition); it makes people receptive to arguments they might not otherwise take in; it invokes that great political asset, prejudice, for or against (as directed) the object represented.

The great example in (relatively) recent UK domestic political history is Michael Foot, Labour Party leader in the early 1980s; in November 1981, Foot, already struggling under the burdens of facing a combative and motivated Thatcher, leading a thoroughly divided party and having the personal electoral appeal (and something of the appearance) of Grandma Clampett, decided to turn up at the Armistice Ceremony at the Cenotaph in some sort of car-coat (rather than a respectable Republican cloth coat, as worn by everyone else).

The newspapers (virulently hostile to Foot and Labour, most of them, at the time) called the coat a donkey-jacket (a coat worn by labourers on the job) - with the implication of disrespect to the honoured dead. His image, already poor, never recovered.

Somewhere, the donkey-jacket that fits George Bush is out there. I respectfully suggest it's past time we started looking.


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Iraqi tribes - a pretty damned wild card...


Evidently, I don't get out much. Because the notion that the tribes of Iraq played now, or might in play in the future, some important politico-military role had somehow passed me by.

While I catch up - there's this piece, datelined yesterday, from the FT. The Cliff Notes version seems to be that, from even before the end of Ottoman rule, the political power of the tribes was in decline [1]: a trend which survived British rule, the monarchy, the coup, down to the takeover of the Ba'athists [2]. Saddam chose to promote the tribes politically (his own in particular, of course!) as a medium to control and govern the country.

Newsweek had a piece (March 17 issue) focussing on Sheik Kadhim Al-Menshab Al-Habib, head of one of Iraq's biggest tribes (strangely unnamed), who, it says, helped put down the revolt of the marsh Arabs near ancient Ur in southern Iraq; and now
controls 267,000 armed fighters
(Note the lack of qualification to this number that reeks of spurious accuracy - not to mention wishful thinking!)

The guy can clearly talk a good game. But, functionally, the problem for USG is this (another tribal leader's aide talking):
We follow the central government. But of course if communications are cut between us and the center, all authority will revert to our sheik.

One is rather more disposed to believe that, perhaps, than telephone number head-counts. And one would need nothing like 267,000 men to put a severe crimp in USG's post-Saddam strategy for managing Iraq; leaving aside what the tribals might do during the war proper.

Clearly, more investigation required [3]. At least, now I know there's something to investigate!

  1. This piece, apparently reprinted from the NY Times of January 7 2003, says the complete opposite. Caveat lector: I go with the FT for now, I think: the writer is an academic, rather than a hack.

    The tribal leader the Times spoke to -

    Sheik Talal Salim al-Khalidi, the portly chieftain of the Bani Khalid tribe -
    says he has 100,000 men under arms.

  2. Timeline here.

  3. I've done a pretty cursory search: this is short but might be useful. I'd surmise, on the basis of past experience, that there's a fair amount online. We'll see.


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US gives Turkey tough love - Cartman style...


A fondly-remembered (by me) episode of South Park has that noted diplomat Eric Cartman [1] let loose in the Costa Rican rain forest - where, in one of his more fruitful interactions, he repeatedly clubs a harmless sloth dangling from a tree branch. He tells the sloth it's tough love. Uncle Sam's technique much the same in Turkey, by the look of it...

Not that USG can dole out the punishment on its own: the heavy artillery is supplied by investors in the various financial markets, who, in a sort of communal mutual ramp, bid up the markets on barely founded hopes of the US quid pro quo aid package (the $6bn or $15bn or whatever it was at the time), and let them collapse in a heap once Powell in his famous phone call nixed the deal, and moved on to Plan B.

Today's NY Times has the story:
During a three-week span in November, foreign investors injected over $2 billion into the Turkish markets on the assumption that the newly elected Justice and Development Party would be in a strong position to negotiate aid from the United States as part of a deal on Iraq.

And, of course, the way the markets work (especially volatile, thin, speculative markets [2] like those of Turkey), the leverage effect of emotion is pretty damned huge - positive feedback, a lack of dampeners.

Of course, by offering the moolah in the first place, USG knew that this was exactly what was going to happen. In making his hard landing phone call, Powell must be presumed to have intended its natural consequences.

But, one might ask, what's the point? Evidently, this is supposedly to have an educative value - for Turkey, and for other economically weak allies tempted to thwarted USG's will. How, exactly?

Right now, Turkey has just $3.5bn of credits to draw down at the IMF, and that's it. Without further IMF support, Turkish debt will be downgraded by the rating agencies - with knock-on effects in all Turkish markets, not just that in government debt.

The FT, in a rather calmer piece today, says, if a government austerity package (more taxes, curbs on spending) is implemented, a further $1.6bn credit is likely to be authorised in April. But quotes a guy from Merrill Lynch thus:
In the absence of capital flight, and assuming the war is not prolonged, and there is no conflict between Kurds and Turks in northern Iraq, you can see the government muddling through with the measures announced today.

Big if.

A collapse in the Turkish markets (not imminent, apparently, but, because of the leverage effect, liable to happen much more quickly than in a country with more broadly based markets) would not, it seems, result in the sort of crisis across the emerging markets sector as triggered by Thailand in 1997. For one thing, the level of foreign investment in Turkey is generally lower than elsewhere in the sector, it seems: the effect of the recent, US aid-induced surge of cash being all the more intoxicating for a market unused to needing to hold its liquor.

And suffering the consequences of economic mismanagement isn't exactly a novelty for the Turkish people: their expectations come ready-managed, as it were.

But it risks damaging Turkey's ability to fulfil its strategic role (the role which is the only reason why it was let into NATO in the first place): in destabilising a weak government, in requiring the military to take a greater hand than otherwise in politics, in souring relations with the main driving force of NATO, and so on.

And, as for other allies, the impression is not toughness and resolution but ignorance and bullheadedness. A reputation USG needed no new demonstration to convince world opinion about.

A companion FT piece today blames failures in US diplomacy, in particular, for the Turkish problem.

Because, negotiating ploys aside, the Turks had a genuine case for compensation (not in bribes - or reverse punitives, one might call them) but for losses actually likely to be suffered; and the fact that their losses in the 1991 war went uncompensated gave them a reason to be sceptical in negotiations with USG.

US diplomats appeared to have taking this as a straight souk haggle - tourist to trader, who are never going to see each other again. And who therefore have no relationship to cherish, no long-term mutual benefits at stake, no knock-on effects to consider.

In his BBC interview on March 14, former Foreign Minister Yasir Yakis may have come off an idiot in suggesting that the carpet salesman cartoons caused the March 1 vote on the US deployment resolution to be lost.

But the truth lay, not in the fact that the Turks hated the stereotype (the interpretation someone from race-obsessed US might have put on it) but because it amply characterised the process. All those years of containing the Soviet threat, and these Yanks are acting as if they don't know us!

Which is all the more surprising, since a prime mover in the GWACS venture and a forward USG policy in the Middle East generally, Paul Wolfowitz, has been something of a cheerleader for Turkey in the past.

The quality of US diplomacy was being widely lamented as the UN processed collapsed (this piece of mine from March 15). Another example right here.

Quite what the results will be is obviously far too early to tell. I am still none the wiser as the reasons for the March 1 rebellion by AKP MPs - whether it was a one-off, or a sign of an unmanageable party; and the game the Turkish military are playing is far from obvious either.

But the US handling of Turkey shouldn't have been this crass in the first place. Rule #1 of diplomacy is, make sure the other guy can save face; the US technique seemed to have been to come into town flashing its wad [3] and daring the Turks to turn it down. Nothing in advance; no recognition of 1991 losses. Just take it or leave it. Presumably, they thought Erdogan was able to work his Parliament with his foot.

And Powell's idea of a Plan B was to ditch Turkey altogether.

Amazing, giving the key apparent role of Bush's Asiatic Mr Fixit Zalmay Khalilzad (March archives passim) - who is not exactly the Old European idea of an American who doesn't travel well. Couldn't he have managed a subtler diplomatic campaign?

All rather reminiscent of US failures in the post-War period to understand the true motivations of Ho Chi Minh; the limitations of Sino-Soviet plans to spread revolution across the Third World; the obsession with those damned dominoes - not the new-style variety, of course.

  1. Well, Rummy evidently took lessons...

  2. I'm no expert - but these emerging markets are there for exactly this reason: as a thrill-ride to goose up otherwise boring mutual fund portfolios. The total value of the markets is small (relative to the NYSE, say) but, then, like chilli powder, a little goes a long way. But a tiny investment for a large US mutual may be huge in a market like Turkey. More leverage. Remember 1929 - stocks sold on margin, plunging brokers: same idea.

  3. London argot - ostentatiously displaying one's cash.


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Monday, March 24, 2003
 

Russia wants ruling that the war is illegal (Non-Aligned agree?)


I first mentioned well before the war started (on March 1, in fact) the possibility of the UN General Assembly's getting a ruling from the International Court of Justice on its legality.

Now, at last, there seems to be some movement - better late than never!

Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov, in move that may be designed to distract attention from the allegations that Russia broke the UN sanctions regime relating to Iraq, has said that
Russia and other countries would ask the UN's legal department for a ruling on the conflict.

I'm not sure what good that would do in itself. Presumably the UN has legal advisers, but I'm not aware that their opinion carries any legal authority.

Perhaps this is a misunderstanding - the ICJ is an institution associated with the UN and perhaps Fedotov was thinking of the ICJ when he spoke. Or it's a translation error, or some such technical matter. Or he was thinking of approaching the UN lawyers with a view to them preparing the case to put before the ICJ.

Meanwhile, in Kuala Lumpur, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahatir Mohamad, who is also President of the Non-Aligned Movement, said today that
Calls for recognising the war against Iraq to be "an act of illegal aggression" were sent to all the members of the UN Security Council on behalf of [the Movement].

Again, fine so far as it goes. But only an ICJ opinion will do - there's a way laid down in the Charter for the UNGA to obtain one, and that's the way to go.

I'll be keeping an eye to see if this promising development stays on track.

UPDATE
A piece in the Independent (datelined tomorrow!) does its best thoroughly to confuse the issue of the illegality of the war by dragging us to the ICJ (as discussed above) via the International Criminal Court (as if the writer gets a bonus by dragging in every international tribunal he can think of!) the (domestic) UK Human Rights Act, and the (at best, tangentially relevant) CND case (December archives passim).

I discussed on March 11 (here and here) the present state of international criminal law as regards the waging of wars of aggression. Bottom line: it was illegal, but no way to enforce the law. In particular, the crime had been deliberately removed from the ICC's jurisdiction, because (supposedly) of the difficulty of definition.

The criminal law avenue, in relation to the invasion itself (as opposed to particular war crimes against prisoners or civilians), has always been closed.

What we're interested in is getting the law condemned as illegal by the ICJ. And the writer seems to give us hope from an unexpected quarter:
There is good reason why the US and Britain are rushing to the ICJ for clarification of the legal position.

Unfortunately, it seems, the guy has been let down by his sub-editor: missing not, I'm pretty sure, based on context.

It's excellent that the legality issue should be prevented from slipping off the political agenda as the war continues; disappointing that, in order to do it, the paid media should only be able to manage shoddy pieces of work like this.


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Turkey and the war - more information, less clarity...


Having rubbished an FT piece on Iran and the war only this morning, I'm now praying in aid a couple from the same source to help on the Turkish question(s). You go with what you've got.

A piece from March 22 to tidy up on overflight rights: Uncle Sam's got 'em. With nothing else agreed on either side. The view from USG was always that these rights ought to have been offered as a matter of course (without the need for any agreement) from one NATO ally to another - and that's how things have turned out, apparently.

This piece, also from March 22, is one of a thousand or two which have the Turks denying incursions into Northern Iraq by their forces: Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul promised to send troops; reports from Turkish sources that
Hours later, Turkish sources said a small force of commandos had crossed the border;
And then
both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdish leaders denied the reports.

[The piece also interestingly says
A number of US officers, mainly of the rank of colonel, are already in the north. Yesterday they met exiled former intelligence chiefs, including Wafik Samarrai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, and the exiled head of a prominent Arab tribe from the Mosul area, opposition officials said.

One objective was to try to establish contact with Iraqi army commanders in the two cities to persuade them to stay put and offer no resistance, and not to surrender before US forces had been deployed by air to the north, the officials said.


What the piece unhelpfully does not try to do is to tie up with FT pieces from last week which suggested that regular army commanders in Northern Iraq had thrown in their lot with the KDP [1]. Perhaps, as I suspected, last week's story was a crock. Too much to hope that they might admit as much, of course...]

Then we get this AFP wire (March 23 untimed) saying that the US and Turkey have agreed the deployment of Turkish forces in Iraq within a zone extending to 12 miles from the border. I have to say I'm finding it extraordinarily difficult to confirm that in other news sources (which normally I'd put down to rank incompetence on my part - but, here, I'm not so sure) [2]. The 12 mile buffer zone has been knocking around for weeks as a Turkish idea (as in this from Reuters on February 27). But the Turks' cheap talk is a galaxy away from an agreement with USG.

As some kind of check (and witness to the desperation here!) Slate today has the WSJ [3] saying that
...the administration is actually negotiating some sort of limited intervention by Turkey - mainly keeping them within 12-miles of the border. "Discussions are under way but there's no agreement yet," said one unnamed U.S. official.

Who knows? The presumption against news [4] decides against AFP pro tem in order to keep the issue alive.

The third FT piece - this one's datelined today - is by Brendan O'Leary [5], a heartfelt plea for the Kurds to get a square deal for once.

He has a proposal, and a new name to go with it:
the regional government should declare Iraqi Kurdistan sovereign but not independent. It should say it is willing to negotiate with the rest of Iraq over its future. What it should seek is a "federacy" - a federal relationship with the rest of Iraq that cannot be changed unilaterally by Baghdad - and protection of Kurds elsewhere in the country.

Sovereign but not independent: one can well imagine Turkish government lawyers trying to explain that to top Turk soldier Gen Hilmi Ozkok - one or two instances of the mot de Cambronne - and worse - from the General, I reckon!

Then a couple of academic fantasy contributions:
Nor could the US and Britain justify stamping out self-government in the one unit of Iraq that has some recent experience of democracy. America, after all, was built from self-governing autonomous entities that escaped a (British) tyrant.

Remember way back to when I mentioned (October 27 2002) Lyndon Johnson's 1965 Johns Hopkins Speech in which he referred to a TVA on the Mekong: this is the plane of unreality on which the good professor is holding forth - oh, and love the brackets, by the way! Move over, Dale Carnegie...

He saves his best to (almost) last:
Nor could Tony Blair credibly advocate a centralised Iraq when at home he has designed and implemented a form of asymmetrical devolution for Britain and a special form of power-sharing for Northern Ireland.

Again, recall the more recent piece quoting Patrick Hurley from 1944:
The only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans is that Oklahoma Republicans aren't armed.

The idiocy level is similar, but O'Leary, as a professor, is surely more culpable...

To summarise - US has its overflights, but nothing else in the Turco-Iraqi neck of the woods is clear. Whatever the military situation may be, the information situation is fubar, as per usual. Are we downhearted? Answers on a postcard...

  1. My pieces (first to last) here, here and here.

  2. Just checking on the State site, I see that Richard Boucher hasn't given a briefing since last Friday March 21 - is he keeping bankers' hours, or is the action to come from Qatar from now on?

  3. Evidently, the subscription-only part!

  4. And in favour of bloviation - a sort of equivalent of beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trials.

  5. Now with the Solomon Asch Center, which seems to have a special interest in the Kurds (this article looks as if it might be interesting - and by some relation of the professor, perhaps) - but formerly a well-known talking head on the Northern Ireland political scene - Catholic, but not Fenian - the counterpart to Paul Bew, in a way.


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Blogosphere breaking news on the war


The multiplicity of talent and inclination in the numerically insignificant population of Blogland comes into its own.

Whilst some of us ply our vocation in the calm and serene groves of comment, analysis and speculation, one or two don the Sergeant Bilko poker visor [1], drink deep of their mug of espresso and provide a genuine news service. Well, just the one, that I'm aware of: Sean Paul Kelley over at The Agonist. All the war, all the time. Though the blog alleges that he actually sleeps sometimes, I'm disposed to doubt it.

Warbloggers have a similar sort of thing going, The Command Post, only provided as a collective.

  1. I've watched the show for years (on and - mostly - off) without realising what that thing was called.


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Iran and the war - the soap version and something a little more likely


It's a tale of two articles - the first, I found first; the second made me wish I hadn't...

Naturally, the story you're most suspicious of is the story that tells you what you want to hear. Either in substance (if you're a regular guy) or in news values (if you're some kind of hack, pro or (raises hand) rank amateur).

So a tale of Iran in an Unholy Alliance with Uncle Sam to eject Saddam from, and promote free elections in Iraq - elections that the Shia 2:1 majority (united on sectional - or sect - lines) would throw to a government of ayatollahs - such a tale is bound to incite monumental doubt. A daytime-soap writer could do better.

(In my piece yesterday I referred to the eminently plausible suggestion (inspired by the example of Algeria) of an Islamist win in the first Iraqi polls: it's the Tehran conspiracy element that turns the story sour for me.)

But that, essentially, is the story the FT had last night from a Lebanese journo. It says that, when it comes to regime change in Iraq,
Tehran has been egging on Washington, albeit in private. Whenever the US has needed Tehran's help, the Iranians have been more than happy to oblige.

(Got to love that albeit - this type of story often seems to depend on the idea that the fact that the action happens in secret actually adds credibility (because, of course, no genuine diplomatic or intelligence stuff happens in public) - a sort of journalistic Morton's Fork. No wonder hacks are with pols at the bottom of the polls on professional integrity.)

However, we do get some evidence offered: the infamous, much-postponed, December 2002 opposition meeting in London, it says,
would not have been possible had Iran not encouraged its Shia cats-paw [1], the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri), to attend.

Then it rather spoils things:
Iran strong-armed Abdulaziz al-Hakim, the Sciri representative, to adopt positions similar to those espoused by Zalmay Khalilzad..
If SCIRI is Iran's cat's-paw, why would it need to do any strong-arming?

In any case, Tehran's return on its investment was
a political statement from the conference that - for the first time in modern Iraqi history - spoke of a "Shia majority" in Iraq. This meant the US was no longer able to ignore the sectarian reality of Iraq.

In addition to securing a friendly neighbour,
Even the hardline conservative faction in Iran believes there are benefits in the US war on Iraq. This faction calculates that by having the US army on Iran's border, it would be able to justify its repressive domestic policies. What better reason for maintaining a hardline stance than having the "Great Satan" on your doorstep?

This really is All My Children with sand. (Which is not to say it's untrue - merely very convenient.)

The piece concludes that
...the only unanswered question is whether Iranian military intervention will be direct or indirect.
Only?

At the end, we learn that the
The writer is a London-based Lebanese political analyst -
and, naturally, the credibility rating sags once more.

The second piece [2] is much more conservative. It looks at possible Iranian intervention arising through incursions into its territory or airspace; Iraqi troops seeking refuge across the border; being dragged in via connections with the Kurds (who are naturally at DEFCON 1 in relation to the threat of Turkish deployments into Northern Iraq), perhaps using the Badr forces of its cat's-paw SCIRI; and an ultimate commitment of Iranian forces if the Turkish situation got out of hand.

Of course, the second piece produces no more evidence than the first. The writer is
independent consultant with international organizations in Geneva,
apparently. But the matter-of-fact tone and modest suggestions for Iranian involvement carry more weight.

And, whilst we wait for a story that goes beyond desk research and speculation, that's better than the proverbial poke with the sharp stick.

  1. Not a word in the modern journalistic lexicon, more's the pity.

  2. Datelined March 25 - I know it's the Asia Times - but it's not even March 25 in Auckland yet!


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Sunday, March 23, 2003
 

Sidebar on existential threats


A correspondent and fellow-blogger has queried the suggestion in my piece yesterday that the last time that the US faced an existential threat to its security was during the Civil War: perhaps I'd overlooked the odd Soviet nuclear missile or several.

The idea I think I had in mind was this: is a guy standing at the foot of the Hoover Dam threatened by the billions of tons of water that lie behind it? No: because of the millions of tons of concrete between him and the deluge. Through the miracle of physics, the water is contained. If there were sluices (which there aren't, I believe), and some idiot were to open them - well, that would be different.

In the same way that the Soviet missile threat was contained by the countervailing threat from US missiles (and vice versa), saving an equivalent idiocy on the part of those on either side with control over launching the missiles. (The Cuban missile crisis I reserved for consideration, later on in the piece, on account of personal ignorance!)

And that's about as sophisticated as my thought got.


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State attempts sabotage of Bush Mideast domino topple - no Guinness record for George?


A story which broke a few days ago which somehow got through the net.

A theme of the blog, you might say, has been the evident desire on the part of some in and around USG (including, so far as I'm aware, the Pres himself) for a revolution in the Middle East, designed to lead to a group of liberal [1] democracies and free market economies throughout the Middle East (which, for economy of typing, I've dubbed GWACS).

And I've never been under much doubt that Powell, even after being launched into the dumpster by the UNSC process he so craved, and his merry men at State have been dubious about the whole idea all along.

The story, originally in the LA Times but reprinted in the Sydney Morning Herald [2] concerns an internal State Department report entitled Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes. According to the WSJ
portions of [the report] were read over the phone to the L.A. Times by an anonymous "intelligence official".

Love those nose-holding quote-marks: puts me in mind of Jeeves in the presence of a polka-dot waistcoat.

Dated February 26, the date of Bush's domino-heavy speech to the American Enterprise Institute, the document (as filtered by the leaker and various levels of news editorial staff - and therefore as pure as the driven slush) says (inter alia)
Liberal democracy would be difficult to achieve...Electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements
The thrust of the document, the official said, "is that this idea that you're going to transform the Middle East and fundamentally alter its trajectory is not credible".

Bush has, it seems to me, long given up on the State Department - after all, he only stuck with the diplomatic process for just exactly as long as it took for the military to get themselves and their kit to the start-line - so I suspect he shares the WSJ journo's weary disdain for the whole thing, report and leak together.

Some dudgeon from the columnists: for instance, Joel Mowbray adduces as proof of State's sabotage its
long-term undermining of the Iraqi National Congress.

(Whereas, to many of us, this (if true) might seem evidence of a rare exercise of sane judgement by State on Iraq.)

But there hasn't been the feeding frenzy that marked, say, the agony as Senate Majority Leader of Trent Lott (who? December archives passim).

Perhaps State is thought by the columnists too insignificant a player to be worth the Lott treatment; or perhaps they're held back by the imminence, and now actuality, of the shooting war.

The NY Times today takes a rather different line. It wonders whether the region-builders in USG are quite as full of Manifest Destiny as, say, Bush's AEI speech might lead us peasants to believe. It cites Robert Kagan thus
To some extent the ambitiousness of the administration is being overstated....It's very American for us to try to replicate our systems to the best of our ability. We didn't go to war against Japan with the intention of building a democracy there, but we couldn't imagine not building a democracy once we went in.

He seems to think the dominoes will fly, but that, much as the British Empire was (supposedly) got by accident- the reluctant empire [3], Uncle Sam, once esconced in Iraq will find nation-building thrust upon it, however hard it protests the modesty of its ambitions.

Others (Old Europeans some them of them, I'm afraid) are altogether gloomier: a Professor Heinrich August Winkler of Berlin is quoted thus:
What surprises me is the absence of worst-case scenarios in the conservative think tanks in Washington...There is a sort of optimism based on ahistorical assumptions and wishful thinking.

Winkler cites Algeria (which as a generator of key events in post-war history - and not just the 1958 military coup in France - has not got the attention here that it deserves) as an example of an Arab [4] state where, in December 1991, the first round of (relatively free) parliamentary elections were held; the Islamist FIS won a majority of the seats decided in that round, and were feared by the post-independence secular ruling elite to be likely to get into government on the second round of voting. Therefore, there was no second round, but only a bloody civil war [5].

The prospect of eventual elections in Iraq leading (thanks to the votes of the Shi'ite majority) to an Islamist government (and not of the watered-down Turkish kind) is something not largely trailed by the Dominists. Perhaps they don't wish to spoil the surprise of which country's next on the programme of the Rolling World War.

The Times somehow has to have an upbeat ending. There's the Iraqi middle class, to support development; and then, having mentioned as primarily US achievements everything from rebuilding Germany and Japan to the reintegration of Eastern Europe...into the democratic fold, it quotes a senior transAtlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund thus:
The world today is a better place because Americans have dared to be idealistic...because they have been willing to take on big historical projects that others thought were unfeasible.


Does he make progress with his German colleagues with that shtick? Now, I'm a little rusty on my Marshall Plan; but, turning up what comes to hand - Stephen E Ambrose's Rise to Globalism [6] - I read,
The general aim was to revive the economy of Western Europe, which was imperative for both economic and military reasons. As [Under Secretary of State] Acheson explained, American exports were running at sixteen billion dollars a year, imports at less than eight billion. Most of the exports went to Europe. If Europeans were to pay for them, they had to have dollars, which they could only get by procuring goods America could import. Otherwise, America's export market would dry up, with grave repercussions on the American domestic scene. Militarily, only with a healthy economy could Europe support the troops necessary to resist the Red Army.

Idealism might have been the presentational cherry on the cake - and, of course, might have helped to round up a few votes in the GOP-majority 80th Congress. But, so far as I can see [7], it supplied very little of the motivation.

And let's not overlook that earlier war fueled by notions of Manifest Destiny, which I mentioned on March 8, the Spanish-American War of 1898. Again I'm forced to rely on the tome that comes to hand [8]; which is full of the efforts of Messrs Hearst and Pulitzer to stir the idealism of an American youth already itching for a fight with the most lurid stories of life under the Spanish jackboot in Cuba. The fact that most of the stories were lies in no way diminished the idealism they stirred, of course. Or the circulation they generated.

And the fact that the war was objectively unnecessary was not viewed as an reason to forego the benefits which might accrue from waging it. The book states that (p233)
The United States thus went to war with Spain to secure ends which had already been secured by diplomacy
and quotes one Senator Spooner [9] thus:
...possibly the President could have worked out the business without a war, but the current was too strong, the demagogues too numerous, and the fall elections too near.

The only idealism to be found was in the suckers who bought and believed the New York World, enlisted (some of them), and croaked of yellow fever (a few, but too many). No one who was wised-up was the least bit idealistic.

This is scarcely a comprehensive or authoritative analysis of the motivation for past US foreign policy actions. Perhaps, though, it suffices to cast doubt on blanket assurances of US idealism - in such actions, past or present; and suggests that there may be good reason to investigate beyond the rhetoric of such claims.

And the conclusion to be drawn about the present plans for a post-Saddam Iraq? USG and friends got their war by every manner of manipulation of the truth that a well-paid operative could devise. They now apparently want us to believe that, in their dealings with what's left of Iraq, they will be motivated by idealism; and, that, because their hearts are in the right place, mundane realities which would stymie the rest of us will be no bar to them.

To which my advice is, Try it on Colin: it's a matter of public record that he'll believe anything....

  1. Not too liberal, of course...

  2. Inside leg measurement not required....

  3. The book of that name - subtitled British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-54 - by JS Galbraith. A period well before the gold-fuelled, Wild West era of South African empire-building under Cecil Rhodes (a name the Dominists might not wish to be associated with).

  4. Up to a point, Lord Copper. For Englishman and Scotsman, read Arab and Berber. It's a whole big thing...

  5. The material online in English is unpromising: the Library of Congress Country Study is updated to 1993; there's this and this from the most cursory search.

  6. 1st Ed 1971 (reprint!) p 155.

  7. As ever, views always liable to give way on the production of compelling evidence to the contrary.

  8. Politics, Reform and Expansion (1958) Harold U Faulkner.

  9. John Coit Spooner (R-WI), that is. President McKinley had, the book says (p232), turned over - in Pontius Pilate fashion - to Congress the question whether the US should go to war. Some things do change.


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Turkey: more information, more fog (but Erdogan speaks!)


The great invasion from the North (oiled by a copious supply of Yankee dollars) has long since been a dead duck. Now, the name of the game is Turkish army incursions: numbers, equipment, duration, purpose - and degree of consent from Uncle Sam [1].

Today's WaPo has a piece which has the Turks denying that any of its forces have crossed into Iraq. The Turkish Ambassador in DC is quoted as saying
We reserve both the option and the intention of sending troops into northern Iraq. But we have to do this in consultation with the U.S. administration, and hopefully with its consent.

Currently, there is no agreement on the point. But
Turkish officials say they reached a preliminary agreement with Washington for the introduction of as many as 30,000 Turkish troops into a 12 1/2-mile band along the border
when the US deployment agreement was being negotiated.

(What puzzles me, military mug that I am, is, What can the Turks do in a 12.5m band that they can't do within their own frontier? How, for instance, could they help their beloved Turcomans? Still less dissuade jubilant Kurds against locking in their desired autonomous status by creating military facts on the ground in Mosul-Kirkuk...)

US Central Command seems pretty relaxed on the movements that Turkey denies
U.S. officials said small Turkish military units, with as many as 1,500 soldiers, have been moving back and forth across the border for months.

But there's trouble from Berlin:
Germany announced yesterday that if Ankara became a belligerent, it would withdraw its air crews from early-warning AWACS aircraft that have been patrolling over Turkey on behalf of NATO.

Perhaps, the US wouldn't exactly move heaven and earth to jump into the breach, all things considered.

Following the BBC's triumph in getting then Foreign Minister Yasir Yakis to speak on camera, the Post has an interview with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan , the man who sacked him.

One expects little from these things, but the piece is not devoid of interest.

After the hack mentions the reduced US request for overflight rights only, we get the following:

Shouldn't Turkey have gotten on board earlier?

What remains is the negative approach of the U.S. toward full cooperation.


When did that occur?

The negotiations started back in January. We came to this point because we didn't have positive results from these negotiations. The U.S. media has a huge responsibility in this outcome: They showcased Turkey as a country just doing things for monetary gain. We suffered major damage after the Gulf War and our people and parliament know this. Now we are entering this war and will incur more losses. We must talk about how to minimize them.



And then
Do you think that American troops will have to stay on the ground in order to achieve this? There's a lot of apprehension that Kurds may start killing Shiites and Shiites may kill Sunnis. Your prediction?

It's obvious that some forces will need to stay there to protect peace.

For a long time?

The sooner we leave that country, the sooner the people of that country can learn to live with each other again.


Note the shift from American troops to we. On Turkish participation in post-war peacekeeping, Erdogan says
I do not have the authority to make that decision. But Turkey has always been involved in such operations.

On the Bush plan for democratising the entire region, he says
Turkey will definitely have an active role in that because Turkey is a model -- a secular and democratic country.

And, of course, General Hilmi Ozkok is right behind him on that. As on all matters...

  1. Triangulating the truth is an impossible task, of course - as with this from the Observer.


  2. The improbably named Lally Weymouth. British aristo?


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Saturday, March 22, 2003
 

The war - don't say we weren't warned! (Part 1)


Up till a few days ago, I had my mind fixed - in hope, rather than expectation - on the search for some method whereby a delay in the seemingly inevitable progress to war might be finessed. No legal byway too narrow, no diplomatic alley too dark.

Now, clearly, all that's over. So there's time to go back and take a look at the paperwork produced by USG and their close associates which put their intentions for Iraq and beyond in plain sight.

I appreciate I'm coming to this extremely late - I'm sure plenty can recite Rebuilding America's Defences and USG's National Security Strategy (both PDF) more or less off by heart. But I suspect it may be useful to take a look at these documents afresh as the B-52s start to leave their calling-cards.

As a gentle introduction, I thought I'd take this article based on Condoleezza Rice's October 1 2002 speech on the NSS. Rice is a Jefferson Davis, rather than Rhett or Yancey, when it comes to the Bush World Order. But the moderation is, I think, in tone and language alone.

In only the third paragraph of the article, we find Rice laying out her stall
...after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security....

It's important to recognise the nature of this claim. The last time the US faced
an existential threat to our security
that threat was carried by a bunch of guys led by - Jefferson Davis. The UK faced such a threat (for the last, perhaps the only, time) in 1940 - it lasted, at the outside, until 1944.

An existential threat is the thermonuclear weapon of justifications for war. Because, since the demise of balance of power notions of the management of international peace, at least, warfare is justified only by an actual or imminent act of aggression - and, in extent, is justified only in proportion to that aggression - an existential threat means that the gloves are off. No holds are barred. Defence by any means necessary.

No such war has been fought (not by any substantial power as aggressee, at least) in the fifty-odd years since the promulgation of the Nuremberg Principles [1]. If the US or UK or France became truly subject to such a threat, there seems little doubt that any and all such principles would be jettisoned. If, for instance, in 2030 the PRC threatened Japan with annihilation, and the only way of avoiding this was to vaporise most of the PRC's population, vaporised they would be.

That is what an existential threat is: the threat of annihilation justifies the response of annihilation. I have seen no evidence that the US is currently within a thousand country miles of such a threat. The 9/11 attack, and what laughingly passes as the intelligence response to that attack, have certainly demonstrated no such threat. But, as a justification for aggressive war, an existential threat cannot be bettered. In response, the sky's the limit.

Rice then characterises the NSS as calling
on America to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom.

Balance of power is another loaded expression - which Rice could scarcely have chosen in ignorance of the fact. It refers to the regime of diplomatic and legal practice governing relations between European states in the period (very roughly) between the end of the Thirty Years' War (in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648) and the start of the Concert of Europe period in 1815.

The idea, as I understand it, of the balance of power, was that the great danger to European peace was a single, over-mighty nation. (The example - albeit short-lived and unique - of that great monopolist Charles V in the first half of the 16th century was readily available.)

There is a brief (and, I suspect, relatively accessible) treatment of the balance of power period in Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars [2]. He cites the Swiss jurist Vattel [3] justifying the War of the Spanish Succession - who seems to fail to convince himself of the idea's merits, despite a deal of trying! And then he suggests that the real problem with the idea is that it reduces war to the mundane (to diplomacy by other means): removes the idea of a step-change when assault by exchanges of notes becomes assault by exchanges of gunfire.

Of historical interest only? Absolutely not. Why else choose an expression with such a clear and well-appreciated meaning? Rice surely intends us to understand the NSS to imply exactly that banalisation (to use the French word) of warfare to which Walzer refers. During the Cold War, the only shooting wars possible were peripheral ones - Korea, Vietnam, the many wars of Africa. No war between the US and the USSR was possible short of the nuclear. The most monumental step-change imaginable.

As a direct result of the end of the USSR - and clearly, the NSS is directed at that change, and the supposed inadequacy of the Clinton Adminstration's response to it - that critical barrier to entry to the use of war has been swept away. The first shot fired no longer implies Armageddon. And she evidently finds this liberating.

Warfare, shorn of its thermonuclear price-tag, is now available in penny-packets. Instead (to take a statistical analogy) of being a discrete function (all or nothing), it's now continuous. You can't be a little bit pregnant, but you can introduce a little bit of a force into Bongo-Bongo Land to ensure that the president doesn't get frisky with his neighbour.

It's this divisibility of military strength - that, during the Cold War, applied only on the periphery of the main diplomatic arena - which is now evidently at the heart of the new strategy. And balance of power is Rice's way of flagging the point up.

It goes on [4]
Defending our nation from its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government. And the United States has a special responsibility to help make the world more secure.

Sez who? A staple of English fiction of all kinds is the woman who arrives in a village and proceeds to horn in on all the local activities. She thinks she has a special responsibility too. She's self-appointed, and resented like hell.

Of course, for the US, this self-appointment to special responsibility is so much more convenient as a source of its action in the cause of peace than the UN Charter. (Which, by Richard Perle, as discussed yesterday, is now fit only for lavatorial use.) Since the US has devised the job for itself, it is sole arbiter of when and how it should be carried out.

And - just like the importunate incomer of fiction - the US is, in its own mind, acting as pure philanthropist. It's the Manifest Destiny complex I alluded to in my piece on the French equivalent on March 10.

The world sees good historical reason to believe that the best of American intentions will do to them what a certain USA unit did to Ben Tre back in 1968, generating an eternal motto [5] for US foreign policy:
It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it.

The fact that the strategy forges a link (which gains force in USG's mind with every blown attempt at proof) between
terrorists and outlaw regimes
gives further suggestion of the bad faith implicit in the assumption of responsibility for world peace over which, no doubt, USG feels the rest of us should all rejoice.

On containment, Rice is pleased to sneer thoughtlessly as a 1966 Beatlemaniac at her father's liking for Perry Como records:
some threats are so potentially catastrophic -- and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are untraceable -- that they cannot be contained.
Those Soviet H-bombs were just glorified Roman candles all along. Silly us.

And thence to preemption. What all that lauding of balance of power and crapping on containment was all about.
Preemption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats. As George Shultz recently wrote, "If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense." The United States has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense -- from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994.

Again with the unspecified existential threats, mark you. And a quote from a man who, from what little I know of him, was as Reagan's Secretary of State even more of a proverbial mushroom than Powell (which is saying a good deal) [6]. And Shultz's analogy is terrible: I suspect that, in those states where rattlers are to be found, the saner citizens in such circumstances go indoors and wait till the snake slithers away!

Cuba and Korea [7] I would have to take under advisement - but, in each case, my understanding is that the imminence of the threat was by orders of magnitude greater than, to pick an example at random, that offered by Iraq last week.

Rice seeks to take the way off her juggernaut just a little:
But this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light -- to the United States or any other nation -- to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

Now, in Iraq, we have the proof of the pudding: very grave? risks of waiting far outweigh the risks of action?

In a way, Rice's winking at the requirements of international law seems more reprehensible that Perle's proposal to scythe the lot down. Either way, we can have no illusions about the contempt in all parts of USG for the basic institutions for the maintenance of world peace.

  1. I covered some of the ground here and here.

  2. Originally published 1977; in my Penguin, pp76-80.

  3. Text available in Gallica in the second of two volumes there (pp20-43 - of the book, not the PDF file numbering) for the section on just and unjust wars - the section dealing with preventive war starts at paragraph 44 on p34 of the book).

  4. I'm cherry-picking rather than parsing here!

  5. Did anyone ever identify by name the actual guy who said that to Peter Arnett?

  6. Powell has yet to have an Iran-Contra scam to live through.

  7. On the 1994 North Korean crisis, these (scroll down) CRS reports are the only worthwhile online material I could find: in particular, this report on USG options and this on the unfolding of the crisis (with timeline).


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Legality of the war - State Department view (and a UK resignation on the point)


I mentioned yesterday that State Department lawyer William Howard Taft IV [1] had spoken on the subject; and that I would comment further when his remarks appeared on State's site.

They have - and they're not entirely worth the wait. Talking to the Attorney-Generals of the several states, Iraq wasn't the primary concern [2]. So his remarks were brief and tacked onto the end of the speech.

As I'd suggested in my earlier piece, his argument is follows that of the English Attorney-General - SCR 678, revived by Saddam's breaches of the SCR ceasefire 687, justify the present war.

Except for the penultimate sentence of his speech, when he goes beyond the English A-G by a country mile:
The President may also, of course, always use force under international law in self-defense.

Whenever a lawyer includes a casual of course in his argument, it means he knows he's on thin ice. And when it's in the final substantive sentence of a speech - and without the slightest semblance of any argument to back it up - that's like the yellow flag ships used to fly when they'd got the plague on board.

I've no evidence on the point; but I'd surmise that the self-defence argument is a point made in legal opinions produced by USG hawks, and is one about which State is less than convinced.

Apart from that snippet - lying entirely in the realm of conjecture - it's a thoroughly disappointing read.

Back in the Mother Country, Elizabeth Wilmhurst, deputy legal adviser at the Foreign Office, has resigned on the question of the legality of the war. The article suggests this may encourage anti-war MPs to put pressure on the English A-G to provide his full opinion on the subject.

Ha! Back in the land of reality, now she has the time, Ms Wilmhurst should spend the next month or two producing the document that the thinking world now craves: an exhaustive - 100,000 words at least, I'd say - fully referenced treatment of the legality of the war and related issues. So we're all legally forearmed for the next stage in the Rolling World War when it comes.

  1. Whose (presumed) relative did the (I'm fairly sure) unique double of President of the US and Chief Justice of SCOTUS.

  2. Which was the Avena case (Mexico v US) pending before the International Court of Justice on consular notification and other Vienna Convention matters in death penalty cases.


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Friday, March 21, 2003
 

Turkey: confusion reigns on overflight deal


The indisputable facts in the case begin and end with the passage yesterday by the Turkish Parliament of resolutions to permit US overflights for the Iraq war, and authorise deployments of Turkish forces into Northern Iraq.

But the FT is reporting (dateline March 21 10.16 EST) that USG and the Turks have failed to finalise an agreement that would permit the flights to begin.

Here's the puzzle: the sticking-point is supposed to be US insistence that Turkish forces are not deployed in Northern Iraq. But, so far as I can tell, USG is giving nothing to the Turks as quid pro quo for the overflight rights. Richard Boucher at State confirmed yesterday that there was no aid moving from the US side. So, why should the Turks accept their Iraq deployment clause?

On that basis, the US would be getting two things for nothing: the flight rights and keeping the Turks out of Iraq. Doesn't sound like much of a bargain. Surely, the surprising thing is that anyone's surprised the Turks are rejecting the offer.

Reuters (March 21 1232 EST) is suggesting that some diplomats are saying that
Turkey wanted a joint memorandum of understanding linking the overflights to broad Turkish freedom to operate in northern Iraq.

That makes much more sense - the Turks looking for a safe haven from USG vitriol provided they, for instance, kept within specified territory in Northern Iraq, or undertook only specified activities there.

Meanwhile, it seems that US special forces are already trying to take the oilfields around Kirkuk (FT March 21 1325 EST - with a good graphic of the fields, north and south) - though whether motivated by the perceived need to anticipate Turkish attempts to do likewise one naturally has no way of knowing [1].

It would be some help if one had a clearer idea of what the Turks wished to do in Northern Iraq. For instance, keeping out refugees would be something that might be done in a relatively narrow strip of Iraqi territory. But protecting the Turcomans (another oft-stated aim of such an intervention) would presumably need a deployment over a much wider area. Perhaps the entirety of Northern Iraq. (The actual danger that the Turcomans might be in from the Kurds is not something I've ever seen explained.)

However, I refuse to be daunted: there is an explanation of all of this that rises (at least) to the level of plausibility, and I will find it (eventually). That Coué guy has nothing on me...

  1. Dow Jones (March 25 1331 EST) reports that oil from the northern Iraqi fields is still flowing down the pipeline to the terminal at Ceyhan in Turkey. The concern is that, with no tankers arriving, storage facilities will prove inadequate.


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James Moran - he's not gone away, you know....


Were it not for the war, I'd be all over this. (Well, there'd be another coupla thousand guys as well....)

But I refuse to let it die. So take this as a sort of holding operation, pending time being freed up from bloodier matters.

Where are we? The last time he got serious attention here was my rather extended look at a thoroughly nasty WaPo editorial [1]. I was interested to see a piece in Forward (which I take to be a publication intended principally for a Jewish readership) also took a look at that editorial, as well as others in the NY Times and LA Times, who
all weighed in with stories during the last two weeks attempting to defuse any suggestion that a Jewish cabal was serving as a collective Dr. Strangelove to the president.


Despite their good intentions, each effort was guilty of intellectual gaffes. In the case of the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post, both newspapers ran editorials arguing that Moran's biggest mistake was possibly his lumping of all Jews together in one boat — suggesting, probably inadvertently, that the measure of acceptable rhetoric is proportional to the size of the Jewish cabal being described.


The tone of the piece is antipodal to the general run of the get Moran commentary (as in the WaPo editorial), whose writers seemed to trip up over their own feet in their anxiety to make an outcaste of the man.

(On a personal note, Gary Farber over at Amygdala who drew my attention to the WaPo editorial, said of my piece
he thoroughly doesn't get it, alas.

I'm relieved to find I'm not the only one.)

So, what are the issues left on Moran? I'd say these:

The circumstances relating to the remarks of March 3: for instance, why it took so long for these heinous comments to emerge into the public prints? Why Moran could have survived a chequered career, but suddenly find himself liable to out on his ear come 2005 for what seems, relative to earlier difficulties, fairly trivial.

(I've noticed (and this may or may not be significant) that pieces on Moran tend not to give the date on which he made the comments - thus giving the impression they were more current than in fact they were. And avoiding raising the question why the fuss was belated, and going on for so long.)

The substance of his allegations: duly cleaned up and put in an academically respectable form, it seems to me Moran's allegations - of the extent of the influence of certain individuals and organisations on the formulation of US Middle East policy - are both capable and worthy of serious research.

The implications of the reaction to Moran's comments: this clearly went beyond a mere get Moran campaign. The extent to which speech on the issue of Jewish influence in public life in general, and on foreign policy in particular, has been chilled by the furore is open to question.

Meanwhile, one can do worse than read Michael Kinsley's piece in Slate - Kinsley uncovers the site of an
organization [which] claims that the influence of the Zionist lobby is essential to explaining the pro-Israel tilt of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Thoroughly vicious characters singing from the Moran hymn-sheet. I was shocked....

  1. I tend not to read any paper's editorials. And I certainly use WaPo stuff a lot. Based on a comparison of the copy, this editorial seemed to be from an altogether different outfit to that that produces the paper's news stuff.

  2. I'm assuming - and here's a confession of ignorance - that, where polls distinguish Dem and GOP views, they are not limiting themselves to those registered as such - since some states don't require party registration, and, on the average day, many voters will not be registered at all. Thus polling results for Dems can't necessarily be taken as representative of the views of registered Dems.


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International law - State takes a more moderate view


Having flagged up the scorched earth 'policy' on international law proposed by Richard Perle [1], it's only fair to do the same for the rather more moderate opinion of William Howard Taft IV [2], the State Department's top legal man.

Unfortunately, all I have of it is the piece in today's WaPo. His valuable words in full - delivered yesterday - do not (so far as I could see) appear anywhere on the State Department's site. However...

There is clear authorization from the Security Council to use force to disarm Iraq,
he says.

When a lawyer says that a point of law is clear, he is whistling Dixie. If it was clear (eg, murder is a crime), he wouldn't need to say it.

It seems - the WaPo piece doesn't go into details - that he adopts the argument of the English [3] Attorney-General as previously discussed [4]: that the authorisation of SCR 678 to use force was merely suspended by Saddam's agreement to the SCR 687 ceasefire terms, and was revived on his first breach of those terms.

However, Taft hastens to add
The president may also, of course, always use force under international law in self-defense.

In so doing, of course, he joins that Grotius de nos jours, Ari Fleischer, who, in Wednesday's filibuster laid claim to a right to self-defence in customary international law that was nothing if not expansive.

Taft, at least, doesn't seem to have talked about tearing up the UN Charter, and resorting to the system run by that notable American jurist, Wyatt Earp, as Perle seemed keen on doing. But more detailed analysis of Taft's position will have to wait on the full text of his remarks becoming available.

  1. Who seems to fit the old British definition of somewhat to the right of Genghis Khan.

  2. The most durable political family today? I mean, how many Lincolns or Roosevelts are there in public office? (Hostage to fortune...)

  3. A word of explanation: often, English is a solecism for British or (in attribution) UK. Here, it's right. Scotland (as any Scotsman - please do call them Scotchmen - will tell you) has its own legal system, preserved when it joined England to form Great Britain in 1707. And it has its own equivalent of Attorney-General, the Lord Advocate.

  4. Here and here.


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Perle to world: what Security Council?


A truly spooky coincidence! Following my piece yesterday which attempted, in the words of a hypothetical apparatchik, to explain USG's view of the new dispensation in international law, Richard Perle has pretty much confirmed it, only (this being Perle) with the bark on.

Saddam Hussein...will go quickly...[and] he will take the United Nations down with him.

He is, however, prepared to see the do-gooding side of the UN survive, much as the ILO survived the League of Nations. But
What will die in Iraq is the fantasy of the United Nations as the foundation of a new world order.

Citing some TV appearance or other of liberal [1] British ex-pol Shirley Williams (whose effect on Perle I can well imagine having been apoplexy), he deals with her view thus:
A willing coalition of liberal democracies isn’t good enough. If any institution or coalition other than the UN Security Council uses force, even as a last resort, ‘anarchy’, rather than international law, would prevail, destroying any hope for world order.

This is a dangerously wrong idea, an idea that leads inexorably to handing great moral — and even existential politico-military decisions — to the likes of Syria, Cameroon, Angola, Russia, China and France.

He has a familiar prospectus for US foreign policy:
This new century now challenges the hopes for a new world order in new ways. We will not defeat or even contain fanatical terror unless we can carry the war to the territories from which it is launched.

However,
The most dangerous of these states are those that also possess weapons of mass destruction....Iraq is one such state, but there are others. Whatever hope there is that they can be persuaded to withdraw support or sanctuary from terrorists rests on the certainty and effectiveness with which they are confronted. The chronic failure of the Security Council to enforce its own resolutions....is unmistakable: it is simply not up to the task.

Still working that old terror-link shtick. And leaving no doubt that Saddam is a the top of a longish list....

So, with the UNSC out of the picture, what alternative structure of world peacekeeping does he propose?
We are left with coalitions of the willing.

That's it. Out with the international legal framework for the maintenance of world peace, in with the prime directive of the New World Order: Let George do it. With whatever chums want to tag along.

Now, what Perle says isn't necessarily USG policy. He's a flagpole guy - the ideas he runs up that folks salute can safely be adopted. One might have hoped, for example, that the guys at State would be having conniptions at Perle's modest proposal.

On the other hand, to watch Powell at those UNSC sessions, listening to Blix effectively call him either a fool or a liar over that dodgy photoint interpretation, and Baradei do the same about the fake Niger uranium deal [2] - I don't think he'd put up too much of a fight right now.

A matter I'll need to return to, I think.

  1. US sense.

  2. For both stories, work back from here.


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Thursday, March 20, 2003
 

The Bush case for a new international law of war and peace


Having passed on earlier today Ari Fleischer's bold, if not revolutionary, arguments for the legality of the current invasion of Iraq, it occurred to me that it might be worthwhile trying to present USG's case for a recasting of international law in the area.

There may be the temptation to treat the suggestion as utterly ridiculous, and suppose it will somehow just go away. The example springs to mind of Colonel Blimp who, commanding a force in a military exercise, was outraged at the audacious strategem of his 'enemy' who anticipated the appointed start-time by some hours in order to capture the Colonel in the middle of his Turkish bath!

Edited for diplomatic obscurity and Rummy-style zingers, (but with a great deal of Cliff Notes generalisations and stuff not checked, to save getting bogged down) the case might go something like this. (It's just supposed to get thoughts flowing on how to meet and defeat arguments of this sort - determining whether these are the best arguments for the Bush case - or are even tenable - is not the main object of the exercise!)

*****

The basic rule is that laws are made for man, and not vice versa. Laws needs must give way in the face of social, economic and political changes. Thus, within around a decade from 1965, most countries in the West liberalised their abortion laws. Not because of any international agreement to do so, but because the society in each such country had changed so radically that the old laws were simply no longer acceptable.

Similarly with the laws of war and peace: as warfare and the polities which carry it on have changed, so have the rules. In medieval times, there was the system of chivalry; no sooner had the great Grotius perfected the notion of the just war [1] than the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ushered in a new era where maintenance of the balance of power was the object of the system (in which pre-emptive war to prevent power imbalances from getting too great was part of the tools of the diplomatic trade); the end of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in the Concert of Europe idea - the powers settling their differences by round table discussion - supplemented by an increasing movement towards general international law fora (though for the moment in areas - like postage stamps - peripheral to war and peace). Then came the League of Nations, in the wake of World War 1; and then the UN.

In each case, the international law was suited to the geopolitics, not the other way round.

The present reality is that the US is now the only nation ready willing and able to perform a role as world policeman. In fact, its power enables it to do much more than that. Many of the world's nations would be vulnerable to the military pressure that the US is capable of applying.

But it has no intention of using its military power, except to dissuade and, if ultimately necessary, eliminate, governments who threaten the peace of their neighbours or the wider world. Only governments who supported terrorism or who themselves violated the sovereignty or peace of other nations (or threatened to do so) would be liable to be attacked by the US.

Where military action is necessary, the US intention is to see in place as soon as possible a government of local politicians and development of the state's economy along free market lines. The US must be permitted to recoup the cost of such operations through participating in the development of the liberated states.

Such development is not merely a cost reduction exercise: the US is committed to establishing democracy and free markets wherever it can. Where the threat to peace leads to regime change in a country, that's an opportunity to demonstrate in that country the benefits of both for the benefit of neighbouring states that aren't endangering peace and so aren't liable to suffer regime change.

The UN has never satisfactorily filled the role marked out for it in preserving peace - there never have been any Article 43 forces; the veto prevented the Security Council from acting (save for Korea - and that was due purely to the temporary Russian withdrawal from the Council) during Cold War; there was a brief flurry of activity after 1991 - but in Kosovo, there was action by NATO without consent; now, the post-war system based on the UN has irretrievably broken down.

In fact, the Kosovo precedent for humanitarian invasion shows the way: essentially a new concept in customary international law, it was widely pressed on governments by groups that are now opposing the Iraqi invasion. In Kosovo, there was no UN authorisation; yet the international community generally acquiesced in, or even came to support, the use of force by NATO to oust the Yugoslav regime.

The Kosovo example is also helpful in demonstrating the limits of national sovereignty. The process of regime-change does not destroy sovereignty - at all times, the state remains intact. The threat to peace offered by a country merely has the effect of suspending certain attributes of sovereignty - the right not to be invaded, for instance - until the threat to peace has been eliminated.

We shall have to consider what role the UN should retain over peace maintenance. In any case, it is no longer acceptable that the UN should retain (or even, be widely thought to retain) a monopoly over authorising the use of force in all cases except immediate self-defence of a member state under actual or imminent attack.

*******


My reading of the general trend of USG foreign policy is that they believe that the end of the USSR was a res novae of staggering proportions which the US has failed properly to exploit. Being the only superpower left is not, for them, a matter requiring modesty, still less apology. Just as it would be absurd to decline on principle to exploit a large natural resource discovered on US soil, so the temporary good fortune of the US's unchallenged status should be turned to account.

And international law should be moulded to fit the new circumstances.

More on this in the days to come, I'm sure.

  1. Based on medieval and Roman writers.


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Powell unleashes on hapless Turks


The last time we left the story (yesterday), Prime Minister Erdogan had decided to put to his ornery parliament a resolution (to be voted today) granting the US only overflight rights, and not the full nine yards that got voted down on March 1.

In the previous piece on the problem (on March 18), I suggested reasons why the Turks might want to sit on their hands completely. And had this word of warning for them:
...Uncle Sam has his attention on the main shooting war, and may neither notice nor appreciate concessions from Turkey in a way commensurate with their cost to Turkish pride and (in the medium term) political stability. (Think of the Powell Scowl from the UNSC footage, and ask yourself whether he's in the mood to be buddied up to by Turks....)

Well, Powell has done more than scowl. He's taken advantage of the situation to unload around a day's worth of DC sewage right on their heads.

Today's WaPo piece says that the order of events was that the Turks felt that the US were fast losing interest in using Turkey for ground deployments (which carried the $6bn aid quid pro quo); they had the resolution for full US deployment ready; then found out the $6bn was off the table for good (because the US had made other arrangements to cover Northern Iraq); then offered to put forward the airspace-only resolution [1].

This suggests that the overflight-only offer was a cunning plan (in the Blackadder sense) of one Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu to lever substantial aid out of Uncle Sam. It says
Powell later called back [Foreign Minister] Gul as the Turkish cabinet was in session and told him the U.S. did not want any bases nor the troop deployment motion and that it would suffice with the overflight rights for now and that Turkey would "not get a penny from Washington."


This created a coldshower effect on the government. On Wednesday Erdogan said the government was not after money and had fulfilled its military and political objectives


The upside for Turkey of no aid deal, of course, is that its hands aren't tied by undertakings to the US on Turkish deployments into Northern Iraq (which the new draft resolution also authorises). The righteous indignation of Powell may well fuel some of same in the hearts of the Turkish leadership. Who will have the costs of the war to bear without any US bunce. Creating facts on the ground around Mosul-Kirkuk - establishing a lien on the property part of the cost of whose salvage they, the Turks, will have borne - seems not unreasonable now there's no US cash to come. And the momentary satisfaction of Powell's exercise in diplomatic onanism may turn out to be expensive in the efforts required to dislodge them.

(The same article suggests that the Turkish military were unhappy that the resolution sent to parliament did not include full deployment rights for the US. The stated reason was that they had already let much military equipment out of the ports (Iskenderun, notably), and were afraid they'd violated the Constitution in so doing - they wanted their illegal acts ratified by the new motion!

Such assiduous concern about constitutional niceties perhaps shows that the military (Gen Hilmi Ozkok commanding) has turned over a new leaf - Care Bears in khaki. Or it's a stunt just about as crass as Turkish diplomacy seems to have been.)

  1. The remaining air issue, however, was the use of Turkish air bases for the war. The resolution that's gone to the Parliament doesn't include this right - which means tanker aircraft will be operating from Bulgarian bases.


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Ari's filibuster on international law


When it comes to technical matters, no one can blame a presidential spokesman when questions get ducked.

But, yesterday, in the spirit of William Walker and those other scions of the South who sought to carve out an empire where slavery could stretch its legs and breathe free, Ari Fleischer filibustered international law for George Bush. Only, if Walker was content with getting President of Nicaragua, Ari's filibuster is the equivalent of - Emperor of Brazil.

It's a model of brevity. Even shorter than the one produced a couple of days ago by his learned friend, the Attorney-General of England and Wales, about which I was somewhat critical [1].
Q ......the President in his speech two nights ago described the Iraqi threat as one that could be one to five years into the future to obtain either a nuclear weapon or something that could strike us, a non-imminent threat. In the President's mind, is he in this action, setting a precedent that the United States could now act, either preemptively or preventively, depending on how you define it, against a threat that is not an imminent one against the United States?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, here's how the President approaches this. He believes, number one, based on the reviews conducted by the attorneys, that there already exists a legal basis both in international law, as well as in domestic law, for the use of force to disarm Saddam Hussein. And that is also found in Security Council Resolution 678 and 687, as well as 1441. The President also believes that there is a gathering threat from Iraq, that with the failure by Saddam Hussein to disarm of his weapons of mass destruction presents a threat to the security of the United States. And therefore, he has come to the conclusion that after exhausting the diplomacy, that military force must be used if Saddam Hussein does not get out of the country.

That summarizes it for him. In terms of precedents, et cetera, David, I think some people have made the case -- and different people will have different historical views of these things -- but you can look at the Cuban missile crisis, of course, where there was a decision made without the United States being "attacked" to conduct a quarantine or an embargo, which, of course, international lawyers will tell you is an act of war.

And so I think you're going to find the historians, legal scholars will have differing conclusions about these matters. But the conclusion the President reaches is that Iraq's failure to disarm presents a threat to the people of the United States and, therefore, he is prepared to use force.


Q Even if you were absent the U.N. resolutions, if they didn't exist, he would still think he would have justification under the current circumstances?


MR. FLEISCHER: There's no question about that.


Because it's extemporised, rather than written down, and Ari isn't (doesn't sound like, at least) an expert in the field, it lacks the lapidary quality of the A-G's prose.

But, if I understand him aright, USG's view is that the invasion is justified on the following grounds:

  1. The war power in SCR 678, merely suspended by Saddam's acceptance of the ceasefire, was revived on Saddam's breach of the ceasefire terms, and was thenceforward available whenever its use was thought desirable.

  2. The right of self-defence under a combination of customary law and the UN Charter entitled the US to attack on the basis of a gathering threat to US national security that may prove to be an actual threat at some time in future.

  3. The right in customary international law, independent of the threat to national security, for any nation to use force to disarm Saddam of his WMDs.

The fact that, in his And so I think paragraph, he refers only to the threat to US national security as the ground for action doesn't, I think, mean he's going back on his third point.

The first ground is that given by the English A-G. The second has, I believe, been mooted - but evidently was not sufficiently persuasive for Blair's man to include it in his paper. The third seems to have been pulled from the Administration's collective fundament.

Clearly, with the Rolling World War in mind, Bush wishes to claim the broadest possible legal justification for the invasion: so that, for the next invasion, he'll be able to say that the international community not only acquiesced in the Iraq attack but did so on the basis of Bush's justification, and therefore have no standing (politically, at least) to dispute his using that broad justification again.

The answer to that, of course, is for the international community not to acquiesce in the legality of the Iraq invasion. I've suggested before that the UN General Assembly could request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice that the invasion of Iraq was unlawful. (Rather hoping this would be preventative - to coin a phrase!) But no reason, I think, why, now the war is a fait accompli, that the regular session of the UNGA in September should not pass a resolution requesting such an opinion - in anticipation of the next Bush war in the programme.

  1. Here and here.


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Saddam's northern battalions - further particulars


The previous piece queried exactly what good stuff Saddam had in northern Iraq, and why it wasn't already in the only place it apparently could do any military good - around Baghdad.

A little online scouting has produced a little more information on the subject.

UPI has a piece (March 18 1716 EST) from Thomas Houlahan (from James Madison University) who runs down Saddam's order of battle from south to north.

He identifies three regular army corps in the North, each with a decent mechanised division. There are also eight regular infantry divisions that apparently are militarily pretty useless.

Apparently, even if Saddam wanted to move his RA armour south to defend the capital, he couldn't, for lack of logistics.

Interestingly, he still puts in Mosul the Republican Guard Adnan division which sources quoted in the earlier piece said had already moved out of the area towards Baghdad. He also calls the RG Abed division shaky.

The NY Times as long ago as March 5 was saying that Saddam had decided to move the Adnan division from its Mosul base. (Implying a tipoff from the USIC [1] - natch - and that, at that stage the metal hadn't started to move.) On the other hand, it says that
American intelligence believes that the Adnan division is probably being sent to guard Tikrit, Mr. Hussein's hometown, north of Baghdad.

According to this map, the division would in any case have to pass through Tikrit to get to Baghdad (if it were using the main road). So who knows?

Earlier still, WaPo was saying on February 28
In the past few days, officials said, Iraq has sent trucks north to pick up elements of the mechanized division, whose tanks, armored personnel carriers and other equipment are now reported spread along a line reaching from Mosul to Tikrit, about 100 miles north of Baghdad.

And a senior military official said
We don't yet know if they intend to move the whole division, and we don't know if they plan to reinforce Tikrit or relocate farther south toward Baghdad....It'll take a while to get a better idea.

The WaPo piece says the Adnan move
leaves a single Republican Guard division in northern Iraq, near Kirkuk, as well as seven regular army divisions,

The UPI piece said there were 8 RA divisions in the North; and the Cordesman paper (9 months old) in my earlier piece also referred to the 2nd Baghdad Infantry Division as being a RG outfit at or near Mosul - the UPI piece has a RG Baghdad Division located south of Baghdad. It says it's
basically an armed rabble. The standard of manpower and leadership is very poor, and it would probably disintegrate on contact.
Is that the same outfit as the RG 2nd Baghdad referred to (with no slur on their effectiveness!) by Cordesman?

The London Times has a piece from March 4 based on the story of (supposedly) a deserter from the Adnan division interviewed in Sulaymaniyah (the most popular transliteration of many!). (The Globe (my earlier piece) interviewed in Sulaymaniyah a deserter apparently from the Abed division near Kirkuk.) The Adnan guy supposedly deserted on February 18 - so any move south presumably came afterwards [2].

Are we any closer to the truth about the current location of the Adnan division (or anything else)? Clearly not. [AFTERTHOUGHT below] On the other hand, after months of trying to pin down the lies and evasions of the same firm that's now delivering us the Rolling World War they promised, lying down and thinking of England at this point is not going to happen.

So, stumbling on through the pea-souper of war it is....


  1. An interesting listing of sources on the USIC here.

  2. Apparently, the Adnan deserter was kept by the Kurds under house arrest and
    there are gaps in his story, and issues he cannot or will not discuss - not least because his wife and young child are still in hiding in Iraqi-held Kirkuk.
    Whether he is telling the unvarnished truth; or a loonie or trickster; or an Iraqi plant; or a Kurdish scam - your guess is quite as good as mine.


AFTERTHOUGHT
This is right at any level of proof beyond plausibility. But, accepting the fact, let's consider for the sake of argument a conclusion that is plausible according to the infomation available, and internally consistent:

  1. Saddam has moved the Adnan division south either to Tikrit (which, as his home town, he may think worth a baroud d'honneur) or to Baghdad; it may or may not have already arrived at its destination.

  2. The other RG division, the Abed, he may (like Houlahan) think shaky, and not worth the necessary logistics to move it south (though it's an infantry, not an armoured division). Or it's there to hold up a putative advance from the north of US+ forces whilst Baghdad's defences are finalised.

  3. The three regular army mechanised divisions can't move for lack of logistics. This means they may not have the mobility to fight effectively where they are. Or may be stymied by lack of effective infantry support (I'm not sure how they would or could coordinate with the Abed division). Whether they have a choice may depend on the effectiveness of the death squads - what the London Times piece calls the siriya [1].

  4. The seven or eight RA infantry divisions are useless - and their generals presumably know as much. If the mutiny story had any basis in fact, it would logically be these generals (perhaps together with those from the RA mechanised divisions) who would have thrown in their lot with the Kurds.

That's as far as I can get for now.

  1. I have a problem with this word - the only online sources connecting the word with Iraqi death squads seem to be reprints of the Times piece quoting the deserter interviewed in Sulaymaniyah. Perhaps it's another transliteration problem, perhaps something else.


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The Great Iraqi Mutiny looks like a crock


Perhaps I should have called it. But I somehow had (past tense...) a little faith that the Financial Times (purveyor of a million financial facts a day) might take a modicum of care before printing a story apparently so redolent of wishful-thinking.

Another hot tip, it seems, from the extremely popular Ben Trovato.

The evidence?
  • I can't trace the story as having been picked up by any other news source following up the FT story;

  • in particular, the (so far pretty reliable) Mark Urban on BBC's Newsnight a couple of hours ago did a roundup of Iraqi forces deployments (including those in Northern Iraq), and did not mention that a few generals had already gone over the side;

  • the FT's latest story (updated March 19 12.19 EST) gives precisely one short paragraph to its scoop of 19 hours earlier.

I should, in fairness, have pointed up the reference in the original FT piece to the fact that the Kurds (who, no doubt, are - and let us not get ahead of the evidence - speaking with tongues at least as forked as Bush's and Blair's) were talking about regular units.

Even assuming the story were correct, that would still leave Republican Guard forces in Northern Iraq loyal to Saddam.

Now, in the last couple of months, I've kept away from military stuff (where my ignorance is utterly exposed!), and concentrated on the diplomatic and political side of things (where there's slightly more cover). Now, however, is the hour.

What do we know about the Republican Guard in Northern Iraq (heart-sink question)?

This WaPo piece from yesterday says
It is far from certain that the Iraqis plan to mount major defenses of [Mosul and Kirkuk]. An elite Republican Guard mechanized unit has withdrawn from Mosul in recent days and headed south toward Baghdad, Kurdish officials said. A Republican Guard infantry division and various government militias occupy Kirkuk, they said, and two regular army corps occupy the long, jagged frontier.

[Those Iraqi defections are very much Sherlock Holmes's silent canines...]

A peshmerga commander in the Kirkuk region told the WaPo guy that:
....Iraqi troops two miles south of here have been replaced by new arrivals from other areas. He said that the Iraqis routinely made these moves, to ensure that local commanders do not make contact with pesh merga commanders and work out a separate peace. "They have brought in a few more soldiers, but I don't think the number is significant," he said.

This Boston Globe piece from March 16 says
The 10,000-member Republican Guard unit based in Kirkuk has hidden tanks and machine-gun clusters in residential neighborhoods, marketplaces, and near hospitals, according to [a] Republican Guard defector, who fled three weeks ago and who spoke to a Boston Globe reporter last week in the northern Iraq city of Sulaymaniyah.

Now, being a duffer at military matters, I naturally ask, why, if Saddam has to be all about asymmetrical warfare, is he leaving any good-quality forces stranded in the North where they can do him no good? (The WaPo guy is also wondering this, evidently. I'll take that, pro tem, as supporting the validity of the question.)

According to one Amin Taheri in the NRO (March 18 1000 EST), he's taken steps on that point:
Because Turkey has refused to allow U.S. and allied forces rights of passage through its territory, Saddam does not expect any major attack from the north. This is why most of the Iraqi elite units, including the Adnan Division of the Republican Guards, has just been withdrawn from Kirkuk and ordered to move south to Baghdad.

That sounds more like it: not exactly a primary source for the withdrawn division, but any kind of corroboration is better than the attentions of the proverbial sharp stick. But most of implies that other RG units have also gone.

And, if the Adnan Division has withdrawn, which is the Kirkuk unit that the Globe was talking about?

The only reasonably comprehensive source on Iraqi military capability that I have is the report by Anthony Cordesman that I've mentioned before: Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment, the last edition (PDF) of which was July 21 2002. Of the Northern Corps of the RG, after mentioning a division guarding Baghdad, it says:
The Northern Corps also includes the 1st Adnan Mechanized Division at Mosul, the 2nd Baghdad Infantry Division at Maqloob Maontin-Mosul and the Al Abed Infantry Division at Kirkuk-Khalid Camp.

So, perhaps, the Globe was talking about the Al Abed Division. Still doesn't explain why it's not already been brought back to defend Baghdad. Perhaps the armour has moved first for logistical reasons, and Al Abed and the 2nd Baghdad (this military terminology is highly addictive!), being more mobile, are shortly to follow.

We'll see...

[CORRECTION The title, for reasons unknown, initially referred to a Turkish mutiny. If there is one, they're keeping it quiet...]


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Wednesday, March 19, 2003
 

Blair's big showdown misses the mark


A useful lesson in distinguishing statistics from substance.

The last time there was a big Commons debate on the war, 122 Labour MPs voted against Blair's Iraq policy. It was the largest rebellion of a government party in the UK in modern times - and seemed to mark the start of the worst period for Blair in the run-up to war. Not, I think, that Blair would have had any second thoughts - it merely reinforced his mock-Churchillian if necessary, alone view of his own role: almost, that the more people who were against him, the better would his example to History of the man who did what he thought was right [1].

But others evidently got the wind up - something of a momentum built as reports of the UNSC process yo-yo'd from elation to desperation on a 48-hourly cycle, with the infamous second resolution on which (subject to the unreasonable veto get-out) Blair had hung his hat in the balance.

The extraordinary outburst by aid minister Clare Short on March 9 (calling Blair reckless several times) seems to have broken the fever: just as, in an argument, where the claims and counter-claims get so extravagant that suddenly one party suddenly sees the funny side, and the tension just falls away.

Whatever, after March 11 (wobbly Tuesday I mentioned one paper calling it), the day after the Chirac veto interview, things seem to have calmed down. Recognition set in that Blair would go for war, resolution or not. And that there simply weren't the votes in the Commons to stop it (thanks to the Conservatives policy of rimming Blair on the issue).

So, come the second debate yesterday - with war imminent - and an even bigger rebellion: 139 Labour MPs this time. With Blair spending hours talking face to face with groups of MPs, it looked as if he thought the vote would actually matter.

But the rebels were never close to what seemed agreed to be the mattering threshold - getting more than half of the 410 Labour MPs to vote against Blair. Yesterday's debate was a classic dead rubber.

Some amusement, though, in the end of Clare Short's personal 'rebellion': after apparently taking command of the cavalry charge against Blair and his war, not only did Blair not sack her (which, had it been anyone else, he surely would have done) but, in the end, she didn't resign either! And why not?
Most important, she said, was the attorney general's advice that an attack would be legal under international law: "Other lawyers have expressed contrary opinions but for the UK government, the civil service and the military, it is the view of the attorney general that matters and this is unequivocal."

So that miserable scrap of paper [2] served some function after all...

  1. Blair's peculiar obsession with, and warped idea of, history: this blog passim - as here.

  2. Previously discussed here and here.


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The Mideast Power Bazaar now open - Iraqi generals are buyers


It's been something of a theme here: the unintended consequences of Bush and his merry men unleashing war on Iraq (with options on anywhere else in striking distance). And Kurdistan has always seem fruitful territory.

And now the FT is reporting (March 18 1700 EST) that a deal has been done: the Iraqi military commanders and Arab civilian leaders in the Mosul-Kirkuk region have agreed not to fight the US+ forces [1].

That's good news for USG, right?
"The tribes and the army have switched to Masoud Barzani," said Saad Bazaaz, a member of the co-ordinating committee of the Iraqi opposition, referring to the head of the Kurdistan Democratic party.

There the complications begin.

Yesterday, the Kurds, through the good offices of Mr Fixit Zalmay Khalilzad, agreed that all of their forces should be placed under US+ command during the war against Saddam. Quite what that means in practice will depend on, amongst other things, what the Kurds are called on to do militarily (if the local Iraqi forces are with them, this may not be much), and the power of the US+ prescence in Iraqi Kurdistan (again, if there's no local opposition from Iraqi forces, the area won't be a priority, surely).

I suspect that this is a defensive move on the part of USG - they want to reduce the variables as far as possible - rather than any intention on their part to use Kurds actively against Saddam's men out of Kurdish areas. (Coordination with British forces will be tricky enough!) And how soon the Kurds start to freelance will also be interesting to see. The alliance between the Kurds and the Iocal Iraqi generals would also surely be a complication arguing against allowing an active Kurdish role in the war unless absolutely necessary.

There are, of course, two parties in Iraqi Kurdistan: Barzani's KDP [2] and Jalal Talabani's PUK. The fact they all they seem to have is a co-ordinating committee after a decade of self-rule in the NFZ is an indicator of their visceral mutual loathing. History shows that the Kurds love to fight; but best of all, they like to fight each other. Proper warfare, like proper democracy, requires a minimum of two parties. For the former, at least, in Kurdistan, the KDP and PUK are those parties [3].

Now, I'm rusty on where the fight between them has got to - last time we came across the PUK, it was when the party's peshmerga troops were fighting supposed AQ missing link Ansar al-Islam. Quite what the disposition of forces is between them is yet another thing for the research to-do list.

But, it seems from the story that it was not possible for the Iraqi military to join with a united Kurdish entity: they had to join with the KDP.

Why the alliance? As usual, it's down to educated guesswork. The generals see that Saddam is finished; and, unlike their colleagues in Baghdad, they have the choice of leaving the sinking ship. Rather than retire into private life - if any of them have one - they see a delightful synergy in teaming up with Uncle Sam's kinda-sorta allies in the region where the oil is. From henchmen of Public Enemy #1, they're now with the Good Guys.

Moreover, they have something to offer the Kurds in return: protection from the Turks making a preemptive strike of their own (to protect the Turcomans and choke off the floods of refugees, natch. You mean there's oil in Mosul......)

And the generals have all these men who need paying and feeding and whoring - where's the cost of that coming from, I wonder? Because no general will give up the force he commands unless he has to. He never knows when they will come in handy.

Suppose an easy US+ victory, in which the Turks are restrained from partying in Kurdistan (perhaps under an agreement with USG, finally [UPDATE]), and the Kurds formalise their existing autonomy. A few months pass and, if history is any guide, the PUK and KDP will be shaking each other warmly by the throat. A general with trained (if not exactly crack) troops under his command can do himself some good in such a situation.

Skip ahead some more, and suppose US plans for the Greater West Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (hereinafter GWACS) are shelved, owing to recession or change of chief executive or whatever. As usual, Uncle Sam loses interest, and a power vacuum arises. The natural tension between Kurdish separatism and the nationalist urges of the Sunni element in what is no long the 'opposition' but the government reaches breaking-point. Iranian interference might be expected [4].

What more natural than a Sunni general, allied to an element of the Kurds, should sweep down from the north to bring order and stability - get the trains running on time, that sort of thing?

The merest speculation on my part: but, surely, the sort of calculation that informed the generals' decisions. Unlike Tommy Franks and his boys, they've got no return ticket. They're there for life, rather than merely for the duration. And difference in planning horizons is just one of the asymmetries that can work against the US+ political and military effort in Iraq.

Funny thing, though: the article mentions not a single general by name. We must know who they are, surely? Have something in the way of a bio on each of them? The fact that the reader doesn't know them from Adam is no bar - half the people namechecked in the average paper fall into that category. Presumably the journos were actually told the names; checked them out, and so forth?

Because a stunt to frighten off the Turks would come in pretty handy right now...

  1. I'm stuck for a name for the combined forces of US, UK Australia and Uncle Tom Cobbley (those guys are so unreliable!) used in the invasion. I'd use allied, except that that rather implies approval; and (as this piece indicates) there will be all sorts of alliances, some of them opposed to the US. US+ is crappy - but it'll do for now.

  2. Also sometimes referred to as the PDK, according to the name in Kurdish - the byzantine multiplicities of the language mirror those of the politics.

  3. That is an absurdly Cliff Notes version - the Kurds have subtle and complex history out the wazoo - I touched before on Saladin; and the connection of Mustapha Barzani ( Massoud's father) and the USSR here, for instance. The Schleswig-Holstein Question is worth $100 on Millionaire in comparison. But it'll do for now.

  4. As I discussed before in the context of the recent elections, Iranian politics is also in flux.

[UPDATE]
Prime Minster Erdogan has decided, according to an AP report datelined March 18 2018 EST, to put to the Turkish Parliament by Thursday a resolution giving the US overflight rights (but nothing more); a resolution on ground deployments seems to have been put off indefinitely.


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Tuesday, March 18, 2003
 

US public cheers on Bush - but do they get the costs of the new strategy?


The Iraq war has already been lost - in the sense that there's going to be one.

What's now on trial is the new US foreign policy of which it is the first fruit: pre-emptive invasion and aggression as an active tool of diplomacy - a stance no first-rate power has adopted since World War 2. Not even the USSR; though, of course, she was pleased to incorporate in her sphere the Eastern European lands crossed as she chased after the German army - and, like the US, provided funds and personnel to various proxy wars.

I'm struck by a couple of today's WaPo pieces: the first has a poll (details here)showing 2:1 support or better for Bush on various war questions - and the UN now stinks the place up! The piece suggests that the recent increase in support for Bush is from Dems rallying round the flag.

None of the questions asked about the economic cost of the war.

In the other piece, the nation's representatives are in la-la land, talking about a budget that assumes the war will cost zimmo. It quotes a Senate gofer thus:
There's a real Disneyland quality to debating the fiscal future of the country before we incur fiscal costs of such unknown magnitude....There's an inexplicable inertia that's driving these bills to the floor of Congress now. This is a case not for Alan Greenspan but for Dr. Phil.

No doubt there are reasons: any estimate will take on a life of its own - the military will feel it their national duty to spend at least the estimated amount - and all sorts of inferences about war strategy would, rightly or wrongly be drawn.

But the cost of the new policy - the Rolling World War - involves more than the cash outlays for the Iraq invasion. I'd say it was more more like the end of the Cold War - only in reverse.

In the years after 1990, defence expenditure was slashed (for the peace dividend) and forces pared down (or, as with some European countries, slashed to ribbons) - because the threat that justified the cost had disappeared. The cost structure followed the choice of policy.

Now, we have the desire on the part of some close to the Administration to reshape the entire Middle East (and who knows where else?) in an image more pleasing to American eyes. It's hard to see how any progress in that direction could be made unless significant levels of US forces were maintained indefinitely in theatre.

Costing a one-off invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam might assume that, during the reconstruction phase, the commitment of US forces would fall dramatically, with most forces required for reconstruction being provided by other nations (including France and Germany, of course). But if more 'progress' is to be made in the region [1], dictators will require the threat (if not the actuality) of shot and shell raining down on their heads before they'd disgorge their fiefdoms. And only US forces are available for that purpose [2].

Moreover, living off the land by taking advantage of oil and gas resources - one way of recouping some of the costs of a forward policy in the region - could only be taken so far before it became counter-productive. And not every country in the region has an Iraqi level of oil reserves.

Given the unpleasant conditions a standing US Middle East army would have to endure, regular rotations would be essential. And, of course, substantial numbers would not return Stateside on their own two feet.

A businessman like Richard Perle would scarcely be involved in a large public offering without business plans and cost and revenue projections and contingency evaluations out the wazoo. Has anyone worked any numbers on the costs and benefits to the US of the new forward policy?

I'd guess not. Because, if they got out, they might put a crimp in that great boost in his numbers that George is getting right now...

  1. Where? Perhaps Syria has the right size and location to be the follow-on target....

  2. Interesting to be a fly on the wall when Bush invites Tony Blair to contribute British forces to the founding of the Greater West Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: whether he says it with ten minutes of effing and blinding or with one of his patent eye-rolls, I'd be fairly certain he'd turn Bush down. Of course, Gordon Brown may be PM by then. In which case, Bush wouldn't waste his breath.


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UK Parliament debates legality of the war...


Following the release by Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith yesterday afternoon of his 'opinion' - deeply unsatisfactory in both form and content - on the war (as I discussed), the House of Lords [1] had a short debate on the legality question [2]. Several lawyers spoke during the debate, and, in the absence of any decent online treament of the issue, their comments are worthy of notice.

I've skimmed the text, and nothing new of substance leapt from the page. What positively screams from the page is the utter contempt of HMG for those who deploy deliberate and thorough legal argument to come down on the other side of the question.

First, one had the A-G's paper (no lawyer would dream of calling what was released an opinion - not one he'd expect anyone to pay for, at least): one may imagine the imperious Sir Abraham Haphazard, Trollope's A-G in the Barchester novels, majestically opining on some ecclesiastical matter - and his reaction to the lowly Rev Harding's piping up requesting an explanation of his reasoning.

The ill-grace, condescension and miserliness in the amount and character of information divulged by Sir Abraham could scarcely have exceeded those oozing from Goldsmith's note.

Then, in the debate, one found that the author of the note, though a member of the House of Lords, and therefore able to justify his position in debate, had declined to appear. And the defence of HGM's case was left to a female Labour peer (who I'd never heard of) [3], who, in arrogance and disdain, continued where the A-G left off.

A flavour of her contribution:
Speaking as a non lawyer, I have been greatly perturbed in recent months by the outpouring of statements and opinions by many lawyers on this subject with specific reference to Iraq....

I should at the beginning enter a caveat that, of course I am not speaking of all lawyers and, of course on Iraq, as other issues, lawyers hold very different views and have spoken on different sides of practically every aspect of the situation.

Of course also I have no problem with those who have political and personal objections to military action against Iraq and I understand very well those who have political and moral problems with that, but I do take issue with international lawyers who invoke legality when that is not justified, and is not in truth what they are really talking about.


Referring to a letter co-written by the peer who opened the debate [4]:
...before military action can be lawfully undertaken against Iraq a Security Council must have indicated its clearly expressed assent. It has not yet done so.
she continued
But I am sorry, yes it has, and it is surely peculiar that international law teachers should be so simplistic and ignore the context and history of 1441. They give no indication at all that there could be a doubt about their way of reasoning. I recognise that people have their own agenda and positions on controversial issues, but I expect them to have the intellectual honesty not to use the cloak of academic cover to claim to my mind a very doubtful objectivity.


When I was an undergraduate, I was told by an eminent professor of law that there was no such thing as international law. I certainly do not want to accept that, having been a fervent supporter of the UN since my school days, and I am an enthusiast for the International Criminal Court......

...I am perturbed by the ease with which international law practitioners seem to be able to use it as a political football.


I am not a lawyer, and that is not said apologetically. I am glad that I am not because I think it helps me to see clearly the differences between what is a matter of law, of politics, or of morality - something which some lawyers all too easily blur. It is of course acknowledged that international law is not an exact science, but it surely does not have to appear as bizarre as some of its practitioners have made it appear in recent months.


You need an extract of decent length to get the point. The tone is peevish and dismissive - the shrill support of a sidekick (but note that gushingly girlish reference to the UN!). She exults in her own ignorance as a layman, to stand aside from and mock the waggonload of legal monkeys and their sleazy trickery [5].

Like the A-G, however, her argument proves rather too much: isn't the A-G also on that waggon? If what we're actually talking about is politics and morality - why should we pay heed to his words of wisdom?

The fact that, in what is (so far as I'm aware) the only opportunity the UK parliament will have had to focus on the legality of the war, Blair has let his corner be defended by such a woman is a fair indication, I think, of his real view of the importance of the question.

One contribution went so far as to make explicit what I surmise Blair's real case to be on the legality issue: Lord Desai (an Indian Labour peer) asked rhetorically
I ask myself whether I want the ideal law as it is enshrined in a book, or can I reduce human misery by an act of aggression, which may be illegal but may be just?

To hear a member of the left-liberal European intellectual elite making the case for the Rolling World War of George 'I Am the Law' Bush is not something one gets to do every day. Come VI Day, it may be a different matter...

  1. The deeply unsatisfactory upper house of the UK parliament.

  2. Text starts here.

  3. The Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, no less.

  4. Lord Goodhart.

  5. After some struggle, I finally remembered where I'd heard the tone and attitude before - the Penelope Keith character in The Good Life, in highest dudgeon in dealing with some recalcitrant tradesman.


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Turkey reviewing the situation on the war...


The movement has so far been in the eye of the beholder. But the fact that the US-Iraq war will take place changes the geopolitical landscape, and the Turkish authorities have to make a judgement.

So far, we've had a meeting last night at the Canyaka Presidential Palace chaired by President Sezer, with old lags Erdogan, Gul and Ozkok (March archives passim) in attendance. The statements afterwards as reported seem to my untutored eye devoid of any steer. But the NY Times concludes on the basis of more extensive briefings than available to us plebs that the government spokesman
was almost certainly referring to a new vote by the Parliament in the next few days.

The suggestion is that a new vote would recognise that the war had started, and there was no point in Turkey trying to buck the inevitable.

One problem I have in getting any feel for what's going on is the continuing lack of any detailed information at the level of individual Turkish MPs - in a situation where vote-counting is obviously vital in forecasting how the new vote (if it comes) will turn out, we still (OK, I still) have no evidence on the question why those who rebelled last time did so. Without that information, all one has is informed guesswork. Which, frankly, I can do pretty much as well as some highly paid Times hack.

On the US side, it seems that money is back on the table - the Times mentions $6 bn - much lower than the sums mentioned before ($15bn was the number last talked of, I recall - perhaps the mix of cash and loan guarantees has changed). As far as US military requirements, the suggestion is that it may be too late - even if authorisation for deployments were given today - for a significant effect on the planning of US operations [1]. Either way, airborne forces would have to be used in the initial phase to cover Northern Iraq.

The US can even work around the lack of Turkish overflight authorisation: though Jordan refuses to accept flights that have crossed Israeli airspace, it would take US planes coming in through Egyptian airspace.

On the Turkish side, clearly an authorisation, however militarily irrelevant in the short term (and who knows how long the war will go, of course), would start to mend fences with the US , and the cash would come in handy. But a swift vote seeing the Parliament overruling itself within weeks for the purposes of getting the big bucks and rimming Uncle Sam may not appeal to AKP rebels; or establish Turkey as a partner whose word (one way or the other) can be relied on. Arabian Nights images of fawning oriental underlings prostrating themselves before the Sultan spring to mind - and prostrate is a position with is neither dignified nor conducive to rational thought or effective action.

The other key Turkish interest, stability/refugees/oil and Northern Iraq, also does not unequivocally indicate granting an immediate authorisation. Any deal for cash on deployments would undoubtedly contain a clause keeping Turkish forces out of Northern Iraq, except for necessary action in self-defence of Turkish soil. No deal leaves the Turks not exactly free agents, but certainly not tied down by explicit, recent and categorical undertakings to the US.

One way for Erdogan to go would be to decide not tp go for a revote in an unseemly rush, get substantial forces into Iraq to stake the Turkish claim (as it were), smoke out Kurdish forces (who may well be less keen on fighting Turkey than brave talk might have suggested) and prepare for larger and more permanent deployments that might be necessary (or possible) depending on the progress the US and allies are making in the war with Saddam.

Clearly, all that is speculation. It's merely intended to show that, although Erdogan no doubt wants to start off on the right foot with the US [2], and wants whatever cash he can prudently take, other considerations [3] may militate against a girlishly gleeful rush into Uncle Sam's embrace.

And Uncle Sam has his attention on the main shooting war, and may neither notice nor appreciate concessions from Turkey in a way commensurate with their cost to Turkish pride and (in the medium term) political stability. (Think of the Powell Scowl from the UNSC footage, and ask yourself whether he's in the mood to be buddied up to by Turks....)

For Erdogan as well as for the rest of, the motto should remain pro bono publico, no bloody panico.

  1. A ten day lead time for the 4th Infantry Division to unload and get into position, apparently.

  2. The fresh start is of course illusory: Erdogan has been pulling the strings all along. But the formalities work in his favour here.

  3. There's a Latin tag (genuine, not cod!) audi alteram partem: a judge should hear both sides before making up his mind. (Not a bad motto for this blog, in fact.)


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Monday, March 17, 2003
 

What now for Turkey?


The Saleable Six having put on their realistic interpretation of Rorke's Drift - with a weedy, white Texan in the role of Zulu Chief Cetewayo - and retired more or less unscathed (so far) from the field [1], Turkey tries its Churchill impression - standing alone against the might of the Great Aggressor (who, this time, is strangely the one without the moustache).

It's tough. The package on offer from Uncle Sam (now snatched back) was mostly loan guarantees [2]. But, following its being taken off the table, the markets have tumbled - the stock market by 8% today. According to this analysis, two-thirds of the existing IMF facility has already been taken. And other lenders have factored in a US handout in judging Turkey's creditworthiness.

On the other hand, a They hired the money shrug of the shoulders from USG is inconceivable, surely. The need to sustain Turkey as the keystone of the regional power structure is as great (for different reasons) as it was when this odd man out was invited into NATO in the first place. USG might not perhaps be averse to an enhancement of the military role at the expense of the power of the AKP government, but surely not if economic collapse was the reason for the change.

And, of course, the US have the tactical question of Turkish plans to occupy parts of Northern Iraq. They need leverage to get the Turks to agree to keep out - the war is complicated enough. But, without an aid carrot, how?

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, we've had one aid bill (HR 1047) that Turkey was deliberately excluded from benefiting from - and now the strange Armenian connection I noted earlier today which seems keen on blocking aid to Turkey.

I'm no expert in these things. But I do seem recall a good many Latin American defaults where the fecklessness and indifferent endowments of integrity of the governments concerned proved no bar to USG encouraging the IMF to treat their countries with kindness and consideration.

I've mentioned the beggar my neighbour idea before. The sting of international humiliation may be so sharp, otherwise sane men may come to believe that a brief orgasm of revenge is worth the years of cost and tedium in putting matters right. Perhaps, they may not even think of the consequences much at all. I somehow suspect that the current Administration are in just the right mental condition (mad as hell and not gonna take it any more) to do something that crazy.

Meanwhile, UPI has other bad news about Turkey- even if Bush acts his age, Prime Minister Erdogan still has to face a 32% chance of a 1999-scale earthquake in the country before 2010. And the chance of a tanker collision in the Bosphorus.

Now, I have no brief for Turkey. The EU membership saga - nothing but deception, much of it self-deception, based on the fiction that the country is European - is time-wasting, Blairite pie-in-the-sky. And the Turks know that quite as well as do EU member states.

But USG can have no doubt as to the geopolitical importance of the country, having just failed diplomatically to capitalise on that importance to enhance their invasion plans. It would be absurd for it to allow Turkish political and economic life to collapse merely to prove some kind of point; or seek to make a Turkish descent into chaos a warning to other friends of the US to do what they're told.

A maturity test for Bush, I think. Let's hope he passes.

  1. Thus doing rather better than the 24th Regiment of Foot (later South Wales Borderers).

  2. A useful piece here on the Turkish experience in the 1991 war, and US mishandling of the recent negotiations: arrogance and an insistence that crisis was no reason for Turkey to slacken off on IMF austerity targets (just marginally hypocritical) are cited in particular. It puts the package at $6bn aid plus up to $24bn in guarantees - a $15bn total is the number most often cited.


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Attorney-General's bald opinion: war is legal


I didn't expect much - and I haven't been disappointed!

The full text of the opinion (as redacted) will scarcely test the slowest modem.

As trailed beforehand, he argues that the original authorisation of force against Iraq (SCR 678) was merely suspended by the ceasefire resolution (687); and that any material breach (MB) (it's that phrase again!) of 687 would revive that authorisation.

Now, the UK opinions that appeared last year denied that the ceasefire worked that way. They maintained that, once Saddam had accepted the ceasefire conditions, the 678 authorisation ceased to have effect. The fact that the UNSC decided to remain seized of the problem implied that any subsequent use of force required would be authorised by a fresh resolution.

The Peacerights opinion (p34) quotes an article thus:
no one would seriously claim that member states of the UN command would have the authorisation to use force if in 1999 North Korea flagrantly violated the 1953 armistice

Wanna bet?

The trouble with the Goldsmith argument, it seems to me - based on the most preliminary look at his laconic text - is that it proves too much. If true, the authorisation under 678 revived (if that's the word) on the first MB by Saddam. No subsequent resolutions have been necessary in order to provide such authorisation. No need to imply it. No need for 1441.

Thus, talk at the UN last autumn about the automaticity of any authorisation to use force in respect of 1441 (para 12 of the CND opinion) involved a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal position, if Goldsmith is right. Because 1441 or any other resolution were irrelevant to the question of whether there would be authorisation - in fact, by Goldsmith, there'd been a standing invitation from the UNSC to the 1991 coalition, operative from Saddam's first MB of 687, to re-invade Iraq any time they damned well chose!

And all that bleating and breast-beating from Tony we've had to suffer was entirely unnecessary.

Goldsmith points out (para 4) that, by 1441, the SC found that Iraq was in MB of 687; and then says (para 8)
Thus, the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and so continues today.

Why the perfect tense for an event that must have happened a decade and more ago? He's surely not seduced into thinking that 1441 could have affected the validity or extent of the 678 authorisation. Because that would be to bring into question whether that authorisation in fact existed immediately prior to the passage of 1441.

And he needs 678 authorisation to have been tripped by breaches by Saddam of 687 because, he says, 678 is the source of UNSC authorisation for the upcoming war.

The fact that early drafts of 1441 (issuing from the US/UK side, I assume) included the magic words all necessary means (CND opinion para 7) - which are generally accepted as authorising force - is less than helpful to him. Why would international law specialists - he isn't one, I believe - waste time with a specific authorisation of force that had already been authorised for several years previously.

There is also the puzzle that 1441 should have been been concerned to establish Saddam's breaches of 1441 (as, for instance, in OP 4) when, by 678, there was already a green light to invasion.

And why, in the extensive list of preliminary paragraphs in 1441, no mention was made of the fact that authorisation to invade was already in place. Not thought important enough?

I'll return to Goldsmith's words of wisdom later.


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Congressional near-silence on the war - Suite et fin


I've talked before about the strange silence on the Hill - from Democrats in particular - on the war.

The Hartford Courant has a piece on the scant attention the war is getting from the nation's representatives, at least in the halls of democracy themselves.

The excuses given are fatuous beyond belief: Senator-Candidate Lieberman is quoted as saying that
Part of it is that Congress has already talked a lot about this, and we voted last fall.

Reminiscent of the man who declined the present of a book on the ground that he already had one.

Apparently, last Tuesday, when Representatives had the opportunity to speak on whatever was on their minds, war was not discussed but
designating a Capitol room as the "Richard K. Armey Room"
was.

One might ruefully contrast reality with the picture painted by the 1st Circuit in Bush v Doe (the failed stop-the-war case I mentioned on March 14) concerned with claims that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its powers to the President (p25):
...Congress has been deeply involved in significant debate, activity and authorization connected to our relations with Iraq for over a decade......

But, lately? Not so much.

Think tank guy Steve Kretzmann says the Dems are divided and don't want to display the fact on the floor; and the GOP don't want to have to speak on the record in favour of the war in case it's a fubar.

Now, that's a moderately grown-up-sounding explanation that almost rises to the level of plausible - unlike so much one hears about the war. So I'm treating the Case of the Mystery Congressional Silence as closed.

Of course, war-talking pols away from the Senate and House floors are ten a penny [1]. In particular, the perils of the Little League (there are still nine Dem presidential candidates just now, aren't there?) dividing into feuding pro- and anti-war camps are being noted all over (as here and here).

On the other hand, over the next few weeks, they could grapple hand to hand, and how many would notice...

  1. What they say on network TV isn't on the record, whereas a floor speech watched by two dozen on C-SPAN is, I suppose. I clearly have a lot to learn.


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Turkey: US reprisals on war aid and the Armenian Caucus


A couple of decades ago, there was something of a British TV sensation when an adaption of the John Le Carré spy novel Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy was first shown.

A story appropriate for these times, perhaps; and - when I last saw the tapes - it had lasted reasonably well. The series is today remembered, I suspect, mainly for its utterly convoluted plot - which would turn 180 degrees in an instant without the audience having the slightest idea why.

I don't think there was an Armenian Caucus in the script. But there were plenty of allusions to similar shadowy entities.

And, according to WaPo, the Turks might well find themselves on the wrong side of one as a result of their nixing of US troop deployments.

There's this:
In a letter last month to Powell, Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. (D-N.J.), co-chairman of the House's Armenian Caucus, said Turkey should not require incentives to support a U.S.-led war aimed at ridding Turkey of a dangerous neighbor.

One has two immediate questions:
  • why should a New Jersey vowel be co-chairman of the House's Armenian Caucus? and (less facetiously)

  • why should there be a House[] Armenian Caucus at all?

According to this - drawn from the 2000 US Census - there are roughly 320,000 Americans with Armenian ancestry. A bit more than one American in a thousand.

Unsurprising, therefore, that their impression on the consciousness ranks well below that of Poles, Germans, Italians and other ethnicities.

Most surprising, however, that the Congressional Armenian Caucus should (according to this) amount to no fewer than 111 members!

Since when? And why? In terms of hunting where the ducks are, it's surely more ridiculous than the GOP chasing black voters - which (post-Lott) I discussed on January 21.

What peculiar concern is it of those few Armenian-Americans to point out that
Turkey should not require incentives to support a U.S.-led war aimed at ridding Turkey of a dangerous neighbor?

Two possible but simplistic explanations spring to mind: Caucasian oil and the 1915 genocide. But how these factors actually operate to get 111 guys signing up to a caucus; and New Jersey Congressmen writing letters - there, I'm stumped. For the moment.

Turkish-Americans [1], never fear - according to the Post piece, you have a caucus of your own - evidently, for reasons which escape me, a recent formation. It mentions four guys in the House as members.

Now, there has already been one aid bill (HR 1047) from which, as I mentioned before, Turkey found itself excluded - supposedly temporarily.

If Erdogan doesn't get his parliament to behave, stand by for the revenge of the Armenians. Or perhaps not.

  1. The Census says there are around 115,000 Turkish-Americans.


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Blair and other ministers' principles


He thinks he's the only one that has them. At least, according to the guy who did the infamous Clare Short interview broadcast on March 9 - Andrew Rawnsley. But they do: so many, that up to 30 of them - almost all small fry - may resign on the Iraq issue, he says.

Now, it is (just) possible to be over-cynical about politicians. Even junior ministers have privileges that are hard to give up. Many, I suspect, have genuinely held beliefs which contradict HMG policy on Iraq.

But, before Jimmy Stewart descends from on high to lead us in Auld Lang Syne with organ accompaniment, let's not completely surrender to the Hallmark Moment.

The real reasons for resignations (if any) will be more numerous than the tally of resigners. The war is a handy pretext. It also offers the tantalising possibility of res novae - a new regime. Under a Gordon Brown now biding his time. In general, a minister would, by previous disloyalty to Blair, scarcely recommend himself to Brown as he formed his government. But resignation on a matter of principle vital to the nation? A matter on which Brown himself might, had he been free to do so, have been tempted also to resign over?

That, it seems to me, is where principle enters the equation.

I'm mindful, as ever, of the message of Mr Smith Goes To Washington: as politicians, you can have demagogues or crooks. Crooks are preferable [1].

  1. But not those - step forward Tony Blair! - who are crooked for their ideals. (Who are really Demagogues Lite.) Far better, the kind that stuff their pockets with bearer bonds....


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A post-war career for Tony?


This piece in the Observer gives three alternative suggested outcomes for the diplomatic process on Iraq, each with its estimated chance of coming through: 5/10, 7/10 and 2/10.

What profession would savour those numbers? Crooked bookmakers, of course! Tony's experience in bending, folding, spindling and mutilating the truth makes him overqualified to take over a pretty extensive operation, I'd have thought. And will all those gullible Observer readers as punters?

I got the horse right here, the name is Paul Revere....


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Top UK Government legal advisor to rubber-stamp the war


On Wednesday (March 12, that is), the story was that the UK Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, was of the opinion that no Iraq invasion would be legal (under international law) unless authorised by a further UNSC vote.

Now, it seems, his belief is to the contrary.

There are, of course, a number of possibilities: he may have changed his mind; or the reporting is right now and wrong then (or the reverse); yesterday's story may be a lie from the Blair spin-machine; or a misunderstanding. (Or some other permutation I can't now be bothered to compute.)

If true, it would, on the face of it, certainly be unhelpful. The more so since, it seems, his opinion will actually be made available to the mob. (This, I believe, regularly happens with US A-G's opinions - but not here.)

Goldsmith, unlike one of the other legal ministers, Lord Irvine, is not a Blair best bud. The impression he will give is one of - if not, impartiality, then at least not being a Blair Siamese twin (such that cutting the bond would certainly result in his own demise).

On the bright side, official legal opinion on the Iraq situation has been a Sahara, in which the Goldsmith opinion will (if it actually appears) be an oasis. Anthony Jay, co-author of Yes, Minister [1] wrote a book [2] one of the precepts of which is: if you're opposing a government body on something, the first thing you want to do is to make them write about it: give clarifications, answer complaints, and so forth. They're almost bound to say something you can exploit.

Quite what (if anything) will finally emerge from Goldsmith is unclear. (There is so little legal red meat on the war, I shall - despite myself - be disappointed if it's half a page ending with an In my opinion, the war is legal.)

And, clearly, it's a mark of Blair's desperation that he should break precedent and make the opinion available.

The question now will be, will it be enough to win back Labour MPs minded to rebel in the Commons debate that will start on Tuesday - many of whom had hung their hats on the (thoroughly displacement activity) notion of authorisation by a second UNSC resolution.

The key figure to note in the vote (which may, apparently, not take place till Wednesday) is whether it would have been lost had it not been for votes from the Conservatives [3]. Isolating Tony from a majority of his party is the first stage of the essential crucifixion process. Many Labour MPs, however, may (in that quintessential English phrase) rally round.

The odds, I feel, are still stacked in favour of Blair - and the Rolling World War. On the other hand, I can't help feeling he envies his Gulf expeditionary force their supply of khaki trousers....

  1. Which I namechecked yesterday.


  2. How to Beat Sir Humphrey: Every Citizen's Guide to Fighting Officialdom - I think that was it (only heard extracts on the radio). Out of print now, apparently.

  3. The mother of all druthers is that the Tories find some plausible procedural gizmo - excuse, whatever - that both enabled them to abstain on the vote, and did not dissuade Labour MPs from voting against. In that way, Tony would be defeated (with any luck) and war plans thrown in the air. This is a footnote, remember. Won't happen in a million years. That's what a druther is, isn't it?

UPDATE
A blow-by-blow account of Blair's Iraq week here.


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Moran - what exactly is the charge?


As I explained at some length in my earlier piece, I'm concerned in the case not to defend either the man or his statement; but rather on account of
  • curiosity - almost entirely unsatisfied to date! - as to the subject-matter which with he unwisely dealt; and


  • suspicion that, in some way not yet clear to me, the complaints so forcefully made about Moran imply a proposal that certain matters ought not to be discussed - whether by politicians or anyone else.


However, a correspondent and fellow-blogger has commended to me the WaPo editorial of March 12 which roundly condemns Moran and his comments with all the authority of a (if not the) leading political newspaper in the nation.

Which brought me back to Moran; and to ask, What, exactly, is supposed to be wrong with what he said? And to take the Post's editorial as representative (as best as anything could be) of the indictment against him.

I think we can dismiss straight away the notion that WaPo thinks he should resign because he has made a statement which is factually incorrect. One would have few politicians left after six months if making factually incorrect statements were made a resigning matter.

There must be something else. The first statement in the editorial helpful to identifying the gravamen of the charge is this:
...by blaming American Jews for an Iraq policy he opposes, the seven-term congressman has confirmed our opinion about him.

Interestingly, it does not even open with an allegation of falseness: Moran's crime is merely stated as
...blaming American Jews...

The piece goes on to say (emphasis mine)
it may be useful to examine Mr. Moran's assertion

Again, the verb suggests that the question of the truth or falsity of the statement is, in its eyes, of secondary importance to the identity of the persons referred to - or, even, entirely irrelevant - in establishing Moran to be guilty of that crime.

It then cites Moran's statement:
If it were not for the strong support of the Jewish community for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this...[1] The leaders of the Jewish community are influential enough that they could change the direction of where this is going, and I think they should.

Immediately after the quotation, it continues:
The comment perpetuates a stereotype of Jews as a unified bloc steering the world in their interest and against everyone else's.

Here, as in the rest of the piece, words are apparently chosen with considerable care. Note that Moran's comment is not itself characterised as embodying a stereotype; but it's suggested that it perpetuates such a thing. How? one may pause to ask. By Moran's massive authority and celebrity throughout the nation? No evidence is given for the assertion - which on general knowledge seems implausible, to say the least.

Then, stereotype. The Webster's definition is
a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment

One might query just which groups in the US (surely we're not attributing worldwide influence to the Congressman from Alexandria, VA?) might hold such a view. There will be some - but in how many will that view be perpetuated by Moran's comments?

What evidence does the Post have of the extent to which the stereotype which it states is held by Americans? Or does its assertion represent
an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment?

The piece continues
Over the centuries anti-Semites have used this libel...

Let's just pause there a moment. Already, we have the introduction of the A-word. Not, of course, that the article directly accuses Moran of being an antisemite. But it does say that Moran has done something that antisemites have also done.

And note the word libel, following a mere four words after anti-Semites. This word (again, one may consult Webster) is in today's usage typically employed as a legal term of art; incorrect or false statements in politics are not naturally called libels - though many may indeed in theory be defamatory. The allusion that is evidently sought here is that of the blood libel: that is, the medieval myth that Jews killed Christian children in order to use their blood to make matzos for Passover [2].

Not every American might pick up the allusion - but the readers (Jew or Gentile) of the Post editorial, I suspect, mostly would. By innuendo (in effect, if not in intention...), Moran thus finds himself placed by the paper in the company not only of antisemites, but specifically of those who perpetuated (to coin a phrase) a fantasy that got many Jews killed.

Let's carry on:
....to distract attention from their own failings and to instigate violence and discrimination against Jews. In the United States today, though anti-Semitism is far from eradicated, such violence may seem a mercifully distant danger.

Is the Post denying (or, at least, declining to assert) that Moran's comments will have any effect in the US (the only country, surely, where any significant number of people have heard of him)? Or merely suggesting that any such effect would tend not to have a violent outcome? The use of may seem appears to promise a subsequent but - followed by evidence that this impression is false. Such an appearance is misleading.

But Mr. Moran's comment will be used to concentrate the poison of anti-Semitism in many parts of the world where it remains virulent and dangerous.

The Post here is making a bald and downright assertion of fact for which no evidence is adduced. That the remark of an insignificant legislator from the Old Dominion should travel the world is hard enough to accept; that it should do something as radical as concentrating the poison of anti-Semitism around the globe seems purely fanciful.

I say again, this is a matter of fact. For aught I know, the Post may be right. But, where's the evidence? There are mountains of this antisemitic propaganda online in English - and a lot more in Arabic, I suspect. Newsgroups are full of the stuff. If Moran's name has appeared, for example, on Egyptian or Saudi websites in support of a pile of lies, the heirs of Woodward and Bernstein wouldn't even need to crease their suits to find it!

[Hey! I'll give them a head start: I've just looked on Google; and I count 38 Usenet threads mentioning James Moran since the story broke [3] (all of which looked relevant - but not all seemed to be antisemitic propaganda).]

A separate point: the Post doesn't actually say that Moran's comments are antisemitic. It's quite possible, I suppose, that purely innocent comments, a slip of the tongue, even, might equally serve the purpose of antisemitic propagandists. Are such comments also blameworthy?

Surely not. Except, as in the reaction to Moran - and in the speech of Lawrence Summers I referred to in my piece on March 12 - for the suggestion that there was a class of statement that was
anti-Semitic in effect if not in intent

In other words, that antisemitism was, as it were, a crime of strict liability. No mens rea required. The most cursory Google search will show that this formulation seems a popular one. The phenomenon is one that deserves to be looked at. Another time.

Only then is the factual question raised by Moran directly addressed:
Jews in fact are far from unified in their opinion of President Bush's Iraq policy.

If it were Moran's facts with which it was concerned, no doubt the Post's ample resources would have enabled it to demonstrate its own assertion (negativing his) with polling data and other more or less objective evidence. It does nothing of the sort.

It continues
Nonetheless many people argue, often in more sophisticated ways than Mr. Moran, that the Bush policy is being engineered by and on behalf of Jews or Israel.

This is a worrying turn. Crude statements of (supposed) fact (including - perhaps, especially - statements on matters related to ethnicity) have a tendency to be wrong. What the Post is pleased to call
more sophisticated
statements covering much the same ground may be more easily be proved to be accurate.

To take an old example - the assertion that Africans (and their diaspora) can run faster than otherwise comparable athletes of other races. Such a bald statement is liable easily to be falsified. However, scientific study does show that there are certain Africans who do benefit from a genetic predisposition to be better athletes.

There are, I believe, some who think that studies on the relative athletic performance of Africans ought not, as a matter of principle, to be done, however scientifically valid they might be.

Similarly, what the Post seems to be suggesting is that, since the area (the impact of American Jews on USG Middle East policy) may be dealt with crudely (as by Moran), that fact alone in some way condemns more limited, targeted, evidence-based statements covering the same area.

The piece proceeds
At its most conspiratorial
- pausing there to wonder at the choice of word! -
the theory goes like this. A small group of Jews (sometimes referred to, in a kind of code, as "neoconservatives" or "neocons") decided years ago that Saddam Hussein should be overthrown to improve Israeli security.

Hitherto, the complaint has been that Moran is attributing uniformity to a heterogeneous American Jewry. And from that, we move to a supposed argument concerning a small group of Jews.

Having given no space to adducing evidence to prove incorrect what Moran actually said, it devotes 117 words (out of 700) to an extravagant counterfactual, in tendentious language, which we are - presumably - meant to take as an example of the
more sophisticated
formulations which it seems to wish to tar with the Moran brush.

There are a further 148 words, in a somewhat self-congratulatory tone, spent in demolishing this ramshackle Aunt Sally.

At last, the up-sum:
It's perfectly legitimate to debate Israel's place in U.S. Mideast policy, or Israel's own behavior; charges of anti-Semitism shouldn't be permitted to stifle criticism.

One notes at this point, on seeing the copyright notice, that the Post will, in fact, make no attempt to deal with the factual correctness or otherwise of Moran's statement.

And then one proceeds to study the Post's suggested amendment to the First Amendment. At first blush, there seems to be the implication of a water's edge sort of concept: one may talk about Israel, so long as one doesn't mention American Jews. (And let's keep the words
perfectly legitimate
ringing in our ears, by all means.)

Then
It's not anti-Semitic to stand up for Palestinians' human rights.

The Post, then, identifies two classes of statements: those which are legitimate and those which are anti-Semitic. It is generous enough to exempt standing up for the human rights of Palestinian's. But what, say, of their political rights? And how stand up?

Almost there.
It wouldn't necessarily be anti-Semitic -- just demonstrably wrong -- to argue that Mr. Bush's Iraq policy is motivated primarily by a desire to protect Israel.

You can hear the intonation - a plunge, followed by an interrogative upward swoop - on the necessarily. The writer clearly wants to leave open the allegation of antisemitism where he can [4].

And, strangely, whilst he has spent 148 words on disproving his rather arch and melodramatic counterfactual, he spends none at all on the utterly unconspiratorial statement that he mentions in this sentence.

Almost done.
But the argument moves from merely wrong to patently offensive when it attributes to Jews or "the Jewish community" a single view and a nefarious influence.

What happened to the more sophisticated methods? Are they to be deemed for the purpose of the Post Amendment to attribute a single view even when they do not? Surely mere sophistication will not permit them to enter the legitimate class?

And - again to be noted - the writer conflates an effective or persuasive influence with a nefarious one. What is objectively the same phenomenon might well be described in approving or pejorative terms depending on the view of the speaker.

No doubt, supporters of Israel would be pleased if it were the case that certain Jews had the ability to bring their influence to bear on Middle East policy so as to favour that country's interest. Others might not be so pleased. Does the Post imply that only the former group may speak of any such influence?

At last, a statement of pure fact:
Some Jews and some non-Jews, in Israel and America and Europe, support disarming Iraq; some don't.

Then a very strange sentence indeed:
In their respective countries, they try to make the arguments on their merits.

These, one takes it, are those debaters of whom the Post approves. So what does respective mean in the context? Is it saying that only when Israelis argue in Israel, Americans in the US, Luxemburgers in Luxemburg can their contributions be legitimate?That would be the natural meaning of respective. But in context, it would be absurd.

It would, in any event condemn this poor blog utterly!

Perhaps a little dictionary work is required at the Post.

Don't think, however, they haven't saved the best for last:
Mr. Moran and his ilk should do the same.

Not only is the good Scots word ilk utterly misused [5], but it is, I suspect [6], just the sort of expression one might have expected to find in some newspapers a hundred years ago in disparaging reference to Jews!

And what, according to the Post, is Moran's ilk, one wonders?

Testing the paper's strictures:

If one were, for instance, to identify individual Jews in positions of influence in and around the foreign policy agencies of USG who are either tasked with a responsibility relevant to its Middle East policy, or whose previous work has suggested they maintain a strong interest in such policy, would that be legitimate? And if one examined their public utterances on the subject, to measure their proximity to stated USG policy?

If one were to examine the resources (financial and human) employed in lobbying USG on behalf of organisations whose membership was to a substantial degree Jewish; to compare the positions for which such lobbying argued with those eventually taken by USG?

If one were to research the links between the Government of Israel and such organisations, by way of funding or exchanges of personnel or other kinds of cooperation?

If one were to do these things, and report one's findings in a measured, scholarly fashion?

Would all or any of that be legitimate?

Or would it only be legitimate if it were done, not for the purpose of blaming but of commending such activity?

Because, my suspicion - which, lacking the necessary evidence, I do not assert as fact - is, when the Post talks about Moran's ilk, it's not overly concerned with Jew-baiting street-corner Paddies with too much stout in them [7] (who, if they exist any longer, would scarcely read the rag); but rather to seek to introduce into the minds of those with more sensitive souls the notion that the entire subject of the influence on USG Middle East policy of some American Jews and of some US organisations in which Jewish members are prominent is an obstacle-course of invisible beams, moved at random times to random places - tripping any one of which would incur the penalty of the brand of Antisemite. Bringing national obloquy and professional ruin.

If one really were a conspiracy theorist, one might suppose the Post editorial was cast in the way it was precisely to avoid giving guidance as to how its Amendment might be infringed. Certainly, as I've mentioned, at several places the choice of language used seems to raise legitimate (how that word gets around!) questions as to the intention of the piece.

Approach the matter from a different angle:

One might, with care, take by way of analogy the informal rules of etiquette that were as important as the law, if not more so, in perpetuating the regime of Jim Crow. The rules were complex and varied from place to place. This, as I understand it, served several purposes: to put Negroes who moved from their own county in fear of transgressing the local code (and the 'justice' they would likely receive as a consequence); to set a standard of docility and submission that 'good Negroes' could meet (if they knew what was good for them); to mark a colour line that whites would know not to cross (and the penalty if they did would be pretty clear, too). And so on.

It seems to me that one might analyse the Post editorial as having a similar effect - if not a similar intention. One first establishes that the penalty for infringement of the rules is dire; one makes the rules uncertain in their ambit (an improvement on Jim Crow! [8]); and one ensures that there is safe haven (under Jim Crow: stay put; under the Post's Mideast Amendment: don't comment about American Jews and USG's Israel policy).

Is there compelling evidence that the Post deliberately sought this effect? No. Which is why, in contrast to the several assertions of fact in its editorial (most of them tendentious in character and colourful in language) for which it fails to provide evidence, I do not assert it to be true.

The editorial does, however, illustrate the need for care with the use of language and argument, one's own use, and one's analysis of others'. In that respect - and in that alone - it might be said to be worth the bandwidth it occupied.

  1. Here, the piece identifies Reston Connection as the paper that was first to report Moran's remarks.

  2. If one searches in Google on libel jews the results (the first page of them, at least) are almost all concerned with the blood libel myth.

  3. The first post would appear to be this, at Mon, 10 Mar 2003 22:41:32 EST - some seven days after the comments were made. Why so long?

  4. Even though the following just seems logically to exclude antisemitism in all the circumstances where the argument referred to is used.

  5. I'm disappointed to see its use sanctioned outside the technically correct context by Webster. Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1926) puts and his ilk in the class of Worn-Out Humour!

  6. Subject to the adduction of evidence to the contrary, of course!

  7. As organised by Coughlinite Joe McWilliams in the South Bronx in the late 1930s (Samuel Lubell Future of American Politics p89).

  8. Not that I'm suggesting that the Post supports Jim Crow! (Well, not in 2003, at least.)


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Sunday, March 16, 2003
 

First, the US screw up the diplomacy - now, for an audacious war...


USG diplomatic performance over the Iraq pre-war seems to be up for media analysis now the real war's about to begin. As with this piece by veteran British war hack Max Hastings - identifying the real problem that diplomacy was at all times subject to military timetable. Other powers were bound to see the US viewing the inspection regime as a sort of vamping till ready charade; the weather-dictated timetable (inspections over by April, no matter what) naturally killed in the womb all thoughts of US good faith in the matter.

(He also has some USG guy suggesting in a public forum that
Russia's economic importance is on a par with Denmark.
Surprising they took so long with that veto threat...)

This WaPo piece says that Clinton diplomatic failures was a topic hit by candidate Bush back in 2000.

For the Bush failures, it blames his team's theory that what their allies were really afraid of was that the US were afraid to commit - that a situation requiring intervention would come along and somehow the Yanks would weasel their way out, leaving the rest holding the baby; coupled with the notion that, if the US really did take a lead, the rest would be so relieved, they'd be happy to be able to slipstream, and would play nice.

Why these absurd notions should have taken hold amongst a bunch of guys who could paper the Oval Office with their degree certificates is not clear. Wish being father to the thought, perhaps, amongst a group intending a forward policy in the Middle East (the weasel idea was Wolfowitz's), and fantasising a free pass for redrawing the map out there.

Again, it sees the crucial design flaw as the running in parallel of mutually inconsistent policies: preemptive war to a timetable would never fly diplomatically - if Bush had to be persuaded that going the UN route was desirable (rather than a legal necessity), he could scarcely be thought to have placed much reliance on the process. And, as it turned out, he hadn't.

Another Post piece suggests part of the failure may have been done to lack of diligence - compared with Bush Sr, the current model and his men just didn't invest the same time and effort (and the piece gives examples).

It quotes Joe Biden on the incompatible twin-tracks idea - strangely, though, he says, this policy started last August, the blunder he so perspicaciously fingered did not prevent him voting for HJRes 114.

It took the French till mid-January to reach the same conclusion, apparently.

Meanwhile, at the business end of the ordnance, the military men also have their incompatible twin-tracks. One moment they're giving the journos (pathetically pleased to be playing soldiers in khaki) the tour, and swearing they're ready for anything; the next (as here) gloomily drawing attention to the enormous risks. Sergeant Mutt and Corporal Jeff, one might say. Who knows what they really think?

Those briefing the Post guys have a pretty convincing line in deflating victory balloons.

Viewers of the BBC sitcom Yes, Minister will recall that, if the head civil servant wanted to dissuade his minister from entertaining a particular idea, he would call it brave. The military equivalent, it seems, is audacious. Good job they're wearing khaki...

Rapid movement, leading to long supply lines and increased risk of friendly fire incidents - for which, from memory, the British are much worse equipped to handle than US forces - on the way to Baghdad. And the prospect of a long siege and street fighting - the Stalingrad bogey (if that's what it is) - when they get there.

And it gives the impression that Gen Tommy Franks may think the plan is a crock. (There was all that fuss last year about Bush thinking the JCS plans for war were too boring, involving large numbers steamrolling Saddam. Where was the fun in that, after all? Bush preferred the dashing, Ramboesque inside-out strategy. My recollection is that it was every bit as crazy as it sounds. Perhaps the current plan is Son of Inside-Out....)

An ex-USAF veteran of the 1991 war is quoted as saying that the current plan
....is probably one of the most risky in our history as it launches us off into terra incognita for the U.S.: our first preemptive or preventive war; our first attempt to democratize an Islamic state; and establishment of a very narrow beachhead in the midst of a billion undefeated Muslims.

Piece of piss, then....


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Moran - what exactly is the charge?


I follow up my piece of March 12 on Virginia Congressman James Moran's controversial comments with an analysis of a rather extraordinary WaPo editorial on the subject, commended to me by a correspondent and fellow-blogger.

I had previously put the follow-up piece in the backup blog (it's long!). But that doesn't seem to have worked out. So, I've reduced the home page for this URL from three to two weeks' posts, and reposted the piece here.


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Bush's first defeat of the war? Let's hear it for the (not so) Saleable Six!


If Professor Higgins could embark with implicit confidence in his success in training a flower-girl to behave like a duchess [1], I had no such faith in the abilities of the Six to resist the blandishments of US diplomacy on the Iraq resolution.

In what I think is the first piece I did (back on February 2) discussing the chances of a Mexican standoff (as it were) with Uncle Sam, my forecast was fairly bleak:
ultimate Mexican yes to a UNSC motion authorising an attack is, I'd guess, still odds-on .

The numbers on their own looked tough - they needed five to pass the USU resolution, we needed two to block it. The identity of the Six, however, seemed to make a US win a pretty good bet: three poor Africans - dependent on aid; two Latins - dependent on trade; and Pakistan - still trying to get back in the world's good books after the 2001 military coup.

Now, I haven't followed every twist and turn - for the very good reason that news coverage tends to be limited to
  1. the modern equivalent of the old newsreel shots of politicians going in and out of building - boilerplate statements, designed to say nothing (as the Irish phrase goes), fencing interviews, and the like; and

  2. the rumour mill - punditry, guessing-games, informed sources and such nonsense [2].

But the general line from the Six has seemed to be: it's none of our direct concern; you're the P5 - you work it out between you. And none of them has allowed itself to be picked off by the US diplomatic war.

Now, Mexico I can understand (with all those voters in California and Texas) - Bush could huff and puff, but roasting a Fox (as it were) was surely never, politically speaking, in the realms of sanity.

Chile - who had the cheek to make a proposal of their own once it was clear that the dutch auction Six Tests [3] had failed - has fewer registrable US citizens to count on. But Uncle Sam's supposed lever - nixing its trade agreement - again was politically fraught. Bush is the guy who went out and got fast-track authority [4] for WTO negotiations set in train by the Doha Declaration; but also for agreements like that with Chile [5].

Those steel tariffs might be understood as down-and-dirty politicking. But screwing with trade agreements to extort compliance from partner nations on unrelated matters involving third states?

Yesterday's WaPo had a piece suggesting the US might. And, apparently, the task has been entrusted to that key member of the Bush foreign affairs team, Henry Hyde. The guy who led the Light Brigade-style impeachment charge against the Great Fornicator [6]. Just the man for such an assignment, perhaps.

Anyway, after all Ari's denials that the thought of linkage had ever entered their minds, Hyde writes to Lagos (breach of protocol, surely?) saying
Mr. President, your strong and unequivocal support on this upcoming [U.N.] vote is vitally important. . . .

One of Hyde's gofers is quoted as denying any threat of delay to Congressional approval of the treaty. It doesn't indicate whether or not he had a Rummy-style smirk on his face as he said it. [7]

But, within the US, a few stray Chilean votes are not what Bush has to worry about. US business is keen on the Chile deal - not, I suspect, on account of that deal itself, but of its setting a pattern for future deals with other countries. Companies that dig deep for Republicans all over, many of them. Who might well themselves have dropped Hyde a line or two, to tell him what they thought about him monkeying around with the business of America.

The Pakistani situation, I haven't kept in touch with. And the Africans - their weakness is their strength. They're genuinely not equipped to deal with quick-fire diplomacy, multi-layered negotiations, complexities of international law. They're willing to listen, but they need time. And the more some crew-cutted, sharp-but-wool-suited, cellphone-clutching Yank pokes his finger in their face, the more apologetically inscrutable they become. (Just my guess, of course....)

Most of all, unlike Yemen - the example those poking fingers have no doubt drawn most attention to - who lost (to it) relatively big US aid when it sided with Cuba against the US in 1991, the Six have had - well, the six of them. Yemen was a point for the Six's side, not Bush's: if they didn't hang together, they'd likely hang separately. Solidarity for ever, say I!

So, before the USA, Marines and the rest cross the start-line, Bush (as of now!) has, it seems, already lost one war. His bluff has been called. By the Six; by France and Russia; by Turkey. No resolution - and no handy French scapegoat to roast for the lack of it. Demonstrably, he is out of step with world opinion (what better demonstration than the UNSC?) and not the other way round.

Of course, the result may be that Bush decides to fight the rest of his Rolling World War without resorting to the UN at all. But that puts the onus on him to justify his position, legally and politically.

That WTO, for instance - that's international law, too. Many WTO members would relish the chance of easing their economic situation by a little Iraq-war-style self-help. Not something they might attempt on their own, of course. Far too risky.

But the lesson from Bush, combined with that of the Six is: if enough of you stick together, who knows what you might get away with....

Thanks, George. Consider this neighbour well and truly beggared!

  1. On film: gloriously, in the 1938 Pygmalion (with Leslie Howard); bloatedly in that ghastly musical...

  2. Friday's piece illustrates the fruitlessness of trying to reconcile news reports of this sort of malarkey.

  3. They were already down to five on Thursday, as I recall. Who knows how many they could have been bid down to?

  4. In PL 107-210 (formerly HR 3009).

  5. Which handily has its own site. The text is not there yet - due, apparently, by the end of this month. This says that negotiations were completed on December 11 2002. Presumably, that means the final text was agreed on that date. Why the delay in publishing?

  6. Thus demonstrating his inability to count to 67!

  7. Will we ever get to see Lagos' reply, I wonder?



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The Uniting for Peace flight is now closing: no one at the gate?


Now, if the French are planning a UFPR coup next week, the last thing they'd want to have is bozos like me queering their pitch for them.

But since I'm (relatively speaking) a very small bozo indeed (a bladderful to the Atlantic Ocean, in fact), I think I can safely point out without incremental risk of damage to the cause that the resolution has been namechecked - and by none other than erstwhile warblogger hate-figure Robert Fisk of the Independent on March 14.

The only new thing he offers (so far as I can tell) is this:
Duncan Currie, a lawyer working for Greenpeace, has set out a legal opinion, which points out that the phrase in 377 providing that in "any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression", the General Assembly "shall consider the matter immediately" means that - since "threat" and "breach" are mentioned separately - the Assembly can be called into session before hostilities start.

Now, I'm not sure the point for the other side that he identifies in UNGA Res 377 is quite as arguable as he supposes. But my main beef, with both Currie and Fisk, is that this wretched opinion is nowhere to be seen online! (Which the CND opinion and related material were.)

(In French, 377 is known as the résolution Acheson, by the way. For, I believe, obvious reasons.)


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Now Turkey hosts the Zalmay Khalilzad Show....


So, what's going on?

[I typed that sentence in all good faith, before hitting the sources. The more I read, the less I know....]

The US, it seems, have given up trying to persuade the Turks. The ubiquitous Zalmay Khalilzad was apparently sent in to call time on the Ankara pantomime; and to warn
Turkey not to go ahead with plans to send its own army into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

Good luck with that. The Turkish war bribe was withdrawn yesterday, in any case (as Powell is supposed to have told a Congressional committee [1]) - on the other hand, this from AP, datelined Saturday at 1710 EST,says
A senior U.S. official said Washington's offer to give Turkey $15-billion (U.S.) in economic aid if it allowed the U.S. deployment was now "off the table." "The package was time-bound and we have moved on time-wise," the official said on condition of anonymity. He did not indicate if a new offer could be negotiated if Turkey did allow in the U.S. troops.In Washington, a senior White House official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed the offer was withdrawn and that the United States was proceeding with plans that do not include Turkey.

No mention of Powell in the AP story at all. I suspect, therefore, the LA Times story (the Globe is reprinting it) to be a crock.

According to the - evidently unreliable - LA Times piece, US ships waiting to unload at Turkish ports are scooting round (via the Suez Canal - let's give a big hand to President Hosni Mubarak) bound for Gulf ports.

And, as for the necessary vote of confidence in Erdogan as Prime Minister - the LA Times says
next week
whereas the Turkish Press says March 23 - which could only be taken as next week in the most twisted and sophistical way.

For what it's worth, the Times piece does say that
Turkish officials had expected Khalilzad to make a last-ditch appeal for Turkey's support for a northern front. Instead, he came to Ankara to dissuade officials from sending Turkish troops into northern Iraq, a US official said.

Which makes one wonder what line State was feeding the Turks to give them the wrong impression (assuming that the Turks, having taken a leaf out of the Bush-Blair playbook, aren't lying their heads off...); whether the Turks don't now feel aggrieved at having been misled; what notice the Turks should take of Zalmay after having been jerked around - without a fresh cash offer to compensate them for their distress; and whether Turkish compliance in Northern Iraq (not to mention overflight rights) may, after all, persuade Uncle Sam that it is worth his while to say it with greenbacks.

Amazingly, George's Asiatic fixer seems to believe his best chance of encouraging the Turks to take a self-denying ordinance on occupying Iraqi Kurdistan is by joining forces with Ahmed Chalabi (can you say Sinatra?) and his Farouk Karno's Army in some kind of diplomatic Oprah - with Erdogan backstage listening to the plaintive pleas, punctuated by ooh-ing and clapping from the audience - before being brought out to be shamed into restraint [2].

Nothing, I'd have thought, more likely to get Erdogan buddying up with Bulent Arinc in a rejectionist front.

  1. That's what it says on the Globe page. I can't trace that Powell was talking to a Congressional committee on Friday. He did appear before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs on Thursday. (Do they even have Congressional committee meetings on Fridays?)

  2. The UPI piece impliedly reports as recent the movement of 5,000 Badr forces of the Iranian-backed SCIRI (representing Iraqi Shi'ites) - the news was at least two weeks old when I mentioned it on March 3!


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Saturday, March 15, 2003
 

Turkey: Yasar Yakis speaks!


A piece on yesterday's Newsnight [1] gives the first chance (that I'm aware of) to hear Turkey's foreign minister talk in English about the war (the transcripts mine, therefore pretty rough and ready!).

The journo, John Sweeney, is notoriously full of it; but he gets marks for actually turning up and interviewing the guy.

YY: We don't want the war...We believe that there is still room for manoeuvre for the peaceful solution to the question. But if the war becomes unavoidable, then we have to take measures.....to protect our national interest.

[On the deployment vote:]

YY: The bigger number lost, and the smaller number won. [2].

.

Q: It seems like a complete shambles, sir [!]

A: It is but it [can't make out]

Q: There's nothing subtle about it: it's an enormous cock-up, isn't it?

A: [Slightly dubious tone] No...sometimes there are, er, [waving hands about] loopholes in the, er, legislation, and it turned out that way. So if, by coincidence those who abstained would have preferred to have gone outside to have a coffee during the vote, the vote was going to get through.


We then get a frightfully un-gratuitous [3] belly-dancing sequence - not seen at its best streamed at 34kbps!
Q: [Asked about government impression of 'belly dancing cartoons']

A: Actually we found it ugly. When you give the impression to the media that the Turks are begging for money, then of course the cartoonist will [] translate this with his pencil the way he likes.

Q: So the money is not an issue?

A: No.

Q; The cartoons did it cause you to lose the vote, the belly-dancing?

A: Very much so.


Later, we get a somewhat puzzling sequence with Cuneyt Ulsever (who is some sort of Turkish pundit) introduced by Sweeney in VO:
[Erdogan] was jailed only four years ago for reciting a poem, The Minarets are our Bayonets

The two most powerful forces in Turkey, Islamism and nationalism, ...have come together to oppose America. The nationalists don't welcome what they see as American occupation. But how long will these self-appointed guardians of the national flame stay onside with the Islamists?

Ulsever: This is a very short-term coalition. It's like, er, one night stand....The reason they come together is that the nationalists say Yes to going into northern Iraq, but they want America stay out of Turkish lands, and Islamists are saying we don't want to fight with our Islamic brothers.

VO: [The vote was ]proclaimed as a victory for democracy in Turkey. But they'd forgotten the third force in Turkey: the Army. The Chief of Staff sent in to firm up Turkey's resolve for war: the implicit message: parliament had better get it right next time.

Ulsever: Let's define Turkish democracy: Turkish democracy is the area where elected can play. But it's defined..the borders are defined by the army. So everybody knows that the Turkish army is big brother, the watcher of us...So when the Chief of Staff says something, it's more important than what the prime minister or what the president say.


What, in my ignorance, I find puzzling is that, surely, the nationalists and the military are pretty much on the same team? Yet the military are supporting the passage of the deployment resolution and the nationalists are opposing it, according to Sweeney (and seemingly supported by Ulsever-as-edited).

In Parliament, it's hard to tell, given that all the parties one might term nationalist failed to gain any seats in the November election [4]. Perhaps there are old-line and neo nationalists? The former seeking to eliminate the Islamists by traditional methods, the second by buddying up to Uncle Sam to provide a pretext (national security, interests of a vital ally, etc) to castrate them politically.

A point worth researching, if the materials were to come to hand.

Sweeney is, besides his cringe-making manner, that thing I most loathe in journalism (OK, it's on the list): the parachutist. My slight kibbitzing experience in the random foreign matters I've got interested in over the years is that it takes months of plugging away before you can start to figure out what is window-dressing and what matters (a state I very rarely have the patience to achieve!) A week or two is long enough only to get you a pile of Will Rogers facts [5].

Oh, and you absolutely have to know (at least to read) the language of the country where whatever it is is happening. A lot of the frustration with the Turkish story is that, even if there are such things in Turkey as an online Congressional Record, and parliamentary committee reports, and transcripts of government speeches and briefings, I couldn't understand a word of them.

And I doubt very much whether Sweeney is very much better placed.

So his interpretations I'd take with a cupful of salt. He did get YY talking on camera, though...

  1. Streamed until 2230 GMT on Monday on the usual URL - start around 30:30 in.

  2. Sam Goldwyn reincarnation?

  3. This is the BBC, after all!

  4. True Path got two.

  5. Of which this is a version:
    It isn’t what we don’t know that gives us trouble, it’s what we know that ain’t so.


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Friday, March 14, 2003
 

Turkey: a breaking news shambles - and an insider's view....


There's a difficulty with news on the Turkish situation in untangling how much of the shambles is the situation reported on, and how much is the news coverage itself.

Prime example today - the question whether Prime Minister Erdogan would, or would not, visit President Sezer to present his list of cabinet appointments.

Search on the Google News page for both names - and you'll find both predictions represented. This BBC piece says that the visit took place; and blames Erdogan for changing his mind. (As opposed to media over-excitement, for instance.)

The special session of Parliament this weekend, the piece says, will not have on its agenda a resolution authorising US forces deployment. We'll see.

A pleasant change from the blizzard of tenth-hand snippets of semi-rumour served up as news from Turkey to have an extended piece of prose from an actual Turk on the subject of the war, novelist Orhan Pamuk.

According to Pamuk, Prime Minister Erdogan [1] is not (as he was generally portrayed in the media, Pamuk says, in the run-up to last November's elections) a Trojan horse for an Islamist takeover of Turkey. Rather, he's a more than willing accomplice of the military-secularist interest that ruled the state for so many years - and exercises its influence via the National Security Council.

The piece as a whole is rather disappointingly lacking in what one really wants - counter-intuitive detail, springing from local knowledge.

There are a couple of interesting points, though.

He says that the intervention of Gen Hilmi Ozkok in the debate on the deployment resolution (which I mentioned on March 5) had actually been made on the initiative of the AKP:
Erdoan's party asked the army to make an announcement in favour of war to influence the parliamentary decision before the rejection of the proposal, but the army did not wish to grasp this thorny issue before parliament.
.
Which makes me wonder what precisely has been the relationship between Erdogan (who's been Prime Minister Gul's puppet-master) and Ozkok since the AKP took power [2].

And, he says,
Unfortunately, Germany and France, who took a stand against Bush's policies, did not come out in support of the Turkish parliament's "no" vote.

From a fairly cursory search, I can't find any French government statement on the Turkish vote - but I'd not rely on that.

Inherently, one feels that that sort of third country intervention in what, essentially, is a matter of US-Turkish bilateral relations would represent a pretty hefty escalation in the diplomatic warfare that France, at the time, may well have wanted to avoid.

(Having pledged its vote to the cause, Germany seems to have been content to let France do its fighting for it. A German intervention on Turkey was therefore always unlikely.)

What appears to be sorely lacking is any detailed analysis in English of the detail of Turkish politics. The equivalent of the WaPo's coverage, or The Note [3].

So, for example, non-turkophones [4] still (so far as I can see) have no clear explanation of why the deployment vote was lost in the first place. How the revolt was organised, an analysis of the MPs who rebelled, as as to get at the reasons for the rebellion, to get some clue as to whether (the $64,000 question) they will rebel again.

Perhaps the information is simply not collected - perhaps the culture doesn't have journos and pundits scouring voting records and cuttings files (or the electronic equivalent). The thought doesn't diminish the frustration.

  1. Confusingly - and un-Google-friendlily - he writes the name Erdoan. From what I can gather, that's how the name is pronounced. But it seems almost always to be spelt Erdogan. Go figure...

  2. Pamuk says Erdogan was previously imprisoned for reciting an Islamic poem. No doubt he has no love for the military-secular interest. But this is politics.

  3. Which, by the way, has shut up shop for the duration. A cold blast from September 1939 in that phrase...

  4. I can't speak for turkophones, obviously.


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Suing Bush to stop the war - appeal fails


The case I mentioned on Wednesday has, as predicted, been lost (Doe v Bush).

The First Circuit opinion is here (PDF). The plaintiffs' case was in the alternative: either that the Executive was in contravention of PL 107-243 (collision theory); or that, in passing PL 107-243, Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its powers to the Executive (collusion theory).

On collision,the plaintiffs' appeal was (if I understand it aright) rejected on the basis of the ripeness doctrine - the Federal courts did not have jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution (cases and controversies) because President and Congress hadn't reached an impasse. The strong suggestion is that, in the case of an impending war, this doctrine would deny jurisdiction almost by definition.

On collusion, the court made the point that the Constitution shared out war powers between the branches, and that was an extra reason (beyond a general question of judicial restraint) for the courts not to intervene [1].

So far as I can see, Doe does not make a successful prospective challenge in the Federal courts any harder: it merely illustrates the existing vanishingly small likelihood of success. But - as Henry Hall used to say, here's to the next time....

  1. They contrasted the Clinton v New York line item veto case - that I'd never heard of! - where the court took jurisdiction and whapped the Executive.


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Flip-flopping USG view on chances of success, Ari's evasions on the whip count


As a rule, I stay well away from transcripts of speeches, press conferences and so on - take ages to read, usually for no more (at best) than the odd moment's entertainment value.

But I've been tempted to a couple.

First - after the relative gloom of the pieces earlier today, I now read in a WaPo piece datelined Friday [1] that
U.S. officials and foreign diplomats said today
- pausing there: how did those guys do that? Because I first read the piece on Thursday EST! - that
a U.S.-backed U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing war against Iraq appears doomed to fail.

Now, I haven't been following the betting on the UNSC result. But I had this piece datelined Monday March 10 [2], which had Powell saying (on Sunday) that
there is "a strong chance" that a majority of the U.N. Security Council will vote in favor of a U.S..-sponsored resolution authorizing war against Iraq this week

pretty much contradicted by other reports (links in my piece of Monday) appearing at more or less the same time.

Then were got the famous British Six Tests.

Skip ahead to Wednesday, and Richard Boucher at State [3]; after being evasive about US support for the Tests, he's asked
Some officials have said that they feel quite confident right now that the three African countries, Angola, Cameroon and Guinea, are now supporting the U.S.-Spanish-British position. Is this something that you can talk about?

Replying that he won't count votes, he answers to a later question that he
...wouldn't deny that we are making progress, but I don't want to mislead you into thinking that we have got it in the bag.

He didn't exactly rubbish what those some officials were saying on the Africans - and, on the radio on Wednesday, I'm pretty sure I understood from the BBC hacks that it was a general USG view.

Thursday, I've already talked about.

And now Friday's WaPo piece! I suggested earlier today that some journos might report according to the last person they spoke to - but this is ridiculous! It acknowledges an earlier more sanguine view in USG, but not the violent swings of USG sentiment on passage of the resolution one might infer from the way it's being reported.
"It looks pretty grim," one senior administration official said. Another senior U.S. official said: "There is no reason to believe positions will change today or tomorrow."

On that basis, I'd clear the East River for a fireworks celebration on Saturday. There is a slice of diplomatic humour:
In a rare moment of levity at a tense closed-door Security Council session Wednesday night to discuss the British compromise, one participant said the Guinean ambassador, who is council president this month, remarked about the British compromise: "It was better to have a bad document than no document at all."

A good thing we're all on the same page with this...

The Fleischer briefing covered the ditching of Bush's March 6 press conference pledge to vote the resolution whatever the whip count:
Q: You've evaded the question three different times. I want to know why the President -- who categorically said that he would demand a vote no matter what the whip count, because he wanted to see how all of these other nations stood -- is now apparently willing to back off and not have a vote?


MR. FLEISCHER: Because your premise is suggesting that in the conducting of diplomacy there can be no room for flexibility. And as the President travels the last bit of this road, he is going to work to consult with our allies and friends.


Ari can do humour, too, it seems...

  1. I wish they'd time as well as date these damned articles!

  2. Oh, and that was a WaPo piece too!

  3. I never did get to the bottom of Boucher's evasions on US contacts with the PKK and the USG view on Russian nuclear aid to Iran.



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Security Council Blues (Second Verse) - and they're wailing in Westminster too


In his March 10 TV interview (mentioned in today's earlier piece ) Jacques Chirac mentioned that, for the final UNSC vote, he had proposed that heads of state and government should represent their countries. Bush had turned the suggestion down (surprise, surprise!) But, he said
Nous verrons en fonction des discussions qui ont lieu actuellement pour savoir si, finalement, il y a intérêt pour une majorité de chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement d'être présents.

I wonder whether this is what Chirac has been angling for all along. What more humiliating for Bush than for a decent knot of top guys [1] to turn up at JFK, and him not be on the spot.

Again, the point of this plan would be to give the Saleable Six an arguable compromise position: Yes, Mr Bush (say each of the heads of the Six), I've decided to support your resolution - now it's been watered down. But I think this is such an important decision for our country that my own authority should be seen to back it up.

Anything to put Bush under the cosh. Wrong-foot him. Get him to withdraw the resolution. Do anything that avoids the appearance of UNSC approval for the war.

In baseball terms, now is the time for our side to start manufacturing runs - getting hit by pitches, infield singles, balks - whatever it takes.

Under the heading of druthers, the one guy one would want to see around the SC table, of course, is Vicente Fox. In case you were wondering, according to Thursday's La Jornada, Fox is doing fine after his back surgery and says he'll be back at Los Pinos (the Presidential Palace) in four days (I guess, counting from Wednesday).

Of course, a few miles is one thing - a five hour flight to New York (longer if on a medically equipped private plane, presumably) quite another. However, with those elections coming up in July, the PR boost from Fox being seen getting up from his convalescence and going, not a measly extra mile, but an extra 4,500 miles, for peace - well, it gets even cynical me a little excited...

[In fact, I see, reading to the bitter end of the Jornada piece, Fox has this precise thing in mind:
....el doctor Peón Vidales fue llevado a la sala de prensa para ofrecer un nuevo reporte sobre el estado de salud del Presidente. "Todo va bien", dijo. Y reiteró que en ocho o 10 días más estará en condiciones de retomar su agenda y reaparecer en público. Inclusive, dijo que si para la siguiente semana hubiera que ir a Nueva York -a tratar el tema de la crisis en Medio Oriente- podría hacerlo, sin problemas.]

Except that Bush won't wait two weeks, of course. Of course, the cunning old sawbones may just have been exaggerating - but presumably the range of recovery times for the operation the Pres had is something any specialist in the field would know.

So much for Fox's part in the brilliant plan, at least...]

Returning to these shores - and, after all, the point of killing the resolution is directed at the UK: to deny legitimacy to Blair, winkle him out if the war goes badly, make sure his successors don't dare to repeat Blair's folly, and give cover to Bush's Rolling World War - again, Thursday was not a good day.

The trigger for the major panic for Blair earlier in the week - Clare Short's going over the top on Sunday - now seems to have fizzled.

Yesterday, the UK Cabinet met (for the first time since the Short outburst) and nothing very much happened, by all accounts (including this one). The reason is, it seems to me, apparent in the round of interviews given yesterday by Blair's #2, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown. The intention utterly transparent: to tar Brown with the War Brush, to preempt an early coup on the Labour Party leadership by Brown that he might have launched if it turned out that no outcome satisfactory to most Labour MPs was achieved at the UNSC.

With the conspiracy-mobile's rotor-arm thus removed, Short had no alternative but to shut up. Anti-war opinion in the Commons thinks she never should have spoke (not unless she was acting with Brown - perhaps she was, but Blair persuaded him to rat on her....).

This piece from yesterday's Guardian rounding up Wednesday's diplomatic war started thus:
The discomfort of Labour MPs was plain on their faces in the Commons yesterday[at Prime Minister's Question Time], but after wobbly Tuesday in Downing Street moral certitude has returned to the frontbenches [2].

Since there was never a realistic chance of booting Tony before there had been (as it were) a military trial of labour, the abject failure of the Short plan (if it can be dignified with the word) merely confirms that any move to oust him now would be - well, premature.

If the war goes badly, no one will deem that Brown's dozen super-loyal interviews on Thursday March 13 will estop him from knocking on the door of Number 10 with his senior colleagues, and handing Tony an eviction notice. But the Short débâcle only goes to confirm that a bad war for Tony is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for his eviction.

So, as the cod-Latin saying goes, Pro bono publico, no bloody panico. But, on balance, for our side, Thursday the 13th still looks more like Bad Friday.

  1. Or whatever the shorthand is - who would understand HOSAGs?

  2. Where government ministers (of whatever rank) sit.


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What's going on at the Security Council?


To misquote Churchill, the news from the East River is very bad.

At least- according to what I've heard and read - it's distinctly worse in several ways than it was this time yesterday.

When we last left the UNSC pantomime, the only thing that was in any way certain was that the French would veto the USU resolution in any form (however caveated, whatever kinda-sorta conditions were mooted - but not added to the text of the resolution - by HMG). And the thought was that the Saleable Six were a decent distance away from collapse.

Now, watching yesterday evening's Newsnight on the BBC, the hack on the UN beat - who was all gloom yesterday about the chances of the USU resolution (in any form) making it to a vote was suddenly suggesting that, not only were the chances much better that the necessary five of the Saleable Six would come across, but that the French (despite having been bad-mouthed by Jack Straw earlier in the day) have been giving signs of resiling from their position on the veto (established by Jacques Chirac in his Elysée interview of March 10).

I get the feeling with some hacks that the story they tell depends on which side they were speaking to last. But the apparent change of UK strategy to one of voiding the USU resolution of content [1], declaring victory, and blowing the whistle to kick the war off is indirect evidence that both the Six and of France have changed their attitudes since yesterday.

Because the UK is assuming - as I have mentioned before - that any old resolution will do to satisfy public opinion in the UK (and possibly elsewhere).

Already, of the Six Tests, the requirement that Saddam broadcast to his people about his WMDs has apparently been dropped. In any case, the Tests are not part of the USU resolution, and (I believe) are proposed and (to date) supported only by the UK.

A day or two ago, I mention the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as a civil rights act with no actual civil rights in it [2]. It was passed (Cliff Notes...) with the permission of the Southern Caucus, to validate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson's availability for the Democratic ticket in 1960. It seems to me that the US/UK (mostly UK) strategy is the same: because, politically (ie, where it matters) no one gives a flying one about the minutiae. Even the fact that it is generally referred to as the second resolution - and not the umpteenth - is a measure of the limited interest in UNSC minutiae.

The other side of the coin is that, the emptier the USU resolution, the less ostensibly there is for the Six not to support. Even though all the diplomats of the Six know (they may be Third World, but they're not stupid) that the content of the resolution doesn't matter a rat's ass, they can feel better - perhaps, even make their populations feel better - if the content is asymptotic to zero.

A further blow suffered today by the wriggling of the French. The Chirac interview of March 10 is now up and is a treat to read. It's calm and collected compared with Blair's headless chicken. He's pretty damned definite on that veto.

Now the French are saying they're looking for compromise. Clearly, one needs more on this before ceasing oneself to be calm and collected - but - well, if you think you've got a 100% definite deal on one point, and 100% becomes 95%, that's much worse than 60% becoming 55%.

One hopes that this is all just stratagem. Clearly, if the French have actually decided to veto, they want to come across as non-intransigeant as possible. They want the Yanks and Brits to come out of the record as the bad guys. They, in the phrase, want to go the extra mile. Let's hope that's all it is.

Thought for the hour: is this the chance for the Uniting for Peace Resolution that I mentioned before [3]? Chirac - in the same laid-back tone of the TV interview - can say to Tony Blair: your argument is that my veto is unreasonable, because I'm just one power on my own. Fine; let's get a world consensus. Why should the greatest issue of war and peace since the end of the Cold War be restricted to the P5 and a random ten?

Because Chirac has had a fallback negotiating position with the Saleable Six, for the worst case: if you have to give Blair your vote on the USU resolution, also give me your vote on a motion to recall the UN General Assembly to discuss a UFPR. Chirac needs seven votes to get a special UNGA session called - the same number as to block the USU resolution, coincidentally or not. He will say to the Six - hey! it's compromise. You don't want war. You just want to be left in peace. Let's turn the whole thing over to the General Assembly, and get Uncle Sam off all our backs.

Or something of the sort.

I'll keep looking at this and, hopefully, some more and better links will turn up.

  1. To the point that it merely reiterates SCR 1441.

  2. The merest smear, in fact.

  3. Here and here.


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Thursday, March 13, 2003
 

Under Blair as before, toadying to the US gets us only disdain in return


Via a concatenation ending with Richard Bennett, I come across a piece that hits a key subsidiary element of my loathing of the Blair MO on the war.

Rod Liddle's stuff can be pretty good - but tends to get buried by the pile of generally poor-to-mediocre op-eds on the Guardian site [1]. Worth seeking out.

This, from February 12, focusses on that turd of legislators, Rep Peter King (aka 'Pete' King - R:NY-3), the most distressing words of whose Political Graveyard biography are
living as of 1999.

And of 2003 - catching a snatch of an appearance of his on the BBC started this whole thing off.

Liddle begins
What a divine pleasure it was to hear the Republican congressman Pete King eviscerating the hapless French on our radios yesterday morning.

And works up to
....it suddenly occurred to me that this was the same Pete King who has spent the past 15 years similarly eviscerating the British, or the "Bruddush", for "centuries of oppression" inflicted upon the Irish people. Pete could always be relied upon to say a few words in support of Martin Galvin's evil Noraid organisation, or to wade into some delicate and confusing conundrum of Northern Ireland politics with his size 12 cowboy boots, ready to give succour to the IRA for the sake of securing a few more votes from his Irish and faux-Irish constituents. He always did so with a mixture of brio and crass ignorance. It is the same Pete King, isn't it?

And so it was.

Depositing a cartful of verbal slurry on King - pleasurable though that would undoubtedly have been - is not his point, though:
my point is more straightforward. We should not delude ourselves that we get anything from standing four-square beside George W Bush, or any other American president, for that matter. They think we're an irrelevance too, and useless, and antiquated and decadent. And what's more, no matter how loyal we strive to be, they would not so much as bother to cross the road to piss on us were we suddenly to catch fire. This has been the signal lesson of the past 20 years of international politics.

And he proceeds to cite examples from the Falklands onwards.

And - oh so close to King's (for want of a better word) heart
More recently, within weeks of September 11 2001, the US failed, astonishingly, to outlaw Noraid, despite having proscribed and seized the assets of every other terrorist fundraising organisation in the known universe. There is terrorism directed against the US and terrorism directed elsewhere, you see.

He concludes
The French are perpetually accused of pursuing a selfish foreign policy and it is a charge which is hard to deny. But it is rather less selfish and small-minded than that pursued by the US, a country for which the concept "ally" works only, it would appear, in one direction.

Now I'd not rely on the man's fact-checking (a correction to his piece appears underneath). But he identifies a vital element in US-UK relations which present circumstances demand to be highlighted.

There's little doubt that the US/UK relationship is inherently 'one-way' for very good reason: the UK is very much weaker than her 'friend', geopolitically speaking.

And the US can feel no sympathy for a power like Britain, reduced to a subordinate position because, by reasons of geography (amongst other things), it has for at least the last 150 years been saved from such a demeaning relationship with any country. Indeed, the fact of never having had to be a national sidekick or gofer is arguably a key element of that peculiar quality that is bizarrely called American innocence.

When the defensive benefits to the US of physical isolation were supplemented, over the same period, by a phenomenal accretion of economic resources of all kinds, the result was inevitable: power, and lots of it.

The blame for the skewed US-UK relationship does not lie with the US for exploiting that power: fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly. Britain, France, Portugal, Spain (to take just European examples) all enjoyed at one time (and for a different combination of reasons each time) a shift in the geopolitical terms of trade in their favour. Mostly, this was due to neither expertise nor hard work - just like America's geographical isolation and natural resources, it was bunce, a one-time dole of manna from heaven.

And each of us exploited that super-power for economic gain or glory or religion, and it was good while it lasted. It was all perfectly natural. None of us, therefore, have any moral standing to complain that the US is doing precisely the same as we did with its own super-power.

The fault of British policy towards the US has not been the fact of its inferiority, or the kow-tow that naturally follows from it: in fact, it's arguable that, had the diplomacy of a Britain then much diminished in power by World War 1 not been quite so de haut en bas to the Americans during the inter-War period, Anglo-American relations over the following couple of decades might not have been so fraught (Suez being a case very much in point).

The fault has rather been the supposition on the part of the British that US policy towards towards the UK has been based on affection rather than interest. The lurgi that generally has infected American foreign policy is the yearning to be liked. The British equivalent is the belief (applied solely to the US) that it is liked. And, it needs scarcely to be pointed out that Tony Blair's personality makes his strain of the disease much more virulent than the average!

When the word illusion is used about British foreign policy, it usually refers to British notions of our own strength that far exceeded reality - in the context of the maintenance of the imperial role, or the independent nuclear deterrent.

But illusions about the US and its policy motivations have been as pervasive: the notion (which I've heard mentioned in recent months) of the British being the Greeks to the Americans' Romans; being a bridge between the US and Continental Europe; and similar nonsense. It seemed that the more the Americans took legitimate advantage of their superiority - the destroyer deal in 1940 was probably the first in the series; the positively Shylockian American Loan of 1945; the insistence on the UK proceeding to convertibility of sterling in 1947, which further weakened an economy in dire shape; and so on - the less the British chose to believe the evidence of their own eyes [2].

A great deal of memory refreshment required to do justice to the topic. But the point is, the British have tended to assume that the undoubted benefits provided by the US (the much-lauded Marshall Plan, for instance, or US NATO deployments) were done purely out of the goodness of their hearts. A view for which, I believe, compelling evidence is somewhat limited!

For example, the most consistently important area of post-War US-UK cooperation, right up to the present - on intelligence - takes place because it makes operational sense for the US to work it that way, not because of some sentimental Anglo-Saxon kith-and-kin nonsense.

Similar sentimentality (on one side only) attached to post-War US industrial investment in the UK [3]. Which, in fact, ebbed and flowed according to the economic case - exactly as did investment in those objects of Rumsfeld's loathing, France and Germany.

Ironically, the effect of Margaret Thatcher's time in office was to sweep away much of the cloud-cuckoo-land of British industrial management thinking, at the same time as, with the Maggie and Ronnie Show, she fostered the continuation of the same sort of illusion in foreign affairs.

And Tony Blair - pursuing ends of incense-reeking, other-worldly piety through means of deceit and violence - is the apotheosis of the post-War British prime minister who really believes that America has British interests at heart.

In earlier prime ministers, the illusion of American selflessness was at least in tension against a general down-to-earth cynicism. But it's becoming increasingly evident that Blair does not have this necessary ballast. He believes his own publicity. And, worse still, he seems to believe other nations' publicity, too.

And the American view of all this fawning? Again, more research necessary - but, beneath the special relationship charade, they seem generally little moved, except to boredom or exasperation. Coming up to date, the Security Council diplomacy on Iraq - especially the second resolution farrago - seems to suggest that patience with slavish British attachment to US policy, and general eagerness to please, can easily wear thin.

Having to keep throwing a stick to keep their faithful dog amused is getting beyond tedious. Genial Donald Rumsfeld has, notoriously, suggested that that irksome hound may soon find itself in the animal sanctuary.

Which brings us back to Pete. Ranking US legislators according to moral obloquy (in descending order), where would you put him? Jefferson Davis led the Party of Treason whilst the treason was actually in progress - he seems set for #1 spot (besides, it would really piss off Trent...). The Crédit Mobilier boys, and their successors-in-title - much further down the list, I think. The nigger-baiters of Davis's party who carried on the treachery as best they could after the Cause was Lost, and vindicated John Calhoun by sparing their lynching constituents the travails of Federal justice: fairly high.

A man who bewails indiscriminate slaughter in Tel Aviv and Manhattan but has roundly supported an organisation responsible for indiscriminate slaughter in Belfast and London: not too many places lower than Davis, I think.

Human frailty unfortunately prevents the total suppression of unworthy thoughts as to King's precise whereabouts on the morning of September 11 2001...

  1. The news operation online, on the other hand, is pretty damned good - crisp, workmanlike, gets you in and out, reading just what you want to read, with minimum hassle and time. Other UK news sites - and all the comparable US sites, that I've found - are packed with modem-sapping useless bytes, and like wading through treacle to navigate. (Besides, some of them being distinctly importunate with registration requirements.) For UK-perspective news, it's the Google.

  2. It occurs to me that someone with knowledge of the field (not me) might make a useful analogy with victims of domestic violence. (With all the trepidation and caveating that any such analogy demands, of course.)

  3. Audit of War by Corelli Barnett is devastating on the effect on the war effort of the vast inferiority of British to US industry during World War 2 - and the dreamworld inhabited by British politicians and industrialists which allowed them to overlook the yawning chasm between the performance of the two. (His other - two, I think - books on the period, are excellent, too, I believe, though I've not read them.)


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Turkey: is there a secret deal for US forces deployment?


Now, my guess is that this is a crock. But - well, it makes a change from following the strange career of Speaker Arinc...

An outfit called Malaysiakini are alleging (in an article datelined 0142 EST on Wednesday) that
a secret agreement signed Feb 8 allows the US to set up bases in Turkey's southeast, news reports said on Tuesday.

Those reports, it says were in Milliyet and Aksahm (or Aksam). To save you looking, neither appears to have an English edition [1].

What of those Turkish sources I can read? There are stories in the Turkish Daily News and Turkish Press that refer to a February 8 secret agreement. But, they both say, the existence of such an agreement is an allegation made in
the closed part of the CHP parliamentary group meeting
by the leader of the opposition CHP, Deniz Baykal [2].

The Malaysian site goes on to say that
NTV, MSNBC's Turkish affiliate, identified nine bases to be established in Mardin/Kiziltepe, Dicle, Oyali, Nusaybin, Gaziantep, Oguzeli, Birecik, Shanliurfa and Viranshehir.

NTV does have an English news page: no sign of their big scoop, though.

And on affiliate MSNBC's site right now, a story headlined U.S. anxiously awaits Erdogan - and datelined Wednesday - makes no mention of that scoop either.

So, it is a crock?

US hardware has been moving for some time - but only a nod and a wink was necessary for that. If large numbers of US troops deploy without Parliament's approval - that would, I suppose, be strong evidence. That they're still bobbing about on the Mediterranean, weak evidence to the contrary.

A caveat on evaluating news stories by measuring coverage by mere avoirdupois: in the week or two after the second Tonkin Gulf Incident in August 1964, of all the weighty news media in the world, only Le Monde divined that there was something fishy with the story (on August 8, from memory - notes have gone AWOL). And that was as far as they could get on their own.

With the NY Times and Washington Post saying the same - who knows?

  1. Milliyet did have - but it apparently last published online in 1999!

  2. One mystery (to me) solved, though, I reckon: Baykal identifies the first resolution that was passed by the Parliament on February 6 as
    the motion that permits renovation work in the bases.
    The second, deployment, resolution was the one which didn't get the necessary votes.

UPDATE

You can't keep a good man down, it seems.

On the (deeply unsatisfactory) press review page of the Turkish Daily News one finds, attributed to Hurriyet: (emphasis mine)
Referring to the shipments Arinc said these gave him a shudder. This is because he did not know about the agreement reached in the framework of the modernization motion that permits such shipments. We are now disclosing the secret memorandum of understanding signed on Feb. 14. LAND BASES: Gaziantep, Mardin, Dicle (Diyarbakir), Oyali (Sirnak), Nusaybin (Mardin), Oguzeli (Gaziantep), Sanliurfa (military base), Birecik and Viransehir. PERMISSION INVOLVING SUPPLIES: The USA will inform the General Staff of the supplies it will bring in -- seven days in advance. THE EXPULSION RIGHT: In case Turkey feels the need Turkey can ask the other side's troops to leave Turkey any time. RESPECT FOR THE LAWS: The U.S. personnel will respect the laws of the Turkish Republic. IDENTITY CARD CARRYING: Outside the military premises the U.S. troops will be carrying the identity cards they will be issued. UNIFORMS: U.S. troops will wear their uniforms only on duty."

Quite when, and in what circumstances, Arinc shuddered and uttered is not clear. Whether this is the same agreement as the February 6 one, or an amended version of it, or a completely different agreement, is not clear.

Nothing is clear.


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Bush press conference scripted? Say it ain't so, Joe...


It's not uncommon to find suggestions in media pieces - from subtle innuendo to bald statement - that the journalist responsible has the inside track, the real dope - from a handicapper that's real sincere [1].

I don't think I've done other than make the polar opposite assertion: if there's a wall, fence, or ditch around a story, I'm on the wrong side of it.

As for the Bush press conference last Thursday (March 6) - well, I fingered the next day the lack of journalistic seeking-after-truth:
To the rank amateur, the questions seem like the pitching at the Home Run Derby.

But, according to this piece in the NY Press, I didn't know the half of it. The conference amounted to
the cream of the national press corps submitting politely to the indignity of obviously pre-approved questions, with Bush not even bothering to conceal that the affair was scripted.

When I saw in the transcript
KING: "Mr. President."

BUSH: "We’ll be there in a minute. King, John King. This is a scripted..."

I'm afraid I reckoned that to be a bit of amiable banter.

Only WaPo even used the S-word - and then (sez the Press) euphemistically:
The president followed a script of names in choosing which reporters could ask him a question, and he received generally friendly questioning.

It's not only the boys and girls on-site at the White House (and therefore subject to badgering - or Stockholm Syndrome) that are the problem: the Press (are they kosher?) says that the NY Times [2] doctored for its dead-tree edition a piece that orginally appeared online:
Mr. Bush, sounding sedate at a rare prime-time news conference, portrayed himself as the protector of the country..."
became
"Mr. Bush, at a rare prime-time press conference, portrayed himself as the protector of the country…"

Jesus H Christ! These are guys who detest Bush, but still can't bear to put in print the (not uncommon) impression that he was less than sparkling on the big occasion.

We hate Big Brother - but we don't think he's a bad bloke, honest.
as George Orwell never quite wrote.

The truth is - it comes to me in a blinding flash! - that the White House Press Corps is George Bush's notion for the New Model UN Security Council - eager, respectful, obedient.

Of course, the article may be entirely wrong - but, frankly, with the array of deception and deviousness employed by the War Party over the last months and years, I'd say they carried the burden of proof. To coin a phrase....

  1. I loathe that musical - but there's no doubting that it gives good quote.

  2. Not the same Times that fought Bush ever step of the Florida way, surely?


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Wednesday, March 12, 2003
 

Better to keep your mouth shut....


Honorable Members of the House of Representatives are above such sage advice - mouths open, and their folly proved beyond doubt.

I'd think it was some scam dreamt up by one of Chirac's boys if it had appeared elsewhere than in the Washington Times:
Joining the growing protest against French products, House Administration Committee Chairman Bob Ney, Ohio Republican, changed the House cafeteria menu yesterday to "freedom fries."

This might be the most constructive Republican contribution to international affairs since 'Big Bill' Thompson - Mayor of Chicago and no stranger to Tommy-gun wielders himself - promised to
punch King George in the snoot.

Powell looks thoroughly pissed off and in need of a a rest: Ney for Secretary of State, say I!

After all, Caligula, or so I gather, got some pretty impressive policy initiatives from that horse he put in the Senate....


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Mexico: the Fox-Bush tussle has put the Pres in hospital (kinda)


It's too long since I last dropped in on President Vicente Fox Quesada.

And - my luck! - I find he's decided to seek relief from the diplomatic pressure by a getting a little back surgery [1].

His political opponents are suggesting he's faking it to evade his responsibilities in standing up to the Yankee bully. Is it a measure of the terror of US diplomacy that Fox would prefer to undergo actual surgery to avoid taking George's phone-calls? I reckon this is one instance where genuine and politician can actually be combined in the same sentence without the verb being negatived!

He's not so sick that he couldn't get together a cabinet [2] meeting to discuss the war, though. The story was that he'd told Gerhard Schröder and fellow-Saleable Ricardo Lagos (Chile) on the phone that, as between the USU resolution and the non/niet, he
......conservó la postura de "no inclinarse" por ninguna de las dos posiciones que se debaten en el organismo mundial.

But it was a different story at the cabinet meeting:
En el caso de la reunión con su gabinete, las mismas fuentes indicaron que "la posición mayoritaria" es de rechazo a la opción bélica planteada por el gobierno estadunidense.

Now, given that, as I believe, the Mexican cabinet serve (and act, if they know what's good for them) at the president's pleasure, logically, that would imply that Fox is coming out against the USU resolution.

To describe Fox's policy, one PRI Senator used the word bandazos ; which I think is best translated as flip-flops. From Fox's recent performance, one can see his point [3].

Meanwhile, Mexican business has already been frantically waving a white flag hoping those across the Rio Grande will notice. They seem to be afraid, not of official action, but the ire of the people:
las eventuales represalias no se darían de manera oficial pero "sí por parte de los ciudadanos, como ya ocurre con el boicot a productos franceses.

And how is the French boycott going?

As for the erstwhile Fox-Bush love-match, WaPo had this last Friday from their DC-based Latin America commentator suggesting that Fox was feeling Bush didn't understand him.

General elections for the Mexican Congress are as close as July. And the PRI - when Mexico was a virtual one-party state, the PRI was that party - has apparently been riding high in local and state elections.

Although relations between Fox and his own party, the PAN, aren't particularly close (as I believe), flouting the will of the Mexican people by voting for the USU resolution would scarcely improve them.

The fact that the US has been humiliating the country (via Fox) with its succession of envoys has, perhaps, made concession on the resolution rather less than more likely.

The piece suggests that if Fox avoided the blue funk of nightmare imaginings (which is where Mexican business leaders are right now, evidently) and analysed the costs of likely US reaction to his not supporting the second resolution, it might not be so bad after all.

Because, contrary to what the USG spin might suggest, inflicting pain on Mexico may itself not be pain-free, politically speaking. Interesting to consider the top, say, 30 Congressional Districts by numbers of registrable Mexicans. A Bush campaign against Mexico might just be the spur for a voter registration drive to break all records! (The piece refers to a similar thing happening in California on account of anti-immigrant initiatives.)

And, perhaps, reprisals against the Mexicans might help to mobilise the electoral muscle of other national groups among the Hispanics, and multinational solidarity across the ethnic group.

Such mobilisation might even have an effect on the 2004 presidential election. Ironic if, in a tight contest in the Electoral College, Florida Hispanics (far from exclusively Cuban, I believe) threw the election to the Dem candidate in a backlash against a Bush post-Iraq vendetta against their Mexican brothers!

  1. For a herniated disc between his L4 and L5 - that makes no more sense to me in English than in Spanish - but, thankfully, the operation ended successfully around 1300 EST.

  2. Cabinet a bad faux ami - I think the Mexican version is much closer to the US than the UK version.

  3. The latest seems to be a joint Mexico-Pakistan initiative to achieve a compromise. Good luck with that...


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Suing Bush to stop the war - case in progress!


Having thought I'd previously concluded beyond a peradventure that legal action in the US courts would be futile [1], I now find from this in today's WaPo that I have completely missed a case that has actually reached the First Circuit!

The suit appears to be grounded on the argument that Congress, in passing HJ Res 114 (now PL 107-243) last October, had unconstitutionally delegated its power to declare war.

The fact that the First Circuit has taken the case doesn't seem, according to the experts, to make it less of a no-hoper; a result in the next day or two.

(The paperwork should be interesting, at least - I have yet to locate it online. Perhaps it's not.)

  1. The fact that (from memory) none of those challenging the legality of war ever won was a clue - start here and work back.


UPDATE
Some materials relating to the District Court hearing are here, under War Powers Lawsuit Over Iraq. Apparently, there isn't much of an opinion from the judge. No documentation from the appeal on that page (that I could see).


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Moran on the war - a puzzle


The warbloggers are in full cry (led, in dashing hunting pink, by the Master of the Hunt) at the misspeaking of another legislator.

Last time (December archives passim) it was the hapless Trent Lott - whom I initially backed to make a fight of it after his own absurd comment, but who, it turned out, couldn't fight his way out of a paper bag. Damp, with a hole already torn in it.

The motive, it seemed from 3,000 miles away, was to oust Lott as Majority Leader, and replace him with a modern Lyndon Johnson, to do for the conservative agenda what LBJ did (to start with, at least) for the Southern Caucus. Is Senator Doctor Frist turning out to be that man? For another time.

This time it's Rep James Moran (D-VA8) [1] who has commented on the part that the Jewish community (in the US) has played in shaping USG policy.
If it were not for the strong support of the Jewish community for this war with Iraq we would not be doing this....The leaders of the Jewish community are influential enough that they could change the direction of where this is going and I think they should.

Now, politically, clearly the man should not have touched the subject with the proverbial barge-pole. Whether what he was saying was factually correct (hard to see how it could be) or not. A good 99% of a politician's utterances should conform with the Irish saying, Whatever you say, say nothing.

My interest - as a curious outsider - lies in the reactions to the statements; and the extent to which, properly reformulated, they might be shown by the adduction of evidence to be true.

A partisan Get Moran motive (from either Dems or GOP) is perhaps unlikely - he's a pretty low form of Congressional life, so far as I'm aware [2]. Which leaves me stumped for the moment. Someone sufficiently interested (not me) might, I suppose, start by looking at how a legislator with such an interesting past managed to finance a successful re-election campaign last year.

More generally, it occurs to me to wonder how Moran's comments at a
forum attended by about 120 people at St. Anne's Episcopal Church last Monday
came to general light. How they came to be recorded for later transcription, for example.

The WaPo piece says that
Moran's relationship with pro-Israel organizations and American Jewish leaders has steadily worsened in recent years over his pro-Palestinian stands in the Middle East conflict, interpretation of Israeli history and acceptance of campaign cash from individuals sympathetic to the terrorist organization Hamas or under investigation for terrorist ties.

It is not, I believe, unheard of for organisations such as AIPAC to identify legislators viewed as unfriendly towards their aims with a view to seeing their electoral defeat. The most cursory search produces the names of Rep Paul Findley (R-IL20 - until 1982) and the late Sen John Chafee (R-RI), who would seem to have been identified in this way.

Perhaps a man with such connections as those attributed by the WaPo piece to Moran might have come under similar notice [3].

As to reactions: no indication at all in the piece that there were any reactions in the meeting to Moran's statements. Which, given the strength of subsequent reactions, one might find a tad puzzling.

Moran's remarks are accused of being anti-semitic or
anti-Semitic in effect if not in intent.
The latter a formulation used most notably by the President of Harvard, Lawrence Summers in October 2002 - which I criticised at the time.

As to what he said: no doubt he is plainly wrong to suggest that American Jewry is unanimous in its support the war. Such crass statements are usually easily falsifiable (by producing a single American Jew opposed to the war, in this case).

But there's no a priori reason that more carefully formulated (and weaker) statements along the same lines might not prove true. For example, that a higher proportion of American Jewry supports the war than that of the total US population. Or (and I suspect this may actually be true) that the proportion of war supporters amongst Jews who are also registered Democrats is higher than amongst registered Democrats as a whole.

Questions such as these seem to me both useful and perfectly legitimate to ask (and capable of serious answer). In the past century, analysis of the propensity of various ethnic groups to support USG policies relating to war was very much in point. Americans of German and Irish extraction, for instance, being particularly reluctant to support policies aiding the UK against the threat from Nazi Germany [4]. No doubt, methodologies are available to test support amongst sections or sub-groups of American Jewry for particular programmes or policies.

And it would, I think, be fair to suggest - the names of the organisations to which the complainants belong seem to support the notion - that, whilst there is no such unitary entity as the Jewish community, American Jews, like many other groups in the US, use their constitutional rights to organise in a variety of structures in order to bring political influence to bear. Including - perhaps particularly - in order to influence USG's policy towards the Middle East.

No doubt, the amount of effective political influence a group may have would not necessarily be dependent on its numbers or financial resources. All sorts of factors - including the allies it's able to make from other groups - may well have a bearing.

I have the sense that the substance of the allegations made against Moran go beyond the fact that he spoke when he shouldn't; and that what he said was factually incorrect: that the suggestion being made is that, in some way, the whole topic of Jewish political activity was generally to be avoided. Which, if correct, I would find somewhat alarming.

Surely, it cannot be denied that American Jews engage in organised political activity, some of it designed to influence Middle East policy? Nothing wrong with that. Why would it be antisemitic to suggest it went on?

Similarly, it is certainly arguable that organisations seeking to exercise such influence have met with a measure of success over recent years - insofar as one can analyse outcomes with complex causes [5]. Why should one not comment on the successes (supposing there to be some) of an admittedly legitimate activity?

And why (if this indeed is part of the argument) is it illegitimate to refer to the activities (successful or otherwise) of organisations drawing their membership wholly or mainly from a particular ethnic group? Rabbi Moline is quoted as saying
Moran's remarks echoed a history of "the most scandalous rhetoric of the last century" singling out Jewish influence and blaming it for foreign policy.

The implication is that, because, in the past, politicians sought to make capital out of suggestions of Jewish influence on some countries' foreign policy, it is illegitimate to analyse the exercise (such as it is) of the influence of particular groups of American Jews on US foreign policy in 2003. Or, according to the Rabbi, the influence of, or of members of,
any minority group in America, whether African-Americans, Hispanics, Muslims or others.

Though he does qualify his comments in calling Moran's words
beyond inappropriate in the rhetoric of a member of Congress.
So not condemning all speakers on such subjects, merely those who are the representatives of the people in the nation's government.

Now, it's one thing to say that politicians should avoid such issues, as a prudential matter. Quite another to suggest that their broaching them infringes some kind of speech code. What other professions might find themselves similarly restricted? Such ideas would surely tend to have a chilling effect on speech which would not be susceptible of constitutional remedy.

I suspect that some elements [6] of the academic world might be more robust in rejecting the restrictions on enquiry which seem to be the implication of the complaints against Moran taken as a whole. Others, less so, perhaps. (Those seeking tenure at Harvard, for instance.)

One feature of American life that, I believe, has been extensively studied is conformism in all spheres of life, including the academic [7]. In establishing the so-called McCarthy Era, arguably an essential ingredient was the American propensity [8] to conform. Only a small percentage of actually or potentially erring citizens could be dealt with by Loyalty Program dismissals and Congressional investigations.

Social control could be effective in the mass in establishing in people's minds that a particular course of action, though perfectly legal, would cause such difficulties of all sorts that it had much better be left alone. Other choices being available, what hardship would there be in that?

It is, of course, not inconceivable that I've got hold of entirely the wrong end of the stick here. If I'm baffled at how a guy like Moran got re-elected, why should the rest make sense?

As ever, I think, further research is indicated.


  1. I'm not aware he has an actual rap-sheet. But his political one includes, taken at random, this allegation of illegal moneys received indirectly from a drug company whose bill he was promoting. All allegations have presumably been disproved.

  2. According to this, he's a regional whip and ranking Dem on Appropriations. If the war went badly and the Dems regained the House, would that necessarily mean he'd take over as Chairman? (I expose my slight to mediocre expertise, clearly!)

  3. One of his critics, Rabbi Jack Moline, is quoted as saying
    A world-class congressional district calls for a world-class congressman.
    A statement worthy of some analysis itself, perhaps.

  4. Samuel Lubell in Chapter 7 of his Future of American Politics provides an ethnic analysis of the phenomenon of isolationism - starting with Stearns County, MN, part of the (then) predominantly German Minnesota Sixth represented in Congress for a decade by the father of aviator Charles Lindbergh.

  5. Not my field: but I believe it's an area that's regularly studied.

  6. Some, perhaps the most vital adjective in any sensible controversialist's armoury.

  7. It took roughly ten seconds looking through a Google search on conformism american to come up with this.

  8. Another useful word.


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Dropping the Pilot? - Rumsfeld tips Blair overboard


Everyone's going to have fun with Rummy's little routine yesterday - but, what the hey...

You read it here first, of course - only, that time, it was Rummy's boss at the big press conference who seemed intent on giving Tony the heave-ho, speaking so contemptuously of his key ally's favourite, the UN.

Perhaps it was too subtle for Tony. Why otherwise would Donald Rumsfeld, jocular scourge of Old Europe with many a quip, have been put on the task of delivering the onscreen Dear John?

Don't tell me it wasn't a set-up with the boys from the press: the question immediately before was about the
Air Force...testing today the biggest bomb in the U.S. arsenal, a 21,000-pound behemoth.

And then Rummy drops his bomb. Coincidence? I don't think so.

It's a crappy transcript - but the questioner does add, by way of coda
Is that the Rumsfeld smile? I mean, Al-Jazeera -- (off mike).

Rummy wasn't laughing about the bomb - it was keeping a straight face for the Blair routine to come that was the problem, I'd bet.

The exchange deserves to be recorded in full (emphasis mine, of course):
Q: Sir, support for a possible war is shrinking rapidly in Great Britain. Would the -- two questions. Would the United States go to war without Great Britain? And two, would the role of the British in an initial assault be scaled back?


Rumsfeld: This is a matter that most of the senior officials in the government discuss with the U.K. on a daily or every- other-day basis. And I had a good visit with the Minister of Defense of the U.K. about an hour ago. Their situation is distinctive to their country, and they have a government that deals with a parliament in their way, distinctive way. And what will ultimately be decided is unclear as to their role; that is to say, their role in the event that a decision is made to use force. There's the second issue of their role in a post- Saddam Hussein reconstruction process or stabilization process, which would be a different matter. And I think until we know what the resolution is, we won't know the answer as to what their role will be and to the extent they're able to participate in the event the President decides to use force, that would obviously be welcomed. To the extent they're not, there are workarounds and they would not be involved, at least in that phase of it.


Q: We would consider going to war without our closest ally, then?


Rumsfeld: That is an issue that the President will be addressing in the days ahead, one would assume.


I mentioned some time ago the Denis Healey (ex Labour Defence Minister) Falklands War-era line about Thatcher glorying in slaughter - I haven't seen the video, but I reckon Rummy's enjoying it just a wee bit too much!

Perhaps he thought we in Ruritania - oops! - would appreciate his indulgence of our ancient customs, being deprived as we are of that Elixir of Life, American Know-How. The one would assume kiss-off is priceless.

Oh, and the clarification?
I have no doubt of the full support of the United Kingdom for the international community's efforts to disarm Iraq.

Yeah, right...

Reaction in London? According to the Guardian,
Mr Rumsfeld's remarks provoked a mixture of panic and fury in Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence....

This piece looks at the various fronts Blair's fighting on.

Apart from Rummy's intervention, the main thing that's new is that (it's reported) the Attorney-General [1] Lord Goldsmith agrees with
the widespread view in Whitehall...that a new, strongly-worded UN resolution was needed before a war could be regarded as being backed by international law.

And, apparently, Goldsmith agrees that the concept of the unreasonable veto is an o'er-brimming crock.

Blair already looks like death warmed up. Whilst absolutely repressing all hubris, one can nevertheless contemplate without absurdity the possibility that, in a few short weeks he may no longer be British prime minister. And that is truly a recent phenomenon.

The Tenniel cartoon I mentioned on Saturday shows Bismarck making a positively dignified exit. Not something Tony can count on, I'm afraid.

  1. The top HMG legal adviser - not comparable with John Ashcroft's role at the DoJ.


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Turkey - talk about your long-shots...


As Prime Minister Erdogan gets his feet under the table, and the US hardware trundles out of Iskenderun just as if the Parliament had actually passed that wretched resolution, a couple of war-related news items strike the eye:

An MP [1], Mehmet Bekaroglu,
appealed Monday to state prosecutors in Ankara, demanding legal action against the government as it, he said, violated the Constitution by allowing U.S. soldiers to enter Turkey.

Coupled with live appearances of Elvis and Lord Lucan, that makes a trifecta to die for - come to think, General Ozkok might be happy to lend a hand there...

And (same URL) tribune of the people (and friend of the blog) Speaker Bulent Arinc is apparently to be left in cold storage as Erdogan reshapes his cabinet.
AK Party's top officials say that Erdogan warned Arinc on this issue, claiming that the two have a serious difference of opinion. AK Party sources said that Arinc threatened resignation from his party during these discussions while he also investigated whether he is required to resign from his post as parliament speaker should he quit his party.

And, being serious for a moment, the importance of killing the USU resolution (in whatsoever form it comes to a vote) is underlined by the following:
When the new cabinet takes over, it's expected to submit to Parliament a new proposal allowing in U.S. troops before receiving a vote of confidence. It's reported that Erdogan will be able to pass such a proposal from Parliament by the beginning of next week, depending on a new decision that would come out from the United Nations Security Council. If the U.S. fails to pass a new decision from the U.N. Security Council or delays it to a further date, Erdogan will unlikely hurry to pass a new proposal.

I treat Turkish journalism with no less cynicism - perhaps a tad more, thanks to the looming prescence of Gen Ozkok and the NSC - than any other. Better be on the safe side, though.

  1. Said to belong to the Saadet Party - but, I reckon, one of six independents (post the Siirt by-election, for the record, the other numbers are: AKP 365, CHP 177, DYP (True Path) 2 (total 550)).


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The Great Torture debate - I'm mildly puzzled...


Fascinating that the question of the justification of torture should have so gripped (sections of) the blogosphere right now (EveTushnet seems to be Torture Central, as far as links are concerned - she's against, by the way).

I've no wish to get stuck in - only so many hours in the day. But, on the substantive issue, I am puzzled by the vehemence with which some attack the practice in principle who find acceptable the waging of war in general, or Bush's Iraq war in particular.

Those fuel-air jobs don't exactly kill with the surgical cleanness of a bullet in the brain. Not to mention cluster-bombs, depleted uranium, napalm. Even if one disregards collateral damage, and considers only the suffering caused to enemy combattants, in many cases (I suspect) this may exceed that of a man tortured for a day or two with electricity.

Munitions (including land-mines, banned in the UK but permissible to US forces [1]) are deliberately designed to wound rather than kill outright - because a wounded man causes more disruption to enemy operations than a corpse. And those things don't dispense morphine with the shrapnel....

And all that, of course, leaves aside nuclear weapons.

So, on what ground is the use of all these awful things permissible, but not torture? One line of argument would be to dispute the question via the definition of torture: would the sort of constitutionally-sanctioned pressure brought on suspects by US police forces count? What about the other sorts of pressure used by US police? Can psychological pressure ever amount to torture? What physical measures might not so do? Etc, etc.

But suppose one considers, say, electricity. I would need some persuading that the psychological (let alone the physical) damage suffered by one so tortured exceeded that of a man suffering third-degree burns over most of his body thanks to a napalm strike.

Surely, the justification for the use of torture is, like the case of war, one of comparison of means and ends. My guess is that many of the opponents of the upcoming war against Iraq supported the 1991 war - those who were around at the time. In 1991, there was a clear right to self-defence, and ample justification for US assistance to an invaded country.

The 1991 war was awful - and was not susceptible of justification (legally or morally) except by reference to the extent of the wrong it was intended to put right [2].

The use of torture is awful, too. But, for reasons that puzzle me, we do not admit in justification (as we do with war) the evils such torture is intended to deal with.

(And - an issue raised that comes to mind - whilst the torturer may well get the wrong man some of the time, is the proportion lower than the civilian proportion of military casualties? And, supposing us to be considering torture carried on by the US, what proportion of those tortured would be children - compared, again to the proportion of war casualties which are children?)

As I said, this is not a topic I intend to spend much time on - mainly on the grounds of relevancy to likely US and allied action.

But it seems to me that, just as with, say, eugenics, it is a matter which, for historical reasons [3] has been boxed into a particular political corner, in which the application of reason is somehow not permissible. Minds have been closed - perhaps for fear of temptation; or guilt by association.

A state of affairs which I find uncongenial.

  1. So far as I can tell, the US has not even signed, let alone ratified, the 1997 Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Convention!

  2. And, a separate point, the likelihood of the allied offensive achieving that goal.

  3. For an illustration of the historical nonsense the subject can get into, one may take the case of the (eminently searchable!) General Paul Aussaresses, who was prosecuted essentially for telling the truth about the use of torture during the Algerian War of 1954-62.


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Tuesday, March 11, 2003
 

Iraq invasion an international crime? (continued)


Earlier today, I mounted a scouting exercise into the international criminal law relating to wars of aggression [1].

Subsequently, comments at Stand Down referred to a piece in yesterday's Guardian by English QC and international law expert Mark Littman [2].

Now, the (extremely tentative) conclusion of my piece earlier today was that, whilst, most probably, the waging of aggressive war was a crime known to international law, there was currently no court in which such a crime could be prosecuted [3].

Littman, after referring to other possible consequences of an invasion of Iraq, turns, as his third point, to the question whether such an invasion might constitute a crime against peace, as formulated in the Nuremberg Charter. Having waved under our noses the name of von Ribbentrop [4], he (rightly) points out (the conclusion I reached, rather more laboriously, this morning) that there is no international court with the jurisdiction to try such a crime.

He then mentions the truly bizarre extraterritorial pretensions of the Belgians to a roving world jurisdiction to try international crimes wheresoever, and by whomsoever, committed. A sort of criminal Helms-Burton [4].

The Belgian law founding (in the domestic courts, at least) jurisidiction over international crimes in Belgian courts is the Loi de 16 juin 1993, Article 1. The law applies to
les infractions graves énumérées ci-après, portant atteinte par action ou omission, aux personnes et aux biens protégés par les conventions signées à Genève le 12 août 1949...
and subsequent protocols.

There is then a list of 20 heads of crime to which the law applies.

As I mentioned this morning, crimes under the Nuremberg heading of crimes against peace do not have a counterpart in Geneva Conventions I-IV signed on 12 August 1949. And consequently, they are not amongst the 20 heads enumerated in the Belgian law.

Littman doesn't actually say that the Belgian law does cover crimes against peace - but he doesn't exactly make clear that it doesn't, either.

The Belgian law has achieved legal notoriety in two cases: the first was DRC v Belgium in the International Court of Justice [5]. This case concerned the issuance by Belgium of an international arrest warrant against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, then Foreign Minister of the DRC, in connection with alleged crimes (supposedly committed in neighbouring Rwanda, I think) falling within the 20 heads I mention above.

Having read the opinion of the court, it doesn't appear address the issue (raised by the DRC) that the Belgian law represents (para 42)
the exercise of an excessive international jurisdiction.
The reason given by the court (para 46) is that the DRC dropped the argument in its final submissions; but avoiding the argument also, no doubt, reflected a laudable reluctance to look for trouble by taking a Dred Scott approach to the matter.

The second case is, of course, that arising out of the unpleasantness at Sabra and Chatila, currently being fought in Belgian courts.

The general controversy [8] that sent the case to the top court appears (and what follows should be taken with extreme caution!) to relate to the question whether the Belgian law can apply to persons not within the jurisdiction at the time a prosecution is initiated; the appeals court said that a particular provision in the criminal procedure code [9] limited the scope of prosecutions under the June 16 law. The top court overruled on this point, and remitted the case to a different panel of the appeals court.

Neither court gave any credence to an idea that the validity of the June 16 law in principle was susceptible to challenge under Belgian domestic law [10].

So, to summarise on Belgium, domestic law does not currently apply to crimes against peace. (I'm not even sure that the judicial rationales offered in support of the present law would cover an extension to cover such crimes.) And the ICJ DRC opinion of the court gives no indication either way on the validity in international law of its pretensions to extraterritorial jurisdiction.

On the Littman article one can say two things: by its superficiality of approach, it rather belies the extraordinary complexity of the legal situation here (with which I have scarcely started feebly to grapple).

And it offers by suggestion hope of action which (so far as I can see) does not exist.

Had I been Mr Littman's client, I'm not sure I'd be altogether happy in settling his fee for an opinion like that.

There is a good deal of extraterritoriality in relation to international crimes (as witness the Pinochet litigation - which Littman mentions, and to which it might be useful to return.) From a fairly superficial analysis, the peculiarities of the Belgian law would seem to be: first, that it would seem to demonstrate some entrepreneurship on behalf of Belgium in actively seeking out cases where extraterritorial jurisdiction will have to be employed; and, second, that it is not restricted in its application to those susceptible to its jurisidiction (opening the way, it seems, to trials in absentia of individuals who never come within a thousand miles of the country).


  1. Qv for references.

  2. In retrospect, I rather think that it was a glance at this piece that inspired mine - clearly it should have been namechecked. The reason I left it alone, I think, was that it was pretty thin and there have been plenty of legal teaser articles on the war, but bugger all red meat! Perhaps I was hasty....

  3. I leave aside ad hoc courts such as those applicable to acts in Rwanda or ex-Yugoslavia - with the thought that the jurisdiction of such courts may not include crimes of waging aggressive war.

  4. The v is not, of course capitalised. I blame the (mythical?) Guardian sub-editors.

  5. Opinions here.

  6. There are separate and dissenting opinions.

  7. The online sourcing for the documentation for this case is pretty haphazard: this site has several items (including an English translation - but not the original) of the judgement of the Belgian kinda-sorta supreme court (Cour de cassation). To get the original, go here and search on the date. The case number is JC032C1_1. I know I got the lower court (Cour d'appel) judgement elsewhere, a few months ago.

  8. It also dealt with the specific issue of Ariel Sharon's immunity as serving head of government.

  9. All of this is lower case, to avoid a spurious impression of reliability!

  10. If, indeed, any Belgian legislation is so susceptible. My guess (no more!) is that they have nothing like US judicial review.


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Iraq - the real Nazi connection?


I've talked before of various ways in which the war might infringe international law. One that I haven't dealt with, though, is the question whether the war might constitute a crime against peace.

I'm feeling my way around this neck of the legal woods. But I think one starts with the Nuremberg Trials. The International Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement of August 8 1945, was governed by a Charter which mostly provided for largely procedural matters.

However, Article 6 of the Charter vested the power to try in the Tribunal; and then described the crimes over which it had jurisdiction, under three headings:

  1. Crimes against peace;

  2. War crimes; and

  3. Crimes against humanity.

Subsequently, the general law in relation to areas covered in the second and third categories was codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The question of aggression was, of course, dealt with in the UN Charter.

Crimes against peace (CAPs) are defined in Art 6 as:
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

All the Art 6 crimes were subsequently included in a document prepared for the UN General Assembly by the International Law Commission [1], entitled Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950.

From what I've read, some UNGA resolutions, such as Res 95, count as sources of international law - to weigh in the balance with all the other myriad sources! Quite what, in 1950, the practical effect of the Nuremberg Principles was (lacking that basic instrument of law, a standing court to administer it!) I couldn't say.

Skipping ahead to the recent past [2], we get to the International Criminal Court, which is established under the 1998 Rome Statute to try much the same range of offences as those covered by Art 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. Amongst them is [3]
the crime of aggression.

However, a clue to the difficulties experienced with this crime is the fact that the ICC jurisdiction on aggression is suspended [4] until a provision is added to the Statute defining what it is!

Of course,
the suppression of acts of aggression
is one of the primary purposes of the UN [5]. Definition for the purpose of a criminal prosecution is evidently a trickier matter.

Where does this all get us? A measure of confirmation (further research needed, obviously!) that any ICC prosecutions (a suggestion canvassed before by academics) arising from the war would not be on the prime Nuremberg ground - because the ICC doesn't cover it yet [6].

And it tidies away, more or less, a nagging doubt as to whatever happened to the most fundamental of the Nuremberg rules: CAPs inhabitat a limbo such that
  • there is no court in which they can be prosecuted as such; and

  • the court that exists has jurisidiction to prosecute cases which would fall within the Nuremberg meaning of CAPs - but that jurisdiction has yet to be activated!

That's about it, so far.

Strangely, the thought also occurs of Crusader Saint Tony arraigned before the ICC for a list of war crimes as long as your arm - whilst George sits out proceedings Stateside!

  1. Under a mandate to
    formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal

    The UNGA had already resolved in Res 95 that it
    Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal;

  2. Leaving aside, for example, UNGA attempts to define aggression in Res 3314 (PDF).

  3. Art 5(1)(d)

  4. Art 5(2) The other crimes are defined rather thoroughly, from a quick look.

  5. In Art 1(1) of the Charter.

  6. The academics were talking about disproportionate civilian damage - which comes under the war crimes heading of the ICC's jurisdiction - no fewer than 34 types of war crime enumerated (Art 8(2)!


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Turkey: Erdogan wins election - but no rush on new resolution


As forecast, ruling AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has won his by-election, and will shortly be installed as prime minister.

He's been on TV tantalising the US with the possibility that a revote of the resolution authorising US troop deployments will find the necessary majority in the Parliament:
Erdogan said that several deputies who had voted against the motion had told him that they would vote in favor of a new motion if it was sent to the parliament.

But
there were steps that the United States had to take regarding the issue of motion, and it would be difficult to ease the atmosphere in Turkey before the United States took those steps.

Such as?
Noting that Turkmen issue and Turkey's role were still not clear, and these issues should absolutely be clarified, Erdogan said, ''these doubts should be removed.''

In other words, the Turks need a free hand in Northern Iraq to protect their brothers and gain nine points of the law over the Kirkuk/Mosul oilfields. (Did I say that?)

As for the logistical blizzard of US forces movements currently going on, resolution or no resolution,
When asked whether or not U.S. troops had exceeded limits of authority in Turkey, Erdogan said, ''I was told that those were totally military equipment and vehicles related to the first motion.''[1]

UPI has a diary-type item on the US movements suggesting that they are taking place (with the cooperation of the Turkish military, natch) under the flimsier-than-gauze cover of the
...January agreement to upgrade Turkish bases and ports. That agreement allowed 3,500 U.S. troops -- and their engineering and maintenance equipment...

But
with a nod and a wink from Turkish chief of staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, a lot more troops have landed, along with equipment that looks rather better suited to war than construction.

That, as readers may recall, is the self-same General Ozkok who (in agonies of conscience!) posed himself the question
what would this mean if NSC had made a recommendation prior to the decision if the motion was at the Parliament?
and answered
....this would be a pressure on the Parliament for the acceptance of the motion. It would not be democratic and conform with the Constitution.

I should coco!

The UPI piece also says
Bulent Arinc, speaker of the Turkish Parliament, has criticized the troop movements as "disrespectful."
I bet he has.

And, finally,
A potentially tricky incident took place over the weekend, when 700 U.S. troops from the 4th Infantry were asked to leave their personal weapons behind at Iskenderun harbor's customs exit. Nobody wants to use the emotive word "disarmed" and U.S. and Turkish brass are trying to draw a veil over the incident as "a misunderstanding."

This frightfully well-informed piece also has Erdogan chumming up with another friend of this blog
special envoy Zalmay Khalizad [2],
telling him that
he would get the 4th Division through to open the Northern Front on Iraq. He also told Khalizad to watch for one other sign of his good faith. The five ministers in his government who voted against the U.S. troop agreement would be sacked, Erdogan pledged. Watch this space.

Is Erdogan moonlighting, do you think, scribing for Yankee dollars?

Meanwhile, sidekick Yasar Yakis is suggesting the question of putting fresh resolutions before the Turkish parliament
had not become clear yet.
He referred to
a state which decided and is seemed to be determined to carry out an intervention in Iraq due to reasons which also we don't think right...
Now, who could he possibly mean?

A cunning mutt and jeff operation or a government FUBAR? Who knows. One at least has the entertainment value....

  1. This is still unclear - I last had Speaker Bulent Arinc saying that there were two resolutions, one of which passed. I'd assumed that the resolution that passed referred solely to Turkish deployments. Evidently not. Not knowing a word of the language makes nailing these things down extra difficult....

  2. The guy's name is Khalilzad, for Heaven's sake - so much for the umma....


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Monday, March 10, 2003
 

Chirac on TV: France locks and loads on second resolution - Straw prepares to bale


In a way, it rather spoils the fun of seeing whether the Saleable Six can be kept onside.

But in one of those big TV interviews (with Elysée gilt on (as it were) brazen display) that French presidents so covet, Jacques Chirac has burnt his boats (those few that remained) [1]. As Cato the Elder had Carthago delenda est as his catchphrase, Chirac has adopted a similar notion in relation to the second resolution (whatever it is):
La France votera non quelles que soient les circonstances.

Chirac has twigged the main point - the point that Tony the Twister does all in his power to divert attention away from: it doesn't matter how one tweaks the USU resolution (within the absurd limitations approvable by USG) - any old resolution will be good enough to authorise war in the minds of critical tranches of public opinion whose opposition is necessary for the preventive retribution (on Blair, in particular) which, itself, is necessary in order to forestall the rolling world war which some, at least, in USG appear to envisage.

Therefore, whatever the fancy-pants arguments (and I can't see them as tremendously fancy right now) on the changes wrought in the USU resolution as originally proposed, he knows he has to vow, elle ne passera pas.

That is the bull point. He's got it. And thank Goodness for it.

In the House of Commons today, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was talking about UNSCR 1441 being sufficient in itself to make an invasion legal [2] - as if in anticipation of the Chirac interview (not to mention the earlier Ivanov veto threat, of course).

They're frit. Pace Colin's Pollyanna act on US TV yesterday (which had rounding up five of the Saleable Six as (in the, thoroughly illogical, vernacular) a piece of piss), it's clear that, with a reported delay to the resolution being voted and the latest round of suggested concessions [3], USG/HMG know they are in deep trouble at the UN.

A minor annoyance for Bush; for Blair, he hears the sawing of the planks on which he'll be crucified. Unless he's got the luck of the devil....

  1. The transcript will eventually appear, I suspect, here.

  2. From tonight's Newsnight on the BBC - streaming from around 1130 [oops! ie, 2330!] GMT here (worthwhile viewing - don't miss the deliciously camp Stephanie Flanders piece on state deficits towards the end of the show). A piece on the statement here doesn't include reference to this - full text available only tomorrow on the Commons site.

  3. In the crass and other-worldly Wilsonian mode of open covenants openly arrived at - a method only employed on snow-jobs for the benefit of the suckers - er, voters....


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Blair: is Bush's weakest link finally giving way?


The evidence, for what it's worth, comes under two headings.

Firstly, suggestions over the last few days (here and here) that Blair is too tired to function properly. As a result of the carefully constructed cult of the leader, Blair has deprived senior ministers of authority - and himself of the ability to delegate to them tasks they (and not he) should be doing.

Giving proper attention to the war is (or should be) a more than full-time job on its own; but Blair has personally to take charge of Northern Ireland, the firemen, the health service, etc, etc.

Secondly, we've had the first Cabinet minister to criticise Blair openly on the war [1]. One the one hand, it's only International Development Minister Clare Short - who's a sort of licensed maverick, whose shtick is blunt, no-spin comment on world affairs - Blair's token ordinary bloke amongst the sharp-suited lie-machines.

On the other hand, the directness of the criticism of Blair - as reckless - and, above all, the deliberate timing of the comments in the crucial week of the final attempt at a second resolution marks a step-change from previous Labour dissent from the war (last seen en masse in February 26's Commons debate).

As an indication that Short has given up on Blair; and as a catalyst for a more generalised revolt among ministers, including Cabinet colleagues.

I first pointed out on January 17 the paradox of the position of a British prime minister (compared, say, with that of a US president): whilst in office, he's a virtual dictator. But, if events move against him - such that he no longer to have the confidence of his senior colleagues - he can be eased out of office in a matter of days, big majority or not.

There are provisions in each party for elections of party leaders - convoluted and time-consuming. In theory, a PM could cling on for weeks against the united opposition of his parliamentary party. But the psychological pressure would make that hard, if not impossible, to sustain - Thatcher, in 1990, was not voted out of her position as Conservative Party Leader: she resigned after failing to win on the first ballot [2].

I'm not clear what the mechanics would be - a motion signed by many more than the 122 Labour MPs who voted against the government on February 26 might help. The rigid control maintained by the Government over Commons business would make action on the floor unlikely, I think (though the rules are sufficiently complex for it to be just possible that some miraculous coup might be effected.)

Probably, if an effective revolt is to happen before the war, it will require the intervention of Blair's heir apparent, Gordon Brown, and all the senior ministers (except the hapless Jack Straw, of course) telling Blair they've seen enough, and will resign unless Blair pulls the plug on the war.

Now, Brown hasn't exactly been yelling Amen at the permanent floating Blair war revival meeting. But I doubt very much whether he'll strike now.

Only if he thought if was his last chance at the top job - and that could only be so if he thought the war was going to go swimmingly. I reckon he'll play the vulture - maintain his current holding pattern, let Saddam finish Blair off, and swoop down to pick the carcase clean afterwards.

The weakest link, I reckon, will hold just long enough for George to do his business. Though, if Blair collapses from exhaustion - the Anthony Eden exit, only before Suez [3] got invaded: that has possibilities....


  1. The radio interview is streamed (probably temporarily) - though the stream was sluggish when I tried it. Traffic, no doubt.

  2. What looks like an interesting article (PDF) on selection of Tory leaders.

  3. This looks like a good summary of the background to the 1956 Suez crisis - not much online competition, unfortunately.


UPDATE
This tantalisingly short piece by the usually insightful Andrew Marr of the BBC says
There's no doubt that Tony Blair is in a very, very weak position indeed.


A lot of MPs and trade union leaders are already circling around to see - if Tony Blair does not get that second resolution - whether they could persuade the NEC of the Labour Party to hold a special conference in London to challenge the leadership.


The kinda-sorta equivalent of the UN General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution which I discussed here and then here - and which has still barely made a ripple in the news pond - latest is this.


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The footnotes...


Since I've seen the odd expression of dislike, a word or two seems in order.

The reason I use them is that my style is rather free-associational (to use a polite expression!) - and the theory is that, to keep the main text vaguely on topic, the considerable quantity of tangential stuff goes better in footnotes; as do the more complex references - where there are several links to go with the one phrase, say. Much the same reasons as for footnotes in dead-wood publications.

The way to get around constantly having to scroll up and down (and I realise this will sound pretty condescending) is to have two windows with the same page and flip between them using Alt+Tab. I know: grandmothers, eggs, sucking - the whole nine yards. We bloggers really live on the edge.....


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Look at it from the French viewpoint....


In some respects, the UK/US Iraq war PR has been near disastrous - the repeated deviations from truth, for instance.

But, on one point, it seems to have worked pretty well: the rhyme and reason behind the French effort against the war. The War Party notion is that this is due to some mixture of:

  • financial interest (the Total Fina Elf deals with Saddam, for instance);

  • delusions of (post-)imperial grandeur; and

  • anti-American bile.

Lying behind this rationale is the implication that, Old Europeans though they may be, they will in the nick of time suffer a Damascene conversion to reality and stand aside for the Crusaders to march on Jerusalem. As it were.

Now, I've no special knowledge of what the French motivation actually is. But it seems to me that one can argue a rather different outcome as being equally plausible, logical, even [1].

The theory is that Jacques Chirac, after five years in the chain-gang of cohabitation with secular monk Lionel Jospin, has received a giant dose of political Viagra thanks to the elections last Spring, and, lacking credible and acceptable dragons to fight at home (he's no union-busting Thatcher), he goes abroad to throw his (self-perceived) new-found weight around.

I'm not sure if we have the evidence to hand to decide whether his stance on an Iraq attack was conceived of as a brief session of grandstanding, to be shaded over by diplomatic miasmas; or a definite policy commitment. The fact that he had the support of Germany (Chancellor Schröder having been locked into opposition to the war thanks to his election rhetoric) could only have solidified his resolve. Franco-German relations have not been of the closest - and the idea of a rapprochement between the two states - on whatever basis - in an era of upheaval in the EU must have had an appeal [2].

But, whenever (as with the presentation of inspectors' reports to the UNSC) the opportunity has been presented to the French to start edging back from the precipice, they've declined to do so.

Lacking inside information, how can one justify this? Surely the US/UK analysis isn't all wrong?

I don't think it is, necessarily. There is an appeal - peculiar to France, amongst present or former great powers - of a leadership role in the world, not only a counter-weight to the US, but a pôle of attraction for lesser nations.

For the origins, one has to go back into history: the fact that, in the 18th century battles for colonial supremacy (fought out largely in Europe, in the War of the Spanish Succession and the Seven Years' War) the French, by and large, lost [3]. And, in the second bout of big imperialism in the second half of the 19th century, again, the French came off worse - millions of square kilometres of Saharan sand and scrub and other odds and sods [4] hardly compared with India and the white Dominions.

The French would bask in their idea of the mission civilisatrice - an idea shockingly close to the Perle/Wolfowitz ideas for the Greater West Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere - which supposedly made their colonies different from those of Britain governed under Lord Lugard's self-denying principle of indirect rule. But the inferiority complex was there all the same [5].

Unimaginable losses in the First World War [6]; the ignominious - worse, perhaps, than 1870 - defeat in June 1940 by Germany; the insane war in Indo-China, leading to the insane-squared baroud d'honneur at Dien Bien Phu; the politically inescapable [7] Algerian War - which resulted in the military coup in May 1958 which brought General de Gaulle back to power: all desperate blows to the prestige of a nation which, once, during the reign of Charles II had its boot on England's neck, and something of a hold on Europe as a whole.

Now, it may seem - certainly does tend to seem, in Britain - slightly absurd that such historical matters play a part in current policy. History, in the UK, is sublimated into ceremony, peerages, the monarchy - the stuff that brings the tourists in (wars permitting). But, in France's case, it does.

The whole French post-colonial Africa policy that I described before [8] seems vastly overblown and anachronistic to most British eyes, I suspect; the recent African summit in Paris (including Mugabe) an instance of the undignified grubbing for approval (and contracts) amongst a generally disreputable bunch of fifth-rate powers [9].

The point is that a nation may perfectly well seek intangible as well as tangible benefits for its people; in particular, may seek to identify principles guiding their policy in the world which are not necessarily directly linked to trade or finance.

America, in disputing the notion, has zero standing: grandiose claims for American betterment of the world have regularly emanated from across the pond since colonial days. Seldom can French arrogance have exceeded that of John Winthrop in his iconic 1630 City on a Hill. John L O'Sullivan's 1839 statement on Manifest Destiny makes de Gaulle's Vive le Québec libre in Montreal in 1967 sound like Gary Cooper in one of his less exuberant roles. The schoolboy smirk on the face of the soon-to-be-late President McKinley (presumably c1900) is evident from his words as he justifies - to a bunch of Methodists! - the taking into safe keeping of the Philippines. And now we have the Bush version.

(There's ample room to psycho-sociologically analyse the US via its foreign policy, as I suggested before. Later, though.)

The question is, what's the cost to France of this national self-indulgence? Unsurprisingly, the US and their running-bulldog [10] are making all sorts of dark threats in case of a French veto:
  • making the UN irrelevant - and thus depriving France's P5 status of value (oh dear, poor Tony loses that way too - but I'm sure George ran it past him...);

  • cutting France out of Iraqi oil; and

  • other, unspecified damage due to the unilateralism forced upon the US by French intransigeance.

The US problem is targeting their retaliation in such a way as to avoid most fire being of the friendly variety - falling not on the Gallic enemy but on loyal servants like Blair. Iraqi oil presumably will be under control of the AMGOT that Bush will establish in Baghdad - so the oil threat is one he can made good. In the short term.

That's a real cost for the French stance - how much, net? $5bn a year? $2bn? As a proportion of GDP, well below - say - the cost of fighting the war to USG.

And how long will the AMGOT last? France is playing for time, assuming that Bush's attention span is limited by the onrushing electoral hostilities of next year; that contemplating the mess that will be post-Saddam Iraq will get too much for him; and he'll pocket his victory and move next question.

There's a good chance, in that event, that an incoming Iraqi government will seek to reassert its independence by a renversement des alliances, oil-wise. Or, at least, by hedging its bets with a little competition for those companies to which the AMGOT gave licences and contracts.

As for the other stuff, the opportunity for significant US surgical strikes against French interests are probably limited. In trade matters [11], EU/US conflicts under the WTO have already arisen - bananas, steel tariffs, etc - and a new round is coming up. In military matters, perhaps there's equipment the US can deny to France; but strategic stability in Europe hasn't suddenly become an optional extra amongst US interests. Diplomatic offensives in French areas of influence would scarcely be new [12] - nor does the US need any incentive to mount them. And those areas are, in terms of geopolitical importance, pretty low-rent.

In any case, in demonstrating the scale of the threat over Iraq, the US has the problem of showing additionality - identifying cases where it will screw France - but would not have done so but for its stance on Iraq. Besides the conceptual difficulties of establishing such a prospective counterfactual, I reckon the French would think that the US would screw them whenever they could no matter how supine French policy was on Iraq. Probably because, mutatis mutandis, that's what they'd do to the Yanks!

And that P5 place - the French, I suspect, look at it two ways:
  • if the only way the US will allow the UNSC to function is if it rubber-stamps any policy the US proposes, that makes the P5 spot pretty close to worthless in any case;

  • the UNSC has emerged from cold storage before - change of circumstances, change of regime in Washington, and the thing will bloom once more like desert after rain.

The paradox is that, while Chirac is a probable lame-duck (after his current five-year term [13] is up in 2007, he'll be 74 years old [14]), Bush's first election (in New Hampshire) is only ten months away. Beyond the mere counting of days, Bush is up against the what goes around, comes around perspective of Old Europe.

(And the almost universal adulation of Frenchmen of all political stripes must have a certain effect on the likelihood of Chirac's sticking to his guns - four years of living under a shroud of allegations of cowardice if he were to give in now is also a pretty potent threat.)

Of course, if the Saleable Six stick to their guns, Chirac will win the gunfight without being put to the necessity of drawing - or, by not so doing, showing himself a craven coward [15].

A metaphor that a Texan might be proud of.


  1. Lacking the necessary facts in support, this is clearly a mere hypothesis.

  2. Both nations have an idée fixe that, without a virtual Siamese twin relationship between them, the EU is bound to break up.

  3. Britain's big loss from the Old Empire, America, didn't help the French much!

  4. Indo-China included.

  5. The (so far as I'm aware) entirely unnecessary Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 - resulting in humiliating defeat by Germany - didn't help French moral, of course.

  6. Around 1.3m killed, from memory - plus wounded, plus the physical destruction of the economic infrastructure of large tracts of Northern France.

  7. A million or so rag, tag and bobtail of the Mediterranean - the pieds noirs - virtually held the French state hostage for years.

  8. Work back from here.

  9. Since the Queen - no less - has welcomed into her home scum like Amin, Obote, Kenyatta, Moi and others of the criminal class in Africa, beware pots and kettles....

  10. Which, as bulldogs tend to do, is now rather winded chasing after his master.

  11. Which Bush singled out during his March 6 Press Conference (mentioned last here) as (by implication) an area where he was multilateralist in approach, against the demos of the same sort of guys opposing the war.

    And trade is, of course, dealt with on an EU-wide basis. Making targeting France even more difficult.

  12. As in Guinea, mentioned here.

  13. Article 6 of the Constitution, as amended in 2000.

  14. One reason he may seek a third term is the presidential immunity his office gives against prosecution for corruption.

  15. Blame the Gary Cooper reference - High Noon has now snuck in to the consciousness...

    UPDATE I've identified the subliminal percolation of High Noon into the brain: John Rosenberg's HN-based piece on the war over at Discriminations. Having only so far skimmed it, I suspect that, on a more thorough read, I'll enjoy the analysis, whilst disagreeing with the result.



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Sunday, March 09, 2003
 

Breaking news! NSA email leaker arrested (perhaps)


The Observer (which broke the email story last Sunday [1]) today reveals that
Gloucestershire police confirmed last night that a 28-year-old woman was arrested last week on suspicion of contravening the Official Secrets Act.

The woman works at GCHQ (the UK equivalent, I suspect, of the NSA).

This companion piece is hyping it up to be the equivalent of the Pentagon Papers! And has an ex-NSA guy suggesting that it was an
authorised leak
as part of the ongoing guerilla warfare between pols and spooks on both sides of the pond that goes back to the famous Tenet letter of last October [2] and much further back than that.

Quite what the facts are here, I don't think we've a prayer of discovering in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, I can see it spawning a whole bunch of fanfics....

  1. Go here and work back [sounds rather rude - but the links are all back there!].

  2. Go here and work back.


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Saturday, March 08, 2003
 

Some smart thinking on the Michigan affirmative action cases - not from Justice, natch...


I've mentioned before that, whilst some of us are battling [1] on the Iraq front, John Rosenberg over at Discriminations has established a Verdun [2] in the affirmative action theatre: ils ne passeront pas - if he has anything to do with it!

And this, I think, is typical of the great stuff he has: Lino Graglia, a law professor at the University of Texas, puts forward what seems to my untutored eye an excellent case for suggesting that the Supremes should rely, in striking down the Michigan schemes, not on the Fourteenth Amendment, but on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
That would, in effect, return the issue to Congress -- where it ultimately belongs.

The reason, if I understand him aright, is that the words of Title VI [3] are unambigously colour-blind - whereas the 14th Amendment operates through the altogether fuzzier medium of equal protection.

Graglia feels that, if the Supremes pursue a constitutional analysis, they will split 4-4, and Justice O'Connor [4] - just like - or perhaps, in memory of - her erstwhile mentor, Justice Powell [5] - will fudge the issue and leave the whole ghastly institution scotched but not killed.

The Uriah Heep-like pusillanimity of the Justice (ha!) Department (see links in [4]) can only assist if it provokes sufficient disgust amongst the Court to take a clean stand against AA (or, at least, diversity, the most pernicious aspect of it).

I've just skimmed the Goverment brief in Grutter (the Law School case - for materials, see links in [4]), and I noticed no reference in the argument to Title VI at all! Pollyanna would suppose that they stayed away from Title VI just because it was not susceptible to the weaselly argument they were putting forward. And that the Court (more likely, I suppose, their clerks), in reading the brief, would note this with a proper disgust, file the wretched document in the garbage can where it belongs, and go the Title VI route in their decision.

Thus, for the first time since Lyndon Johnson's time, putting the Republic's legislators under the cosh, race-wise, and daring them positively to enact the reverse discrimination they have been happy to tolerate these thirty-odd years [6]. An idea almost good enough to eat....

But then, I was always an Anne of Green Gables guy myself....

  1. Memo to self: watch the military metaphors...

  2. Damn!

  3. 42 USC 2000(d):
    No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

  4. Previously mentioned in the Michigan connection here, here and here.

  5. In Baake.


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Iraq - biggest American aggression since Jeff Davis?


I've just been getting a little historical perspective on war via the latest instalment of the repeated 1964 BBC series The Great War [1].

Which has led me to offer the following hypothesis: that the proposed invasion of Iraq represents the only instance of American or British aggression, otherwise than in response to an actual attack by some other power (and with comparable numbers of troops engaged, or likely to be so), since Jefferson Davis decided to attack the Union back in 1861.

I say hypothesis because my knowledge of military history is not of the most reliable. I think I'm covered as far as the World Wars are concerned. The Boer War was started by the Boers, it says here. The North Koreans and North Vietnamese kicked off those wars. As Saddam did the 1991 Gulf War.

If you say the Maine was a crock as well as a wreck, perhaps the Spanish-American War qualifies - I don't reckon so, though [2].

Jefferson Davis has carved out something of a cosy spot for himself in a place named after his arch-enemy! The Trent Lott farrago (December archives passim) brought up Lott's love that really ought not to have spoken its name for the First Traitor - getting his citizenship restored, getting his Senate desk dedicated to the Mississippi Senior Senator.

And Davis also appears in connection with one of the Little League, Carol Mosley-Braun [3], who, heedless of what I'm presuming were her enslaved ancestors [4], failed to protest this last, monstrous, celebration of the Peculiar Institution [5].

And now the mantle of Davis falls on the shoulders of another Flower of the Confederacy.....

  1. Which I've mentioned before, in anticipation. Three episodes in (of 26), and they're still just at the start of Mons. Almost uniquely for TV, the hype has been matched by the performance. If you can, see it.

  2. According to this, 307,000 men were 'enrolled' for the War - with a grand total of 385 combat deaths! The implication is that many were called, but few were chosen to do any actual fighting (I'm no expert, evidently). Disease - yellow fever, in particular - was the real killer (non-combat deaths amounting to around nine times the KIAs) - other SAW links here.

  3. Who dislikes the hyphen, apparently....

  4. Not all African blood arrived in what is now the United States on slave ships - as the current Secretary of State can attest.

  5. I'm rather hoping the fact has not escaped the notice of the Walrus of Hate....


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More from the Blair fake factory


A few short weeks ago, there was a report to the UNSC by the inspectors, and it was a seething Colin Powell who got it in the neck from UNMOVIC's Hans Blix over the interpretation of some photoint (the notorious truck movements) [1].

This time, it was the IAEA's Mohamed El-Baradei - and he was fingering the supposed attempts of Saddam's regime to buy uranium from Niger. Documents supposedly evidencing such attempts were provided by the British to IAEA (though, in his report, Baradei does not single out Britain).

The result:
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents, which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger, are in fact not authentic.

Now, the usual intention in forging documents is (one way or another) to get richer thereby. And perhaps some element of what passes for the UK intelligence community was sold these documents for hard cash. Their only crime would, in that instance, have been rank stupidity.

How much more likely, however, that some over-zealous operatives, feeling the heat from their lords and masters in London (who were merely passing on said heat from Blair, Straw and Co), took it into their heads to produce the fakes? And, the wish being father to the thought, with how little scrutiny might they have been accepted as genuine by said lords and masters?

Far fetched, of course, to suppose that Blair or Straw ordered the faking - but if the man with the ultimate power is sufficiently monomaniacal, it's not hard to see how a climate would be created in which those lower down the chain might feel it their duty to provide facts to back up that man's most fervent (to use a polite word) arguments.

As an encore, Baradei was happy to relieve himself all over the (once) much-vaunted claims concerning the famous aluminium tubes:
....there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have been -- it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in question.

Strangely - and this is really just my impression, with Google as my guide - the faking story seems to have got remarkably little coverage as yet (is it a US news cycle thing?). Perhaps War Party evidence-faking is now on a par with the Pope's religion and ursine defecatory habits as a paradigm statement of (in the London vernacular) the bleeding obvious....

  1. I talked about February 14 and 15

UPDATE [Mar 10 03]
Strange thing: Google's news machine is still not picking up the Niger story in news reports on the Baradei statement: un baradei report produces 189 items, un baradei report fake produces two items, un baradei report niger six.

More peculiar, because the third of those searches produces a WaPo article (which times itself at 1430 EST on Friday) - but the second of the searches doesn't pull up the WaPo article I mention above - from Saturday - which actually has fake in the title!

Persevering readers may recall the case of Lawrence Summers and Eliza New (new readers start here) where I suggested the possible of censorship at Google. Is this another case? What point in trying to cover up what has been on worldwide TV and on the site of one of the best known US newspapers?

Sounds like an NSA job, if you ask me. That Frank Koza's fingerprints all over it. Good old Frank...


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A new high-water mark for Bush unilateralism?


Looking again at the transcript of the big Bush press conference (I touched on yesterday), I wonder whether this is just more of the same (with a broader smile, now that most his hardware is convenient for the start line); or whether some line has been crossed. (I'm no Bush kremlinologist.)

Clearly, Bush was always going to have his war. And the UN action was just a sideshow, pending erection of the Big Top out east, to keep the folks amused and Saint Tony morally (and electorally) uplifted.

But, by Thursday, the niceties could be dispensed with, and the UN told exactly what role was on offer in Phineas T Bush's little entertainment: cheer or hit the pavement (literally, if it wasn't careful...).

To the question
Mr. President, are you worried that the United States might be viewed as defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with military action without specific and explicit authorization from the U.N.?
Bush says [1]
No, I'm not worried about that. As a matter of fact, it's hard to say the United States is defiant about the United Nations, when I was the person that took the issue to the United Nations, September the 12th, 2002. We've been working with the United Nations. We've been working through the United Nations.


Secondly, I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don't need United Nations approval to do so. I want to work -- I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to be a robust, capable body. It's important for it's words to mean what they say, and as we head into the 21st century, Mark, when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission.


Gotta love that Texan sense of humour! He wants the UN to be effective [2]: and the way it shows its effectiveness is to do what it's damned well told.

All those foreign connect-the-dots Kyoto whiners demonising Bush [3] for contempt for treaties and international law and organisations - well, it turns out: wrong treaty, right idea.

One can't help feeling sorry for Blair - in sticking up for Bush against his party's instincts, he was mixing Realpolitik with East End settlement work [4], combatting the social exclusion of the unjustly stereotyped. They had so much in common, it seemed - especially in both having religious beliefs in a godless age. And, in those respects where their differences were great, I strongly suspect that Blair felt he could change Bush, like an ill-advised bride in some cheesy daytime soap.

And now - in speaking so contemptuously of Blair's Darling on the East River, Bush is changing the arrangement between the two of them. No longer the inexperienced hick, appreciative of the benefit of an Old European's savoir-faire in international affairs (without the attendant sarcasm to be expected from Continental purveyors): Bush now has the confidence to relegate Blair to a purely decorative role, and dispense with the pernickety attention to quibbles and decorum with which he had indulged his erstwhile milquetoast mentor.

A plotline not unfamiliar, I believe, in the gangster genre. (Not that any crude read-across is implied, of course...) And - it just occurs to me - not without echos of Wilhelm II's dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 - immortalised in Tenniel's Punch cartoon, Dropping the Pilot.

  1. Not, as with Captain Mainwaring, Stupid boy! (as well he might have).

  2. A Voltaire Holy Roman Empire riff goes here - perhaps with a reference to George Orwell's 1984 and Politics and the English Language. At this time of night, frankly I lack the motivation....

  3. As if Clinton had any doubt it would not be killed in the Senate when he signed it!

  4. Think Jane Addams and Hull House, with toffs from Oxford and Cambridge Universities do-gooding in the London slums. Attlee worked in one, as I recall. One of the few aspects of Old Labour that Blair regrets, I'd guess.


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Friday, March 07, 2003
 

NSA Email - one mystery solved at least (it seems)


A correspondent has kindly pointed me to some evidence suggesting that there really is a Frank Koza [1]: a fellow-blogger (let's hear it for Big Journalism) Mark Kraft fingers Koza Central as
11808 Blue February Way

Columbia, MD.


And this guy has got maps of the place (just in case you wanted to swing by!) and aerial photos (for those planning a bombing run?).

Now, I don't know - but I suspect that the amount of shamus-ing involved in locating the guy was limited to a search like this.

Should have tried it myself, of course: but - call me naive - I suspect I subconsciously figured that a senior man in a spying organisation would have kept his real identity - well, a little more secret.

It is, of course, possible that the guy residing at 11808 Blue February Way is, as he should be by all that's Ian Fleming, a complete phoney, a fly-trap for just the sort of amateur sleuthing engaged in by the Observer and others.

On the basis of the general performance of US intelligence services over the past decade, however, I have a horrible feeling that the White Pages don't lie.

Which makes rather a nonsense of all that colour stuff in the Observer article, of course. And still doesn't explain why the story substantially died. Or any number of detailed matters arising.

And the next question is - having got the man's phone number, has anyone actually called the number and talked to someone on the other end? Now, that's what I'd call journalism....

  1. Previously discussed here: where you'll find links to previous pieces.


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Professors: any attack on Iraq illegal


A letter from a dozen or so academics to the Guardian today is uncharacteristically blunt:
We are teachers of international law. On the basis of the information publicly available, there is no justification under international law for the use of military force against Iraq.

And again
The doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence against an attack that might arise at some hypothetical future time has no basis in international law. Neither security council resolution 1441 nor any prior resolution authorises the proposed use of force in the present circumstances.

Well worth reading - but disappointingly brief. I referred before on February 26 to a similar set of statements in Australia - again with no detailed discussion of the law to back up the heartening conclusions.

I talked earlier on today about the persistence of the fabrication of material breach as a justification for war. Discussion in today's UNSC session (from the snatches I've caught) was very much based on the same delusion.

Not, therefore, that a full argument on the point (a couple of hundred pages would probably do it) would stop the war - but it would help in the achievable quest of at least not going into war without being as wised-up as possible.

So, in default, it's a dose of old Samuel Smiles's remedy: Self-Help....


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RSS Feed


On occasions when Blogger has failed me, the RSS feed has carried on working. Now, while Blogger staggers on, the RSS appears to have died.

I'm investigating, and hope to have the feed working again as soon as I can.

UPDATE The feed seems to be working fine now


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Bush and his invasion evasion on self-defence


I can't say I've done more than skim the transcript of yesterday's Bush press extravaganza.

To the rank amateur, the questions seem like the pitching at the Home Run Derby. Perhaps it was through sheer exasperation at not being asked anything challenging that he volunteered that they would call for a vote on the USU resolution in any event:
No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for the vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council. And so, you bet. It's time for people to show their cards, to let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam.

Lyndon Johnson is spinning so hard, they could use him to drill for Texas tea! Goes against all the laws of politics and diplomacy. That is, if you think Bush's tongue isn't as forked as a rattler's, of course....

And, coincidentally, that wasn't the only time LBJ's ghost stalked the room: in reply to one guy's
Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam. Fifty thousand Americans died. The regime is still there in Hanoi, and it hasn't harmed or threatened a single American in the 30 years since the war ended. What can you say tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq?
came the presidential zinger:
That's a great question.[1]

But no one put the basic point: that disobedience towards UN Security Council resolutions - in whatever fancy words you dress it up - is not, in international law, a justification for war [2]; therefore, the proposed invasion must be judged according to the general principles applicable to pre-emptive war; and, according to those principles, the invasion is illegal.

I've not researched the point: but it seems to me that there is a general presumption of morality that crosses a range of cultures and epochs that violence is only acceptable in self-defence. Whether carried out by individuals or, in war, by nations or groups. Other uses of violence (voluntary euthanasia, for instance) cause all sorts of difficulties in not being susceptible to this plain test of legitimacy.

Self-defence does not require one to accept the first blow before taking action; but the threat of violence must be real and imminent to permit the defence to run.

In international law, one has (amongst others) the well-known case of The Caroline and the Israeli attacks on Egypt in 1967 and on the Osirak (Osiraq) nuclear reactor in 1981.

In every case, though, the evaluation is made on the basis of the actual threat.

When it comes to UNSC resolutions, the War Party is presumably not saying that every material breach would raise the right to violent action against the defaulter nation. Where the resolution related to some administrative matter, say. It can't surely be the breach itself that's the justification: it must be that the breach is taken as some sort of constructive threat [3].

Now, based on my scant knowledge of the subject, I'm aware of no analysis which permits a nation to allege such a constructive threat as giving rise to a self-defence justification for military action.

Yet, in the case of Iraq, it's the so-called material breach - rather than the actual threat posed now by Saddam - that the US has principally relied on to justify its proposed war against Iraq.

I'll try and do some work on the question, attacking it from the self-defence end of the telescope, in the hope of finding more joy than through approaching it from the material breach end.

Certainly, PR has worked a treat for the War Party, on this if no other matter - at the Bush press conference, no one even used the word pre-emptive [4]. The hold of material breach on the psyche of even these relentless seekers-after-truth is evidently positively mesmeric.....

  1. Then the boiler-plate machine kicked in again.

  2. My lengthy analysis of the pet War Party term material breach cast doubt on whether it had any standing in international law as relevant to the present case.

  3. I mean constructive in the legal sense - in expressions like constructive trust, constructive notice - where the whole point is that the trust, notice, or whatever never exists, but is assumed by law to do so.

  4. Or preemptive - damn the variability of English spelling!


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Turkey: Speaker Arinc speaks - again


Nothing particularly striking, that I could see. Except that he mentions that, on Saturday, the Government resolutions put before the Parliament were the subject of two separate votes:
The first prime ministry motion was approved by the parliament. As for the second prime ministry motion, sufficient number could not be reached for approval or rejection of the motion.

It was, as I recall, at one time mooted that votes on the resolution on US deployments, and that relating to the entry of Turkish forces into Northern Iraq, would be taken separately. Evidently [1], it was the second of these resolutions which was voted on first.

Presumably, vote-counting had suggested that piggy-backing the US resolution on the Turkish one (and taking just one vote) would not have improved the result (from the government's perspective).

  1. But I can't find it confirmed online in so many words. Online references to a second resolution (in the Turkish context) all seem to be to the resolution possibly to be introduced by the Erdogan goverment (as it will probably be) in the fulness of time as I discussed earlier today.


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Turkey - democracy thriving, no thanks to Uncle Sam


A number of useful US pieces on the Turkish situation in the wake of the vote against US deployments - this WaPo piece has Turks bewailing the fact that, after decades of the West complaining about the lack of democracy in Turkey, when they get a large steaming helping, they do nothing but bellyache!

On timing of another vote (if there is to be one), UPI is talking about a week starting with the (expected) election to Parliament of AKP party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan as being required to get his takeover of the premiership duly approved; AP is suggesting a three week (from yesterday) timescale. (It also has Erdogan suggesting that it would be a good idea to know the UNSC result before representing the deployment resolution: but, if the approval of the Erdogan takeover takes at least ten days, that rather takes the UNSC result off the critical path.)

AP says that US military equipment is already being moved out of the port area of Iskenderun towards a waiting station - in anticipation of an eventual Yes vote. Yet the NY Times[1] quotes a senior American military official thus:
"We're beyond that now," the official said of staging through Turkey. "We're at Plan B."

Fog of war....

Returning Stateside, there seem some confusion about the implication of the Trade Bill just passed the House [2]. Some - like the London Times - seem to have the impression that an American revival of beggar my neighbour [3] is underway - with one neighbour in the frame.

On the other hand, AP has a Congressional aide suggesting that the exclusion of Turkey from benefits under the bill was to give
...the administration....a free hand in negotiating a financial package with the Ankara government.
Though
Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Texas, a critic of the administration's Iraq policy
suggests something to the contrary.

Being a novice at these things, I've no idea in what state, if at all, these provisions are likely to emerge from whichever Senate Committee [4] takes it on. But it wouldn't, I believe, be unprecedented for the upper house to take a more measured view on the matter.

[Under the miscellaneous heading comes this CSM biography of TV pundit Fehmi Koru, supposedly influential in achieving the Turkish parliament's No vote.]


  1. Link via Slate which has more links on the Turkish situation.

  2. Just to save you the trouble that the so-called grown-up media choose to put us shmuck-readers through: the bill is HR 1047 (the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act) - and passed on Roll Call 45. In fact, tracing recently passed bills alluded to but not - bastards! - given their proper numbers on news sites is probably easiest via THOMAS's roll call link.

  3. Any excuse to namecheck those fine Republicans Rep Willis Hawley (OR-1) and Utah's Sen Reed Smoot - who according to Political Graveyard is related to no fewer than four other entries - Mayors of Provo, UT and members of the Utah legislature. And that was in the post-polygamy era, too! [CORRECTION!] And, since I pulled up the URL, this looks interesting on the eponymous tariff.

  4. According to THOMAS, it's yet to find its way to the Senate at all yet.

CORRECTION! Polygamy in Utah was - it seems - only made illegal in 1896, under the state's constitution, though the Mormon Church banned it in 1890. Which, if correct, means that all of the Utah Smoots listed by Political Graveyard could have been the product of legal, polygamous marriages. Whether any of them were is entirely a different matter, of course....


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The thoroughly illogical draft resolution amendment


Not often that one can accuse the War Party of an excess of subtlety: but this, I think, is such a case.

Their starting-point, of course, is that SCR 1441 [1] in itself constitutes UNSC authorisation for war against Saddam. And the only substantive operative paragraph in the draft resolution is purely parasitical upon 1441, providing no language, however coded, that provides any independent basis for an authorisation of war:
Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441.

Now, the proposal apparently is to
give Iraq a deadline of less than a week to show it has no weapons of mass destruction after a resolution authorizing war is adopted.

One could scarcely see a more blatant act of bad faith on the part of the US/UK than putting forward a deadline which is patently - and with the best will in the world - impossible to comply with [2].

Or a clearer sign of US/UK desperation founded on a real fear that either the Saleable Six will do the impossible and hold out against the relentless diplomatic artillery barrage; or that France or Russia or both will pony up a veto; or both.

In fact, the diplomacy against the Six seems to be counter-productive. They have the (perfectly justified) feeling of being innocents taken hostage by the US for purposes in which have no interest. And innocence is a pretty strong moral bulwark - especially when buttressed by the fact that the Six are all in it together. They have the Spirit of the Blitz - they will never surrender! (Well, one wouldn't go quite that far....)

But in demonstrating Bush as the Ugly American, it does pretty well.

If the new resolution isn't thought to be needed legally by US/UK, the political imperative seems as clear as ever. In the UK, it's always been that way. Now, it seems, UN authorisation seems to have attained a degree of salience with US voters: according to the Reuters piece
A nationwide survey of U.S. voters by Connecticut-based Quinnipiac University found 56 percent wanted Washington to wait for U.N. support instead of going to war alone.

And even Tom Daschle is now saying that
military invasion today would be premature.
(Which compared to the performance on the war of the Congressional Dems - that I've complained of before - is the equivalent of a whole Blair moral crusade wrapped up in one sentence!)

But what resolution? I'm pretty sure it's any old resolution. The subtleties are unlikely, one feels, to make much impact. If there is a new resolution, and Bush is sponsoring it, and it passes, that will be taken as a thumbs-up from the international community; if not, then not.

Hence the importance of ensuring that no new resolution passes unless, by its terms, it denies authorisation until the inspectors have had a proper time to do their job (ie several months). (A Russian delegate was on the BBC Newsnight programme tonight suggesting that the inspectors produce an itemised list of timescales they require to complete the various tasks they have; and that Russia might go for a resolution that made Saddam's compliance with those timescales mandatory.)

At this late date, practically, the alternative is war with a second UNSC resolution, or war without. In denying the resolution, nothing much would be achieved with the Iraq war. But it would set up (if the war goes badly [3]) the political crucifixion of Tony Blair - Bush's moral-political fig-leaf - and make the British supply of fig-leaves for the future military adventures currently being planned by Bush's guys much more unlikely.

(Of course, if everything goes swimmingly down in Iraq, Crusader Saint Tony's sword will remain pledged to oppose any foe of John Fitzgerald Bush - tally-ho Pyongyang. Fortunes of war....)

  1. Iraq UNSCRs here.


  2. The Canadian proposal of a 31 March deadline is hardly more practical.

  3. Just to save a regiment - well, platoon - of warbloggers an apoplectic fit, I'm not saying I want the war to go badly. I am saying that I don't want the war at all; that the responsibility for the sequelae of the war lies on the heads of those who start it; and that wars, once started, rarely go to plan.


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Thursday, March 06, 2003
 

Powell Common just got suspended


Way back in his CJCS days, I'd rather come to think of the current Secretary of State as quite a guy. But - it's bad enough that he's come vigorously in behind Bush's crazy war; worse that (I lead a quiet life) I find he made a big speech in favour of affirmative action at the 2000 Republican Convention.

But this puts the tin lid on it: in a WaPo piece on Al 'Tawana' Sharpton, the Walrus of Hate was pleased to confide that
Colin Powell returns my phone calls.

Perhaps it's on that whole different planet Powell is evidently living on that some moustache-guy's going to get blitzed. Here's hoping...


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Medical malpractice - are the sky-rocketing costs another Bush fairy-tale?


Without looking at the subject too deeply, I'd kind of gone along with the tort reform case that the system was rife with abuse, with forum-shopping to Podunk jurisdictions with illiterate jurors voting telephone numbers in punitives - and a good slice of the lawyer's take going to oil the local Democratic machine that kept the tort laws unreformed.

As Mr Dooley said (in the context of some other law reform issue) not so fast. According to this piece of 3,000 words of apparent actual journalism from USA Today (link via The Note, which is proving worryingly addictive) some of the horror stories are a little overdone.

For instance, those tobacco-chawing, moonshine-swilling missing-links of legend very rarely get to inflict frontier justice on the insurers by way of a damages award:
Less than 2% of malpractice claims result in a winning verdict at trial, according to insurance industry estimates.

Scoot me over to the undecided column on the issue for now. I confess to a partiality to having my mind changed by the adducing of cogent evidence. This might be a case in point.


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What happened to the NSA email story?


There ought to be a Godwin's Law about the Dead Parrot Sketch. But, in the meantime - the email story is no more; it has ceased to be....

Naturally, since I've rather gone to town on the wretched document [1], you might say I am somewhat parti pris in favour of keeping the thing going. True. But even the authors of the Observer piece are puzzled about its prompt demise in the world's media (and, frankly, its scarcely having made a showing in the US), according to this page referring to a broadcast on Tuesday by Pacifica Radio, in which one of the authors, Ed Vulliamy, and James Bamford (a spooks expert I mentioned before), took part.

The page has a streaming link and I duly listened to the relevant section of the programme. Nothing, I think, of relevance beyond what has already come out; interesting, though, that, according to Bamford, the US security services have been bugging the UN since the San Francisco Conference - before the Charter was even signed!

And, on the subject of the mysterious phone call to the even more mysterious Frank Koza, Vulliamy said that the telephone extension number he'd been originally given was one digit out. So he got the number of the NSA switchboard from 411 (anglice, Directory Enquiries) who were happy to oblige him!

Like the old battalion of legend, it seems that, Tom Ridge or no Tom Ridge, the security of the United States is hanging on the old barbed wire.

And, for the moment - or for the duration! - the NSA email story is right there next to it.......


  1. On Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday,