The Lincoln Plawg - the blog with footnotes
Saturday, August 16, 2003
Hutton Inquiry: Notes on Evidence of Andrew Gilligan (BBC journalist)
Something of an experiment here, in attempting to deal with the enormous volume of material being thrown up by the Hutton Inquiry.
These notes are, I'm afraid, even less polished that the average piece here: verbs missing, that sort of thing. (Tech note: no way I could find to turn MS Word product into HTML that Blogger will accept - formatting is therefore all to cock!)
My thought is that the product of my heavy digging on the material might prove useful to to readers with genuine green fingers. We'll see.
The order of the notes generally follows the order of the transcripts, which come in two files, morning and afternoon. The morning session finishes on page 90. References are made thus to page and line numbers: 92-17, to pages alone p10.
Copies of the pages of documentary evidence referred to in proceedings are available on the site - at the evidence tab on the home page. At present, only individual pages are up; the evidence index page says that, from next Thursday (August 21), most of what they've got will be made available. In almost all cases, when a document is referred to in the transcript, the page number (and the file name in the evidence section of the site) is given. I, therefore, generally don't reference document page numbers here. They are all short PDF files, mostly 30-40KB.
(Conceptually, if not physically, the evidence is in arch lever files, with each page individually referenced. Thus BBC/2/110 would be page 110 of File 2 of material supplied by the BBC. Indexing is by page, not by document. A long letter, therefore, will have as many reference numbers as pages.)
Abbreviations: AG-Andrew Gilligan; DK-David Kelly; RS Richard Sambrook (head of BBC news); AC-Alastair Campbell; LH-Lord Hutton OR Inquiry counsel asking the question.
August 12 (Transcript Part 1)
1 Has the June 30 DK letter confessing his meetings with AG (see top of here) (and other material) been tested for authorship analysis?
Use of Cusums and the like.
2 AG memo to RS:
We spoke on the phone whenever Iraq was in the News- Newsvery odd capitalised.
3 Hutton p15is keen to know how folk got DK's phone numbers, whether they called him on land line or mobile, etc, eg
23 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you something, Mr Gilligan?
24 Where did you contact Dr Kelly? Did you telephone him?
25 A. Yes.
1 LORD HUTTON: To where?
2 A. I am not sure. I think I would have probably used his
3 home number, probably his mobile.
4 LORD HUTTON: That is his home number in Oxfordshire?
5 A. Yes.
6 LORD HUTTON: So you had both his home number in Oxfordshire
7 and his mobile?
8 A. Yes, I did.
4 Refreshment for May 22 meeting (p17): one soft drink for 90 minutes of hard talking meeting - seems stingy (probably 330ml servings?)
6 Q. That shows a bottle of coke and a bottle of Appletise.
7 That shows the time on that. Can you help me with the
8 time on that?
9 A. That says 4.15, 16.15. That is the time I went to the
10 bar to buy the drinks.
Who drank which? Why not coffee (grownup drink)? Or water - why didn't they get some mineral water? AG has an Amnesty International do on according to his diary:
Amnesty media awards……6.30 for 7.30 BAFTA (?)
Did dinner come with that? Gilligan won an award!
Sale of illegal landmines, Andrew Gilligan for Today, BBC Radio 4
Why wasn't the fact mentioned?
5 Notetaking (18-3)
How can he possibly manage without taking any notes at all (as opposed to a verbatim transcript)?
3 Q. Did you make notes throughout the meeting?
4 A. No. It was like our other meetings, in that it was
5 intended as a general discussion of issues around Iraq.
6 I started out without taking notes actually and then
7 I asked to take notes when he got on to interesting
6 AG relationship with DK (p18-19)
Something not quite kosher there. (May be in the strange way AG expresses himself.)
Eg, conflict on May 22 meeting: DK saying to pick AG's brains, AG saying DK was being polite 18-25
7 [Made sense at the time!]
8 AG's Bin Laden leak 13-22 - AG saw a secret document on the Iraq-Al Qaeda link that sparked a leak inquiry in which DK was a suspect
Not really followed up by LH with AG?
9 DK-AG conflicts on when they met
Why should, eg, DK make up a meeting in 2-02? 14-17
10 Notes of earlier meeting (not May 22 - but which?) (19-2)
Was this on A4 pad or reporter's notebook. (If latter, writing incredibly small) - judging from size of holes on LHS, must have been A4.
BUT - AG says 19-12;
12 Q. Into a notebook?
13 A. Yes.
11 Notes of May 22 meeting (physical) )19-19)
Why does printout from personal organiser have kelly.txt and kelly_cont.txt at top of page? Did AG write these? Why include the file extensions?
Strange pattern of abbreviations (or shorthand, as they call it): eg, he abbreviates programme to prog in line 14 (starting it was small…) but uses in full two lines down.
No abbreviation for Iraqi(s) etc.
Could be artefact of situation that AG could not touch-type, was working on a fiddly machine and trying to concentrate on what DK was saying, no secretarial matters. Even so…
He writes all in lower case: there's a particular psychology behind this: I don't think it's just a question of speed: in fact, you would have to override the reflex to go for the shift key.
(For instance, there is a great deal of lower-case-only on fan message boards by people who, their prose suggests, know perfectly well how to punctuate. Using LCO makes it more informal, more like IRC, more spontaneous.)
Reason: on personal organisers, UC requires special key sequences! One mystery solved...
What does isq ba mean 24-1?
12 What does There is a bit more in there. 26-3 refer to?
13 The only documentary evidence of the famous introduction of AC into the discussion is the word Campbell in AG's Palm Pilot notes. The first retailing of the story to the FASC goes:
Q457 Mr Olner: Who from Number Ten asked for the dossier to be changed?
Mr Gilligan: I asked this. The source's claim was that the dossier had been transformed in the week before it was published and I asked, "So how did this transformation happen?", and the answer was a single word, which was "Campbell". I asked, "What do you mean, Campbell made it up?", and he answered, "No. It was real information" - this is the 45 minute claim - "but it was included in the dossier against our wishes because it was not reliable. It was a single source and it was not reliable."
No indication in the FASC evidence that this is not a verbatim account of the conversation.
To LH 27-2, he says
2 A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation
This is the very crux of the story: yet AG hadn't, before his first FASC interview, settled on a single way of expressing it - to be consistent.
14 At 27-13 Hutton gets AG to confirm that AG first mentioned the idea of sexier - and then 27-19 to contrast that it was DK who first mentioned AC.
15 The Master Prospects Log
At 28-8, this is referred to:
8 Q. Can we then turn to look at what you first produced for
9 your Today broadcast. This is BBC/4/202. I hope now
10 that BBC/4/202 should be on-line. This is a log. It
12 "Gilligan has a very good story. He has not stood
13 up yet. I will explain in the meeting."
14 That is ET and we are told somebody obviously has
15 made an annotation. Who is ET?
16 A. That is probably Eloise Twisk. She is one of the people
17 on the programme.
There is a single online reference (apart from the Hutton transcript) (Google search on "eloise twisk" bbc) to Eloise Twisk: from Oct 01 as Assistant Editor of BBC Radio One News .
Why doesn't LH ask for an explanation of the role of Suzanne Mooney? At the bottom of the entry, it says:
Suzanne Mooney 28/05/03 1756
which looks like the author, time and date of the entry. [Later documents suggests it may be the person who printed out the hard copy, and the date and time on which that was done, not referring to the origination of the document at all.]
In fact, there are a dozen items returned on Google for "suzanne mooney bbc"- mostly, it seems, dealing with her as a science producer on the Today programme.
Just a loose end, I'm sure.
More puzzling is the line just above:
from Today Master Prospects for Sat May 24 28/05/03
Why would a document be made on May 28 to discuss stories for possible inclusion in a programme that already went out four days earlier?
16 When did AG tell his bosses about the DK story?
Commenting on The Master Prospects Log 29-4:
If it is from 24th May, I did
5 not tell anyone on the programme about this story
6 until -- at least I told one of the editors I met in an
7 awards ceremony it was not a formal conversation. I did
8 not tell anyone in the office about it until the
9 Wednesday. So I think this must be another story,
10 I think.
The awards ceremony must be the Amnesty awards ceremony on May 22 (the evening of the meeting with DK).
If he did, that would have been in time for the log to have been created on May 24 (though internal evidence suggests it to be more likely created on May 28).
Why doesn't he name the editor he spoke to at the awards? His memory is good enough to identify whoever it was as one of the editors, it seems.
Why distinguish the editors from anyone in the office? Isn't a not a formal conversation just the sort of thing that might give rise to a very short note as in the log?
17 AG's efforts to corroborate DK's story
The two senior contacts 30-9: his story:
16 A. I said I had been told that the dossier had been
17 transformed the week before it was published and that
18 this was done at the behest of Alastair Campbell.
No mention of the 45 minute claim?
He's told 30-25
25 I think you should keep digging, something like that.
Strangely, he's not asked about the way that was said, the context. Without anything as theatrical as a wink, it could have been meant as a patent hint that the speaker knew or suspected there was something to find. Or it could have been a throwaway comment; or it could have been facetious (ie, that AG didn't stand a hope of finding the truth on the point). There must be additional possible readings of the line.
When it comes to textual analysis, he's right about the difference between the recent intelligence in para 5 of the Dossier and the conclusion drawn. But, in fact, the discrepancy is apparent from para 5 itself: it mentions
intelligence [that] has become available
and says it
confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.
But the items of recent intelligence listed, as AG points out, do no such thing. He takes 700 words going through several later paragraphs of the dossier to make the same point.
His point 36-6 that his search on the BBC equivalent of Lexis showed almost no references to the 45 minute claim in the period since the launch of the dossier, suggestive of HMG lack of confidence, has, no doubt, been tested.
18 Charges v challenges
There is a strange passage at 43-7:
7 LORD HUTTON: You said that it made Dr Kelly's challenges
8 more credible.
9 A. Charges.
10 LORD HUTTON: Challenges?
11 A. Charges.
12 LORD HUTTON: Did you regard him in his conversation with
13 you on 22nd May as challenging the Government's claims?
14 A. With respect my Lord I said charges rather than
15 challenges. I do not think he set out to sort of take
16 on the Government in that sense. I just think he was
17 expressing his professional opinion of the dossier and
18 saying what he said.
19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes.
I don't see how charges - which is an analogy from criminal law - is somehow weaker than challenges.
19 Language not like JIC reports
AG says he's seen one 45-4 - and the JIC language is more cautious.
20 The missing manuscript version of May 22 meeting
At 49-12, AG says the second note of the meeting he produced has been mislaid. There is a feeling of The dog ate my homework about this, given the importance of the meeting (consider how important AG thought it was at the time) - but these things happen…
21 The What my man said note
The note 49-21 sent with quotes for use in the May 29 piece to assistant editor Miranda Holt. Nothing novel, but cleaned up from Palm Pilot notes.
Notably in Courier, not the ghastly sans font the BBC material on the Hutton site is usually in. Yet AG says
22 A. This is an EMPS message. EMPS is our internal computer
23 message system at the BBC
Moreover, the first quote has DK volunteering the sexier idea (ie, that the dossier had been transformed to make it sexier). Whereas we've established 27-13 that it was AG who first used the word. (Hutton quizzed AG on the point.) This, I suppose, is part of the journalistic convention that it is legitimate to put quote marks around gist statements.
22 Language lapse
Talking about the phone calls made to Miranda Holt on the DK story 54-10, he says parenthetically
I did not tell her his name, I told her his
He can't mean that literally, presumably. He must be talking about the agreed formula he used 71-4 that DK was
one of the senior
5 officials in charge of drawing up that dossier
23 AG briefing of MoD press office
At 55-1 is introduced the question of what (if anything) AG said to the MoD on May 28 in relation to minister Adam Ingram's appearance on the May 29 programme.
Interestingly, the first answer he gives to the first challenge on the point 55-22 smacks of his evasive FASC performances:
22 Q. So who was the person who had contacted someone to talk
23 from the Government side about this story?
24 A. Well, the contact with -- deciding how the programme
25 should get a Government response is the responsibility
1 of the office team.
He says 56-6
I spoke to Kate Wilson, who is the chief press
7 office at the MoD, on my mobile phone about 7.30 and
8 I told her.
9 Q. And what did you tell her?
10 A. I cannot remember exactly what I told her because it was
11 a mobile phone and I did not take notes of my
I suspect an element of hyperbole when he goes on to claim 56-19 that
it was one of dozens and dozens of calls I made
20 that day to MoD press officers.
But he goes on
I know I took her
21 through the outline of the story.
Part of the escalation of the BBC-HMG dispute on the MOD's part (later evidence) was because they said AG was lying on this point.
Later, 62-10, AG talks about what he said: it seems he referred in so many words to the two most striking allegations, the 45 minute and the sexing up claims. He said he put the gist.
24 Holbrook June 29 letter
Notable 60-11 on two grounds: that - from the Director of BBC News - it misspells the name of John Humphries, one of BBC's Radio 4 best-known and longest-serving news presenters!
And that it claims that AG rang the MoD on May 28 mainly to talk about a cluster bombs story that wasn't his! Unchallenged (yet!) evidence of AG was that one journo would brief this way on a colleague's story. If true, you'd have thought Holbrook would have known it.
25 AG's May 29 call to MOD
This 60-20 is truly odd: Defence Secretary Hoon alleges in a letter to Sambrook that, at 0850 on May 29, AG called the MOD Press Office.
Mr Gilligan said he was calling to
24 'note that he had spoken to the Chief Press Officer
25 before the programme was broadcast and that was what he
1 had said'. He then rang off without offering any
For some reason, it puts me in mind of National Coal Board Chairman Ian Macgregor during the 1984-5 miners' strike turning up to a meeting with the unions with a bag over his head.
26 Live and unscripted
Another strange phrase from AG in this exchange 69-21, on AG's first May 29 broadcast, at 0607:
This is me speaking live and
23 LORD HUTTON: You are speaking?
24 A. Speaking live and unscripted.
25 MR DINGEMANS: Live and unscripted.
1 A. Yes.
There's some in the phrase that screams bumptious teenager. And when examining counsel repeats the phrase like that, I'm pretty sure he showing he's not impressed!
27 What is, and what isn't a quote
There'll be a separate analysis of the language of both of AG's May Today broadcasts; but, in relation to his use in the 0607 broadcast of the word wrong - that HMG knew the 45 minute claim was wrong when it put it in the dossier, he makes a strange distinction 71-14:
This is not intended
15 to be a direct quote from David Kelly. I make it clear
16 that on one occasion when I do quote him directly in
17 this piece, I make it clear by bracketing him with the
18 words something like -- where are we? Where is it?
19 Yes, here we are: "because to quote the source, he said"
20 and then at the end I say, "that is a quote from our
A bizarre game of Simon Says for those up at that ungodly hour!
28 AG's admission he was 'Not perfect' on wrong
The 0607 was the only broadcast in which he said HMG knew the 45 minute claim was wrong - the rest, he toned it down. On the 0607 wording, he says (p72)
But I have to say that with the benefit
25 of hindsight, looking at it now with a fine toothcomb,
1 I think it was not wrong, what I said, but it was not
2 perfect either, and in hindsight I should have scripted
3 that too.
For a journo, and adjusting for the infelicities of language - should one trust a hack that looks with a toothcomb? - that ranks with the best begrudging expression of regret of Sir Humphrey Appleby himself. (Not quite in the Fonz class, perhaps.)
There was no apology, as such 73-15.
Interestingly, he left it to counsel to point out that, at the end of the 0607, he did make a problematic distinction between deception and mistake 74-3. He does sound grateful for having been reminded of this helpful passage.
(LH 74:14 points out that the press coverage of his May 29 broadcasts was his 0607 allegation of bad faith. AG replies
18 A. Yes, but that was not an allegation I would necessarily
From memory, someone in the FASC accused AG of ducking and diving when it came to stating his position on these matters….
29 A close reading…not meant to be read
A classic AG line 75:13:
On a close reading of this, I do not
14 think it quite supports that interpretation but
15 obviously these words are not meant to be read, they are
16 meant to be heard.
30 The 0607 singleton and AC's selective quoting
AG takes the line 75-17 that he should be judged on the overall effect of his output on the DK stuff. He only said wrong once.
He goes on 76-12 to say that
12 The Government has used on occasions in the past
13 a particular technique where it quotes selectively from
14 a particular detail of a report that it believes is the
15 weakest detail and then uses it to discredit the whole
He suggests that that's what HMG is doing with his umpteen reports on the DK stuff.
Which implies that one should take all the day's output into account. Whereas, of course, the not perfect report - the 0607 one - was his first to be broadcast. (And had travelled more than half way round the word before the first of his toned-down pieces went out - at 0732.)
31 Kevin Marsh flawed reporting email
Marsh perhaps the worst affected with (what may prove) the terminal BBC disease cacoëthes scribendi of the email.
In this case 77-3, one can't - on the evidence - dispute his general thrust: AG is a loose cannon. The implied criticism of his predecessor as Today boss, Rod Liddle, may be noted for future reference - Marsh must be on Hutton's list for Week 3, surely?
[Marsh's 30 May email to AG 78-17 -is sophomoric verging on gushing. I suspect that AG is not to only BBC ordnance in want of strong rope!]
32 BBC Governors' arse-covering
The Minutes of their June 6 meeting include 80-9:
careful language had
10 not been applied by Andrew Gilligan throughout".
Elsewhere, from memory, that's presented as the view of one guy (the 0607 broadcast amongst the Governors, as it were). I'm not sure whether these minutes are made public as a matter of course. When the BBC brass appear, time enough to get into the politics.
32A DK's FASC evidence
DK's version differs 81-5 on various important points (who raised 45 minutes, role of AC, DK's view of the dossier)
August 12 (Transcript Part 2)
33 DK's public line diverged on inessentials, too; he suggests in an MOD interview 90-25 that, at the May 22 interview, AG took notes with notebook and pencil - and not his Palm Pilot, as AG said.
All this mildly corroborative - or not - detail is really empty calories, I suspect. Essentially - there's a great deal of the stuff - FASC and ISC evidence, MOD interviews, etc - put to AG in the Inquiry. But really, it's a he said, she said.
[The question of corroboration from elsewhere - Susan Watts, for instance - we'll come onto.]
There is the first derivative question: how far the various actors resolved the emerging conflict of evidence at a give time whilst the affair was in progress. And why, in notable cases (the FASC, for instance), they resolved it more or less in favour of DK.
33A DK misled the FASC and ISC
After reciting all that testimony to the committees, counsel puts it to AG that DK denies AG's version of their meetings 113-6.
AG replies with a version of Mandy Rice-Davies' He would, wouldn't he? -
10 was an employee of the Ministry of Defence, he had to
11 keep faith with them;
34 How voluntary was DK's June 30 confessional letter?
Counsel raises the point 113-19:
it seems extraordinary to have volunteered the
21 A. Yes, I mean I still do not know the exact circumstances
22 under which Dr Kelly came forward;
35 AG's lack of contact with DK post May 29
He seems to have tried but not too hard
116-19. His excuse is essentially not wishing to compromise DK. In which case, why did he even try twice?
[In fact, there was a leak inquiry ongoing in which DK was a suspect - as discussed with the MOD people later in the week.]
(The point is not the morality of it - Daily Mail finger-wagging at BBC rats deserting the guy for whose peril they were responsible. It's just another factor going to AG's credibility.)
36 AG's second FASC appearance
There's a teenage shrug at the start of discussions 119-5:
I understand that both the Foreign Affairs Committee
5 and you, as the person who contributed, are happy that
6 it should be published by this Inquiry?
7 A. Yes. I mean it is up to the Inquiry what it does with
8 the evidence.
Reads to me a whole lot like "Whatever!"
This is the extremely fraught session. AG blames this for a couple of errors:
First 120-2 his statement on the alleged transformation of the dossier by AC:
That is the claim we have always
3 made and that is the claim that the source has always
4 made and that is the claim that the source continues to
The part in bold, he admits was wrong.
Second, a statement on whether the source claimed that AC inserted the 45 minute claim 150-13:
I did not quote the source as saying Campbell
14 inserted the 45 minute claim in the dossier. The
15 source's only mention of Campbell was in the context of
16 the transformation in the broader process of the
(The line AG was actually taking was that the 45 minute claim was an example of the transformation - it was the classic 20-23. It was a whole big thing - MPs burst their blood vessels all over a cross-purpose conversation.)
37 Mail on Sunday article
This article 122-3named AC in connection with the dossier - none of AG's BBC pieces did. This time, it was personal, as it were.
The question of BBC approval gets discussed. There is a Kevin Marsh email suggesting he would never have agreed if he'd have known AC would have been named.
AG's reason for going further than the BBC pieces 123-19:
I had had a difficult relationship with Mr Campbell
20 during the Iraq war. He complained about my coverage
21 several times; and I thought he had a particular issue
22 about some of my reporting. I did not want to be the
23 first to name him in this context…
38 HMG-BBC war
From 124-10, a slew of complaints from AC about AG's work.
Nothing surprising here: we've always known AC believed in a constant (creeping?) artillery barrage of complaints as a way of giving his guys cover to cross No Man's Land and slit throats - that's an analogy, in case he's reading…. That was his job.
All that's new - and there's a definite frisson - is seeing the stuff on Downing Street letterheadings.
Interestingly, after several pages of this, he asks AG 133-21 why the BBC could not specifically have apologised for 'the wrong point' (my para 27 above). AG ducked and dove - and Hutton was not best pleased:
23 A. I think that is probably something that you would have
24 to ask Richard Sambrook.
25 Q. In which case --
1 A. But I mean, I think that probably is a question for him.
2 LORD HUTTON: What was your attitude? What would have been
3 your attitude? Were you aware of this letter that was
4 sent to Mr Sambrook?
5 A. Yes, I was aware of it.
6 LORD HUTTON: Did you have a view on it? It may have been
7 for Mr Sambrook to reply to it, but did you have a view
8 on that particular question? "Does it still stand by
9 the allegation made ..."
10 A. My views, as a rather lowly member of the BBC hierarchy,
11 are not really of much account, to be honest, when
12 answering this kind of letter. This is a very high
13 level letter.
14 LORD HUTTON: But you had made the allegation, it was you
15 who had said this on the programme.
16 A. As I said this morning, the wording in that first
17 two-way was not a fair reflection of how the whole story
18 was covered either by me or by the BBC…
39 Was DK shopped to The Times?
An article on July 5 or 6 gave details of AG's source which suggested that someone who knew the source had leaked those details 135-2.
AG denies contact with the Times.
40 DK's status as source
Part of the debate has been about how senior DK was in HMG. AG described him in the 0607 piece (para 27) as 136-7
one of the senior
8 officials in charge of drawing up that dossier
AG says this was one of the descriptions DK offered to him as being fine.
41 How big did AG think the story was?
AG said not big, not the lead 136-18:
6 intended as a contribution to the debate.
The follow-up: did DK realise how big it would be?
19 sometimes in a specialist field you sometimes get that,
20 you know, you cannot see the wood for the trees.
42 Governors: AG's lack of notes
The July 6 minutes 138-17 quote Stephen Whittle (Controller of Editorial Policy, no less) on the dispute about the AG-MOD phone call (para 23 above):
"... said the BBC's weakness in this area was the lack
18 of solid and reliable notes about what was said to the
19 MoD about the allegations made by Andrew Gilligan's
He seems, from the evidence in so far, to have a valid point across the piece - and not just on the MOD issue.
43 Rubbish from CENTCOM
One AC complaint that Sambrook upheld was this from AG from Iraq 127-11:
12 might just be more rubbish from Central Command
Rubbish, he agreed, was a bit strong. (Objectively, I suspect, one of AG's more accurate efforts, though!)
44 AG's first FASC session - more cross-purposes conversations
Sir John Stanley, who got apoplectic in AG's second session, was almost as agitated in the first 142-2.
On the 45 minute question, they'd asked Jack Straw whether the claim was
exactly the same as it was
5 in the intelligence assessments applied to the
Straw replied (p143) that
The same report [the Iraqi source's 45 minute claim] was
10 reflected in almost identical terms in the JIC's
11 classified work.
Stanley enquired of AG whether, given this assurance,
14 saying that the Foreign Secretary is lying to this
AG could appreciate the work of a fellow ducker-and-diver: he replied
I note the words 'almost identical' in the Foreign
21 Secretary's response.
The Foreign Secretary's assurance was not on point (p144):
We never mentioned the JIC. And he
12 made it clear that it was real intelligence.
AG knew it; and I very much suspect Straw knew it, too. Sir Humphrey would be proud of them both.
Counsel wearily asks
13 Q. So would it have been too much to have made that clear
14 to the Foreign Affairs Committee?
AG tamely says
…sometimes you do
19 not always come up with all the points you think you
20 could have made at the time…
But then later 145-25 spots something his Learned Friend missed.
I notice at the answer
1 to question 452 I do make that point:
2 "As I have said, the JIC did not enter into my
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